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Abstract 
This research argues that cooperatives have become uncategorizable in terms of their identity, 
especially when one attempts to distinguish them from investor-owned firms and hence it is 
further  argued that they should have specified objectives that match with their historical not-for-
profit objectives so that they can easily distinguishable. The cooperatives have become 
uncategorizable mainly due to the gradual adaptation of the idea of investor owned firms into 
cooperatives and the possibility of organizing business enterprises in the form of cooperatives. 
The problems are further exacerbated in Ethiopia due to (1) the existence of state incentives to 
cooperatives,(2) the legislative failure to properly define cooperatives,(3) the policy failure to 
properly define cooperatives objectives (4) the absence of state regulation of cooperatives or 
self- regulation by the cooperatives themselves. Cooperatives could easily be categorized if they 
have specified objectives that match with their historical not-for-profit objectives. Historically, 
they were intended to solve problems left unsolved by market forces or state intervention or even 
the charities. Currently, it is the issue of trust that remains unsolved by these alternatives. 
Although trust is a foundation of any society, it is an attribute which is in decline due to 
changing nature of community. Consumer cooperatives are viable alternatives of reviving trust 
by rebuilding traditional communities in a contemporary world. 
This argument is advanced by reviewing academic writings and critically analyzing the 
Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 in comparison to the Commercial Code of 
Ethiopia. This is further followed by critical examination of policy documents of the Federal 
Government of Ethiopia concerning cooperatives. The actual motives and practical regulation of 
Ethiopian Cooperatives are evaluated on the basis of interviews. Academic literature is used to 
review the importance of trust and the role of the cooperative in safeguarding and rebuilding it. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Existing literature on cooperatives may generally be classified into three categories: the first 
categories are those which analyze the experience of cooperative movement. For the purposes of 
this part this approach is termed the ‘institutional approach.’ The center of discussion is the 
cumulative benefit that the cooperatives would give to their members. This approach follows 
mainly the utilitarian theory of justice. The second approach is those which examine the 
economic efficiency of the cooperative as a form of enterprise. The central concern with the 
literature here is the benefit individual members obtain by becoming a member of a cooperative. 
The theory of rational, economic egoism is the underpinning assumption of the literature here. 
For the purposes of this part this approach is termed the ‘efficiency approach’. The third 
approach is those which analyze the role of the cooperative from a sociological perspective. Here 
the central concern is not the collective benefits to members or the individual benefit, but instead 
the benefit that society can obtain from a company in a cooperative form. For the purposes of 
this paper this approach is termed the ‘societal approach. ’The first two approaches concern 
economic issues and the third approach goes beyond economic concerns and looks towards 
societal issues. 
Most of the literatures on cooperatives are descriptive of the experiences of cooperatives from a 
historical vantage point and is most relevant to the institutional approach. The literature displays 
a tendency to see cooperatives as instruments of economic reform that would bring social justice. 
Their central objective is to energize the new cooperative movement by learning from the legacy 
and challenges of past cooperative movements. 
In Sidney and Beatrice Webb’s book of 1921 on the British consumer cooperative movement, it 
describes the consumer cooperatives movement with very little attention to the theoretical 
foundations of the cooperative movement.
1
 They appeared to believe that cooperatives would 
end economic inequality. Similarly, Arnold Bonner’s book of 1961 describes the history of the 
British Cooperative Movement from 1820s to 1950s.
2
 The book is descriptive of the cooperative 
movement emphasizing the different phases entered into by past movements looking specifically 
                                                             
1  Sidney Webb, The Consumer Cooperative Movement[1921] (Cornell University Library, 2009) 
2 Arnold Bonner, British Cooperation: the History, Principles, and Organization of the British Cooperative 
Movement (Co-operative Union Ltd, 1961) 
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at the successes and challenges. The book tends to see cooperatives as the best alternatives to the 
market economy.  
Another book written by Aloysius Balaweyder in 1980 also followed a similar tradition by 
describing the cooperative movement in Eastern Europe.
3
Four years later, a book entitled 
Workers’ Cooperatives in America was published by putting together eleven articles.4 However, 
although the titles of some of the articles appear to involve an economic and legal analysis of 
cooperatives, the overall tendency was to document the experience of the worker cooperative 
movements. In 1988, Hans Hedlund edited a book entitled Cooperative Revisited.
5
 This book, 
like to its predecessors describes the problems and progress of the cooperative movement. It 
differs from its predecessor only by the fact that its description was on cooperative movements in 
Africa.  
In another book published in 1991 on the French consumer cooperatives by Ellen Furlough 
(editor), there is an analysis of the consumer cooperative movements from the 1830s through to 
the 1920s.
6
 The book indicates that consumer cooperatives in France were politically galvanized 
by the working class movement. Ellen Furlough, in collaboration with Carl Strikwerda, also 
edited another book with a similar theme eight years later.
7
 The book describes the historical 
struggle that consumer cooperatives made against the market economy in Europe, North 
America and Japan from the industrial revolution to the end of Cold War. 
This tradition of writing continued into the new millennium. A book edited by Christopher D. 
Merrett in collaboration with Norman Walzer and published in 2004 describes cooperatives from 
a historical point of view.
8
 The book is concerned with issues of how cooperatives have 
responded and should respond to the increasing market economy and intense global economic 
pressure. However, the book also shows some inclination towards theorizing cooperatives on the 
basis of the existing domestic and global factors; it attempts to determine the place of 
                                                             
3 Aloysius Balawyde, Cooperative Movement in Eastern Europe (1st edition, New York: Macmillan, 1980) 
4 Robert Jackall and Henry Levin (eds), Worker Cooperative in America (University of California Press, 1984) 
5 Hans Hedlund (ed), Cooperatives Revisited (Nordic African Institute, 1988) 223 
6 Ellen Furlough (ed),  Consumer Cooperation in France; The Politics of Consumption: 1834-1930 (The American 
Historical Review, 1992) 
7 Ellen Furlough, and Carl Strikwerda, Consumer against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in Europe, North 
America and Japan (Rowman& Littlefield Publishers, 1999)  
8 Christopher Merrett, and Norman Walzer, Cooperatives and Local Development: Theory and Applications for the 
21st Century (M.E. Sharpe, 2004) 
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cooperatives in a market and globalized economy. In his book of 2005, Richard C. William’s 
argument for economic efficiency and social justice in the organization of cooperatives is based 
on a historical and practical review of the cooperative movements in different parts of the world. 
His analysis of cooperatives in comparison with more competitive, and economic self-seeking 
companies forms part of his argument that Cooperatives should also be seen as part of political 
economic theory. This is the first recorded mention of cooperatives in this form with the only 
previous mention by Robert Owen and the British Labour Economists of the 19th Century who 
had argued for cooperatives as an alternative to market economy driven companies.
9
In a similar 
vein, a book edited by Lawrence Black and Nicole Robertson published in 2009, is the result of 
historical research although there are  other articles which have seen cooperatives historically 
from different ideological perspectives.
10
 
The economic efficiency approach also attempts to evaluate cooperatives in an economic 
perspective. Property rights, agency and game theory are major themes of the literature in this 
area.In this respect, Richard J. Sexton’s article entitled “The Formation of Cooperatives: A 
Game-Theoretic Approach with Implications for Cooperative Finance, Decision Making, and 
Stability” and published in 1986 has been an influential publication.11In contrast with the 
institutional approach, it examines the incentives of individuals to form cooperatives. It applies 
game theory to justify producer cooperatives. The author also published a similar article a year 
later in collaboration with Richard and Terri Sexton.
12
This article argues that game theory also 
applies to consumer cooperatives. A book entitled Cooperatives in Agriculture edited by David 
W. Cobia and published in 1989 also contains topics on cooperative economic and marketing 
theories.
13
 These topics review the economic justifications of the cooperative as a form of 
economic organization, and development of cooperative game theory. The other topics the book 
                                                             
9 Bonner (n 3) 10, and Peter Davis and Martin Parker, ‘Cooperatives, Labor, and the State: The English Labor 
Economists Revisited’(2011) Review of Radical Political Economics 
<http://rrp.sagepub.com/content/39/4/523.full.pdf+html> accessed on 30 January 2015, 522. 
10 Lawrence Black and Nicole Robertson (ed), Consumerism and the Cooperative Movement in Modern British 
History-Taking Stock (Manchester University Press, 2009) 
11 Richard Sexton, ‘The Formation of Cooperatives: A Game-Theoretic Approach with Implications for Cooperative 
Finance, Decision Making, and Stability’ (1986) 68(2) American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
<http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/content/68/2/214.full.pdf+html> accessed 30 January 2015, 214-225 
12 Richard Sexton and Terri Sexton,  ‘Cooperatives as Entrants’ (1987) 18(4) RAND Journal of Economics 
<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2555643?sid=21105155657961&uid=2&uid=3739256&uid=4> accessed 30 
January 2015, 581-595 
13 David Cobia (ed), Cooperatives in Agriculture (Prentice-Hall, 1989) 
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considers include the cooperatives as an alternative form of economic organization. A book 
edited by Christopher D. Merrett in collaboration with Norman Walzer and published in 2004 
also contains topics that discuss cooperatives in relation to game theory.
14
 
Some of the literatures analyze the role of cooperatives in community building. In 1963, William 
P. Lebra and Thomas W. Maretzki described and analyzed the role cooperatives played in 
building peasant communities in East Asia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
15
Leslie H. Brown’s 
article of 1997 considers cooperatives as a ‘new’ form of organization for community economic 
development.
16
In an online publication of 2011,Wilson Majee and Ann Hoy also argued that 
cooperatives are indispensable in building local community necessary to fight poverty.
17
Dave 
Nicholson in his online publication of 2011 also argued that cooperatives would even be able to 
reduce crime.
18
 Stephen Yeo’s argument in his article published in 2009, shows that cooperatives 
are the contemporary substitute of professional associations that were anticipated by Emile 
Durkheim as a source of modern social solidarity.
19
There are very few papers in the literature 
that attempt to see cooperatives from a theory of justice perspective.
20
 
 
However, there are a few papers in the literature that analyze cooperatives from a theoretical 
point of view; theorizing that cooperatives are less abundant especially from the perspective of 
political economic theory. More importantly, some of the literature gives very less attention to 
the distinction of cooperatives from similar organizations; especially the distinction from 
investor owned firms. The only work this research has found in this regard is the article by Mark 
                                                             
14Merrett (n 9) 
15 William Lebra and Thomas Maretzki, ‘The Community Cooperative in Northern Okinawa’ (1963) 11(3) 
Economic Development and Cultural Change  
<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1152346?sid=21105155657961&uid=2&uid=3739256&uid=4> accessed 30 
January 2015, 225-238 
16 Leslie Brown, ‘Organizations for the 21st Century? Co-operatives and ‘New’ Forms of Organization’ (1997) 
22(1) The Canadian Journal of Sociology 
<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3341564?sid=21105155657961&uid=2&uid=3739256&uid=4> accessed 30 
January 2015, 65-93  
17 Wilson Majee and Ann Hoyt, 'Cooperatives and Community Development: A Perspective on the Use of 
Cooperatives in Development' (2011) 19(1) Journal of Community Practice 
<http://devstudies.wisc.edu/docs/Majee%20and%20Hoyt.pdf> accessed 30 January 2015, 48-61.    
18 Dave Nicholson, 'Co-operating out of crime?' (2010) 81(1) Criminal Justice Matters 
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09627251.2010.505385> accessed 30 January 2015, 16-17 
19 Black (n 12) 
20 Stuart Henry, ‘Community Justice, Capitalist Society, and Human Agency: The Dialectics of Collective Law’ 
(1985) 19(2) Cooperative  Law & Society Review, 303-327 
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J. Hanson.
21
In his analysis of cooperative legal structure in America, he showed the distinction 
between traditional cooperatives and profit-motivated cooperatives. Researchers who have 
looked at the role of cooperatives in building community, especially for non-economic purposes, 
is scarce.  
 
The cooperative literatures from Ethiopia focus on the institutional approach and are descriptive 
of practical functioning of producer cooperatives.  What is peculiar about those papers is that 
they appear to advocate increasing state support for cooperatives. They also advocate greater 
autonomy for cooperatives without giving adequate consideration to the dependency and 
wasteful rent-seeking nature cooperatives here are known for. They unduly place too much 
responsibility on the Government to support the functional needs of the cooperatives. Producer 
cooperatives, as discussed in the above papers, heavily utilize marketing which is considered a 
key target of producer cooperatives. For example, the article written by Yuka Kodama published 
in 2007, analyses the financial constraints that coffee farming cooperatives have been 
facing.
22
.Woldegebrial Zeweld Nugussie’s article of 2010 limits itself to identifying information 
factors that induce rural people to join agricultural cooperatives.
23Kindie’s article written in 
collaboration with Tsegaye and published in 2012, is about the positive influence of cooperatives 
on the livelihood of its members.
24
There is a lack of publications surrounding the efficiency 
approach to cooperative building, especially regarding the role of cooperatives in community 
building, the place of cooperatives in political economic theory, the legal framework, and the 
distinction between true cooperatives and investor-owned cooperatives. 
 
This research attempts to fill the gap by trying to conceptualize cooperatives from a theoretical 
perspective by looking at them from the perspective of political economic theory, especially by 
                                                             
21Merrett (n 9) 95-122 
22 Yuka Kodama, ‘New Role of  Cooperatives In Ethiopia: The Case Of Ethiopian Coffee Farmers Cooperatives’ 
(2007) African Study Monographs <http://repository.kulib.kyoto-
u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/68489/1/ASM_S_35_87.pdf?origin=publication_detail> accessed 30 January 2015, 
87-108  
23Woldegebrial Zeweld Nugussie, ‘Why some rural people become members of agricultural cooperatives while 
others do not’(2010)2(4) Journal of Development and Agricultural Economics, 138-144 
24Getnet Kindie and Tsegaye Anullo, ‘Agricultural Cooperatives And Rural Livelihoods: Evidence From 
Ethiopia’(2012) 83(2) Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 
<http://www.fearp.usp.br/cooperativismo/_up_arquivo/8740ddf6d01.pdf> accessed 30 January 2015, 181–198 
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comparing them with investor-owned firms and attempting to anchor them into building the trust 
necessary to support the rule of law.
25
 
 
 Since this research intends to anchor the cooperative into building trust through social solidarity, 
a short review of literature on trust is necessary. I have chosen to assess five authorities in this 
area; Emile Durkheim, Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman, Robert Putman, and Francis Fukuyama 
as set out by John Field in Social Capital.
26
Durkheim argued that social solidarity maintains 
social stability and reduces individual anxiety, and he proposed professional associations as an 
instrument to build social solidarity. Pierre Bourdieu believed that social solidarity/relation is 
one source of inequality between individuals and advocates that economic equality can not be 
ensured by equal opportunity alone unless people are made to have similar social capital. James 
Coleman writes about the role of social solidarity for child education while Putman writes about 
the importance of trust in government administration and believes that trust is the result of 
solidarity. In contrast to this, Fukuyama argued that trust is indispensable in establishing 
economic efficiency.  
 
However, none of them give their attention to the role of trust in ensuring the rule of law. More 
importantly, with the exception of Emile Durkheim they have not indicated how to build social 
solidarity or trust within a society. Durkheim anticipated professional associations but since such 
associations have not materialized in Ethiopia, Yeo argues that cooperatives should be the 
contemporary substitute.
27
This research shares their ideas on the importance of social solidarity 
and trust, but adds that their importance goes beyond the issue of health, equality, education, 
economy and crime control and extends to the rule of law- and becomes the foundation of a 
human relationship. The research shares Putman’s idea that to build trust you must build social 
solidarity and the research joins Yeo in the argument that social solidarity could be built through 
community consumers cooperatives.  
 
                                                             
25 “By the phrase "the rule of law", I mean nothing more and nothing less than the state of affairs that obtains when a 
legal system exists and functions.” See Matthew H. Kramer  On the Moral Status of the Rule of Law The Cambridge 
Law Journal, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Mar., 2004), pp. 65-97 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4509076 
Accessed: 10/08/2011  
26 John Field, Social Capital (2nd edition, Routledge, 2008) 13-47, 61 
27 Black (n 12) 86-106 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cooperatives have become uncategorizable in terms of their identity, especially when one 
attempts to distinguish them from investor-owned firms. This has partly been due to the 
attainment of multiple not-for-profit objectives in contemporary cooperatives, and an expansion 
in the number of initiators of the cooperative movement. Moreover, the decline of not-for-profit 
objectives in cooperatives due to change in the role of the State, has forced cooperatives to place 
greater emphasis on profit as an objective. Entrepreneurs have also realized that businesses may 
be organized as cooperatives and with the existence of state incentives for cooperatives; this has 
also opened the floodgates for pseudo-cooperatives to emerge. The legislative and policy failure 
of Government to properly define cooperatives has exacerbated the problem in Ethiopia. 
To more clearly define their identity, cooperatives should have specified objectives that match its 
historical not-for-profit objectives. Historically, cooperatives were intended to solve problems 
left unsolved by other alternative forms of human associations. Currently, the issue of building 
trust within communities remains unsupported by natural market forces, the state or the work of 
charities. 
This research is divided into eleven chapters. Chapter one shows that cooperatives have been 
utilized to attain multiple objectives that have largely been initiated by their own members, the 
state and charities. This chapter also shows the decline of not-for-profit objectives in 
cooperatives due to changing role of the state. Chapter two looks to demonstrate the increasing 
trend of entrepreneurs to organize companies in the form of cooperatives.  
Chapter three to five look to demonstrate that the legislation in Ethiopia is insufficient to 
distinguish cooperatives from investor-owned firms. This is done by comparing cooperative law 
in Ethiopia with the Commercial Code of Ethiopia that governs investor-owned firms. Chapter 
three compares the definition, objectives, privileges, formation process and the liability of 
cooperatives with investor-owned firms. Charter four examines the principles of cooperatives. In 
Chapter five, ownership and management of cooperatives are examined to see if they can restrain 
pseudo-cooperatives. Chapter six to eight seek to show that in Ethiopia neither the policy nor 
practice distinguishes cooperatives from investor-owned firms; there is no cooperative policy 
 x 
 
and in practice, cooperatives are concerned with profit-maximization and there is no mechanism 
to restrain or redirect this motive towards not-for-profit objectives.  
Chapter nine proves that although trust, which is indispensible for the rule of law (which in turn 
is the foundation of human relationships), is declining, the state, the market and charities have 
not come to rescue it. Then chapter ten proposes that cooperatives should take the responsibility 
of rescuing trust.  
Finally, the conclusion and recommendation of this paper is that the ultimate objective of 
cooperatives should be limited to rebuilding traditional community in a way suitable to 
contemporary life.  
5 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT MOTIVES OF THE COOPERATIVE 
MOVEMENTS AND THEIR DECLINE 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter has two points to address. The first point is to review why the ultimate objectives of 
true cooperatives have been not-for-profit motives. The second point is to show how not-for-
profit motives have been declining due to a change in political ideology; partly due to the 
emergence of efficient investor-owned hypermarkets, consumer associations and management 
challenges. 
The chapter has two major topics; the first sub-topic is the not-for-profit motives of the 
cooperative movement. This topic has three subtopics: movement from below, movement from 
above and movement from side. The second topic is the decline of the not-for-profit motives of 
the cooperative movement. 
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1.1 Not-for-profit motives of cooperative movements 
The ultimate motives of ‘true’ cooperatives have been economic self-help, community building, 
cultural and economic transformation and charity. All of them are not-for-profit motives.  
 
A. Movement from below: self-help movements 
Self-help movements were concentrated in the West and mainly intended to solve economic 
challenges of members that came as a result of ill-effects of the market economy. These 
movements were strong in the second half of nineteenth century and the first half of twentieth 
century. However, there have also been cooperative movements intended to community build.  
 
Economic self-help movements 
Economic self-help movements have been dominant in North America, Britain and Continental 
Europe. The producer cooperatives of small hold producers are major features of cooperative 
movements in North America while the consumer cooperative movement has been the dominant 
movement in Britain and worker cooperatives have been dominant in Continental Europe. 
Producer Cooperatives of North America 
Cooperatives have been a fundamental part of North American economic activity, especially in 
agriculture in the form of small hold producer cooperatives.
1
 They emerged as part of a sweeping 
socio-economic transformation aimed at changing the lives of countless people in North America 
throughout the past two centuries.
2
However, the cooperatives neither caused the basic 
transformation of North American society in the nineteenth century, nor opposed such 
transformation, rather they aimed to guide the transformation and protect the people involved 
from the ill-effects of that transformation.
3
 Economic stress and change due to the industrial 
revolution was the driving factor.
4
 The nineteenth century North American farmers were exposed 
to market fluctuation, monopolistic abuse and technological change.
5
 The cooperatives were a 
                                                             
1David Cobia, Cooperatives in Agriculture (Prentice-Hall, 1989) 110 
2 Christopher Merrett and Norman Walzer (eds), Cooperatives and Local Development; Theory and Application for 
the 21st Century (ME Sharp, 2004) 23 
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
5 Ibid 30 
7 
 
response to these challenges.
6
Agricultural producers’ were using cooperatives as self-help 
business alternatives.
7
 There was also a political reason for the emergence of these self-help 
cooperatives.
8
 The farmers were using their cooperatives as a medium to oppose urban centered 
policies.
9
 “Political and cooperative actions were intertwined at every stage; farmers’ 
organizations, political parties and cooperatives developed in synergy with one another.”10 In 
fact, “prior to World War I, farmer cooperatives were enmeshed in a broad agrarian reform 
movement that included important political and cultural dimensions.”11 
The emergence of big corporations, democratic politics and the modern state in the twentieth 
century further led to the evolution of cooperatives in a more organized and systematized 
manner.
12
 In the twentieth century, although the Government started to support cooperatives, 
farmers were still left to organize many of the responsibilities of the cooperative including its 
marketing.
13
 
The consumer cooperatives of Britain 
In Britain, Robert Owen had established a village of cooperatives to develop a moral community. 
The so called ‘Owenites’ aimed to make workers in the cooperative movement free from 
exploitation.  Although both movements did not succeed, they influenced the emergence of the 
consumer cooperative movement. The consumer cooperatives were in fact started by the 
‘Rochdale pioneers’.  
 
The influence of Owen and the Owenites and the economic situation of 1840s was the driving 
factor for the emergence of the consumer cooperative in Rochdale. The political and economic 
situation in Europe and England was bad in the1840s.
14
 More importantly, Rochdale weavers 
were seriously affected as a result of the industrial revolution and brought about repeated strikes 
                                                             
6 Ibid 29 
7 Cobia (n 2) 112 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 23 
10 Ibid  31 
11 Ibid 32 
12 Ibid  
13 Ibid 
14Hebe Spaull, The Cooperative Movement in the World Today (1st edition, Barrie and Rockliff, 1965) 17 
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but without success.
15
 It was against this back drops that the twenty-eight ‘pioneers’ in Rochdale, 
Northern England, established in 1844 a cooperative store and named it the Rochdale Equitable 
Pioneers Society.
16
The memberships were made up of diverse artisans including,  ‘weavers, 
wool sorters, a cloggier, a cabinet maker, a tailor, a joiner, a hatter and a shoe maker.’17 In 
relative terms most of them were well-paid, skilled and some of them had their own private 
business.
18
 Their immediate objective was “to free themselves from adulteration and the credit 
system of the little shop keepers and the ‘truck shop’ of the employer.”19 They also had the 
ultimate goal of emancipating themselves “from wage earning slavery by such reorganization of 
industry as would enable them to provide themselves with employment.”20  To that effect, they 
immediately developed a system of cooperation which was modelled on the basis of their own 
interest. Unlike Owen and the Owenites they gave little attention to philanthropy.
21
 
Accordingly, they started by collectively purchasing the groceries, draperies and household 
requisites that their family needed and dividing these commodities among themselves.
22
 The 
cooperative was able to distribute a dividend to its members within a year. Their success drew 
many persons to the society and those who were remote from Rochdale began to imitate the 
Rochdale Pioneers.
23
Generally, the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers is a model of many 
modern cooperatives in all corner of the world. 
24
More particularly it could be termed as the 
mother of modern cooperative stores.
25
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The success of the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers coupled with consumers’ 
dissatisfaction, facilitated the flourishing of retail cooperative societies.
26
In the middle of 
nineteenth century “retailing costs were high, price competition was weak, and customers rarely 
had an effective choice  between  more  and  less  elaborate  and  costly  methods  of  
retailing.”27Adulteration and joint price fixing was very common.28 “The 1860s saw the spread 
of co-operation over much of the country and in any urban area it was almost inevitable that 
somebody would eventually bring forward a co-operative scheme.”29Accordingly “between 1862 
and 1888 the number of separate consumer retail societies appears to have risen from about 400 
to about 1200 with an aggregate membership of less than 900,000.”30  The growth of retail 
cooperative societies did also include increases in capital, trade and profit.
31
 The size of retail 
cooperative societies further led to sectionalisation and departmentalization of trade.
32
 Retail 
cooperative stores normally began with limited type of foodstuffs and gradually embraced other 
commodities depending on the interest of their member consumers and their financial 
capacity.
33
Later they were used for bakeries, tailoring, dressmaking, furniture making, boot 
making and repairs, farming and many others.
34
 
 
Worker Cooperatives in Continental Europe 
The worker cooperative movement was attempted in Britain by labour economists, Christian 
democrats and trade unionists, but despite their efforts all of these movements’ failed. Owenite 
communities and self-help business enterprises were established by the workers to liberate 
themselves from capitalism.
35
They began to develop in the 1820s and reached their climax 
between1835 and 1846.
36
In the 1850s a few Christian lawyers and clergymen reintroduced a 
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philanthropic concept of worker cooperatives and began to preach that all the miseries of the 
time were due to the neglect of the Christian obligations of love and friendship.
37
But the 
movement was unsuccessful.
38
By the time such lack of success was attributed to the lack of 
cooperative knowledge on the part of the promoters that led them to over-optimistic assumption 
of human nature
39
 (the promoters (Christian Socialists) did not have any knowledge on social 
science, on the life of industrial preliterate and on “even earlier and contemporary cooperative 
efforts” in England.40), and to bad behaviours of co-operators that led to serious disputes between 
co-operators themselves and managers.
41
 After an 1880 initiative to establish worker 
cooperatives, societies began to come from trade unionists.
42
 However, in the 1900s the worker 
cooperatives were generally declining.
43
  
 
Worker cooperatives have been more successful in Continental Europe. The most prominent 
example has been the Mondragon Cooperatives Corporation in Spain.
44
 The Mondragon 
Cooperatives were established to create enterprises where people are more important than 
capital, and their results are to be directed to improve the quality of life of the community.
45
 
Their ultimate objective was to build a new model of social, humane, and democratic 
organization which would contribute to the social and economic welfare not only of the 
cooperative workers and their families, but also of the population at large.
46
 The Mondragon 
Cooperatives Corporation has passed through four major historical phases. The first phase was 
the inception, the indoctrination of the idea and the capacity building of the workers through 
technical training.
47
  The second phase was from 1955 to 1970 where the first cooperatives and 
auxiliary institutions began; the third was during the 1970s and 1980s when cooperatives were   
according to geographic proximity and when a process of productive restructuring was begun, 
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and the fourth phase began in the 1990s, with the formation of the corporation, 
internationalization, and departmental reorganization.
48
 
The Italian worker cooperatives are the largest and fastest growing systems of worker 
cooperatives in industrialized Western economies.
49
 Agricultural land worker cooperatives have 
been the most prominent and successful types of worker cooperatives in Italy.
50
These 
Cooperatives were formed by farm workers who were unable to secure permanent employment 
for themselves, and then were driven to form a cooperative in order to lease, buy or reclaim land 
to work on.
51
The first successful cooperative farm was founded at Ravenna in 1886.
52
 Others 
followed with increasing frequency.
53
 The Italian land reform of 1950 further increased farm 
cooperatives.
54
 The farm cooperatives have been either socialistic farming societies which aim to 
end private property in land and to socialize the means of production, or catholic farming 
societies which limited themselves to the ultimate objective of ‘land to the tiller’55 or agricultural 
technology distribution cooperatives.
56
  After World War II, non-farm worker cooperatives, 
especially in the construction and manufacturing sectors, also increased.
57
There have also been 
successful worker cooperatives in France.
58
 
  Community building movements 
Here we very briefly review ‘cooperative- like’ or cooperative community building that intended 
to meet different purposes.  This is to recognize that cooperatives may have non-economic issues 
as their ultimate objectives although the economic issue still remains a catalyst for their 
emergence. These ultimate objectives may be nurturing morality or a necessity to the defense of 
community.  
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Nurturing ethics 
Plato in his political writings argued that leaders should reside in common and share everything 
in common, including meals and shelters with the people.
59
 Plato believed that such way of life 
would keep the rulers enlightened with the truth (knowledge) which was the ultimate justice for 
him.
60
 Plato claimed that private property has been the source of many unholy deeds, and corrupt 
truth. Accordingly, he proposed a ‘cooperative-like’ institution to strip rulers of property 
ownership. The next groups of cooperative makers were the early Christians.
61
  The Bible 
describes this institution as follows:
62
 
“The whole body of believers was united in heart and soul. Not a man of them 
claimed any of his possession as his own, but everything was held in 
common…..They were all held in high esteem; for they had never a needy person 
among them, because all who had property in land or house sold it, brought the 
proceed of the sale and laid the money at the feet of the apostles; it was then 
distributed to any who stood in need.”  
The sixteenth century Thomas More’s fictional utopia could also be taken as a cooperative-like 
institution.
63
 According to Thomas More the political state had to be divided into small 
communities where works should be performed cooperatively and the members of the village 
took meals together.
64
This cooperative work and village community life style was thought to be 
solution to unethical behaviour of human being’s desire for wealth.65 
Robert Owen’s village cooperatives of the nineteenth century were in fact cooperative 
movements that intended to resolve ethical problems as their ultimate objective. According to 
him, competition led human beings to learn to deceive and be selfish.
66
 The employer considered 
the employee as a mere instrument to maximize his profits and hence increased working hours, 
cared little about the suitability of the working environment, paid very meagre wages and 
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preferred to employ the cheap labour of women and children. Young children were usually 
employed in mills and mines rather than going to school.
67
 As a result of their meagre income, 
the dwelling house of the working class were very poorly furnished and were uncomfortable to 
live in.
68
  In urban areas, there was no free space for the working class to sit and read newspapers 
with open areas prohibited for the working class and therefore public houses were solitary places 
of relaxation and emotional release.
69
 Owen sympathized not only with the working class but 
also with the factory owners. He argued that the competitive system enslaved not only workers 
but also the factory owners themselves.
70
 “Many had little capital and were generally on the 
brink of failure” and competition was generally a matter of existence since “failure meant a 
plunge back into the mass of wage earners from which many had painfully climbed.”71 
 He believes that if workers were happier, healthier and received better, character-moulding 
education they would be more productive.
72
He also believed that crime, misery and poverty 
were, due to bad character caused and shaped by the competition of the time.
73
 
So to help human beings by improving their moral character, he organized his workers in a 
community consisting of about a thousand persons occupying one thousand five hundred acres of 
land.
74
 They practiced cooperative housekeeping and common training of children.
75
 “Buildings 
were erected in the form of parallelogram enclosing a court yard, and would provide a common 
kitchen, dinning rooms, lecture rooms, schools, library, workshop, slaughter house, brew house, 
grain mills and individual quarter for separate families.”76It was a self-supporting society 
although some of its manufactures might be sold outside.
77
 The administration of the villages in 
the cooperative was paternalistic since he believed that workers were unable to determine their 
own destiny.
78
Summarily, he advocated for his villages as a replacement of capitalism and 
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competition and provided the conditions for universal happiness. He proposed to replace the ‘Old 
Immoral World’ with the ‘New Moral World.’79 
The common characteristic of Plato, Christian Apostles, More, and Owen was that they believed 
private property was the cause of moral corruption and hence cooperatives should serve as a 
means to keep individuals away from private property. 
Providing collective security 
 
The word security here means either physical defense of a village community against man-made 
or natural dangers or ensuring the continuity of culture and language. The cooperatives were also 
intended to build a community that would serve as a shield for individual members by creating a 
culture of a community to protect them from those who would seek to divide them up for their 
own purposes.  
 
European settlers of nineteenth century in North America used cooperatives as a tool to establish 
themselves as settlers in a world that was new to them.
80
 Cooperatives served as a forum for 
collective action against any dangers that the new settlers could face. Moreover, cooperatives 
also served as a welcome form of integration against the exclusion by the majority, older 
immigrants against the minority of new arrivals.
81
 
 
In the case of the cooperatives in Israel, these were instruments in establishing the new   state.. 
From the nineteenth century the Jewish community had faced increasing hostility, violence and 
finally genocide from their neighbors. Two solutions presented themselves, cultural integration 
with the neighboring community or immigration to the Middle East. For those that chose the 
latter cooperatives help ease settlement in the Middle East.
82
Thus, the ultimate objectives of the 
cooperative movement in Israel even before 1948, was non-economic and non-social, but rather 
a political objective of creating a Jewish state in the Middle East.
83
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“Cooperation as an essential aspect of social integration appears widespread in peasant 
communities of East Asia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.”84 The development in peasant 
communities of economic mutual aid institutions has indicated a perpetuation of traditional 
values and patterns of cooperation.
85
Cooperatives, therefore, have also been intended to facilitate 
the social cohesion of individual members of a community.
86
 
 
B. Movements from above: cadre movement
87
 
Cooperative movements in Africa and communist countries have been movements from above. 
In Africa, cooperatives have served as a mechanism to intervene in the local culture and 
economy. The communist countries were using cooperatives as a forum to dismantle the old 
political landscape and build a communist culture of production and distribution of 
goods/services. In Ethiopia in 1950s, 1960s and 1990s, cooperatives served as instrument of the 
state to interfere into the economy, particularly in agriculture. In the 1970s and 1980s the 
cooperatives were used to help the state to build socialist culture. The following subsections look 
at this in more detail under the headings of ‘Cultural Transformation and Economic 
Intervention’. 
   Cultural transformation 
Modern cooperatives emerged in Africa during the colonial era as instruments to implement 
colonial socio-economic policies.
88
 For example, the French colonial government utilized 
cooperatives as instruments to implement its colonial policy of direct rule.
89
The cooperatives 
were intended to transform African culture into French culture.
90
 The Belgian and Portuguese 
colonial rulers also pursued the same aim of transforming African culture through cooperatives 
although in “the Belgian territories, cooperative development was closely linked to the 
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paternalistic approach of the [colonial administration, which sought to keep Africans in relative 
underprivileged and subservient positions.”91 In Portuguese territories, the ultimate object of 
cooperatives was to bring change in the culture of indigenous Africans.
92
 
In the pre-1991 communist countries, recognized cooperatives were mainly used as instruments 
to pull out individual production culture and inculcate communist culture of production into the 
general mass. For example “Stalin saw in cooperatives a school for communism in that through 
association the peasants and their close cousins, the artisans and handicraftsmen of the villages, 
might learn to work together rather than individually. He expected that by demonstration the 
work in association would prove to be more productive than individual enterprise.”93 As a result 
the Stalin government was using cooperatives to create collective farms in rural areas.
94
China 
and other Eastern European communist countries had at least partly adhered to this Stalinist view 
of collectivization.
95
 
 
Ethiopia   
The military regime of Ethiopia also adhered to the Stalinist view of cooperatives. In September 
1974, the military brigades came to power through a coup. The new Government declared 
socialism as its political ideology and affiliated itself with the USSR and Cuba. Four years after 
the coup, the military government issued a cooperative society law.
96
 The cooperative societies 
were organized as a means to build up socialism
97
 and so promoted a form of Stalinist 
collectivism.  
The concern of the government was mainly over agricultural cooperatives. This was to remove 
the remnants of feudalism and semi capitalism in the country in general; and this was especially 
true in rural areas. These ultimate objectives were intended to be attained by using cooperatives 
as a medium to provide goods and services, create collective ownership of the means of 
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production and to mobilize efforts and resources of the broad masses.
98
Cooperative societies 
were expected to become involved in political agitation to effect the transformation of feudal 
culture into socialist culture and the building of a socialist economy. They were intended to serve 
as a bridge to access the scattered peasantry. 
Traditionally and with aspects still true in the contemporary society, the Ethiopian peasantry 
lived in scattered homesteads in between fields and pastures where small clusters of houses can 
be found.
99
Such a situation, combined with an absence of a communication infrastructure, made 
the peasantry inaccessible for socialist collective ownership and planned economy. To solve the 
problem, in 1975 the Government established Peasant Associations all over the country within a 
minimum area of 800 hectares.
100
Every resident of the locality was by default a member. The 
purpose of the Association was to distribute expropriated land to its members thereby leading to 
the defeat of landlords and the abolition of the feudal system. In the same year, the Government 
established the Agricultural Service Association within areas of every Peasant Association to 
provide agricultural inputs and consumption goods to members of the Peasant Association and to 
purchase agricultural products from members on behalf of Government.
101
These associations 
were under a duty to politically indoctrinate the peasantry and then encourage collective or 
communal farming.
102
 However, communal farming did not emerge as expected and some small 
farmers began to thrive.
103
 This was taken by the Government as a symptom of re-emergence of 
capitalism or at least the retardation of the socialist revolution.
104
 Hence the Government decided 
to apply another alternative, the agricultural producer cooperatives, that would make the 
peasantry more accessible to political policies and to discourage small holders.
105
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 Economic intervention 
Cooperatives have been used as instrument by the state to interfere in the economy mainly in 
Africa and South East Asia.
106
 In Africa, such a strategy was started by the colonial powers but 
further strengthened after independence. Since the 1960s, Ethiopia employed cooperatives as an 
instrument to interfere in the agricultural sector of the economy. 
Post-independence Africa 
As already indicated, cooperative development in Africa originated from individual state’s 
political objectives.
107
 In addition to the objectives of transforming African Culture, they were 
intended to serve as way for the state to interfere in the economy. Although the economic agenda 
existed before independence, it was further strengthened after independence. For example, the 
British promoted cooperatives to increase the productivity of white settler cash crop farmers in 
order to enhance export to Britain; the cash crops being integral to fuel industrialization in 
Britain.
108
 
 
This tradition was continued after independence. “In the independence era of the 1960s, 
cooperatives were widely seen as central instruments for development, which could be promoted 
rapidly on a large scale.”109In many African countries, cooperatives were the African alternative 
to Asian or European private trade.110For example, in Egypt, cooperatives served the political 
mission of land distribution and joint planning of agriculture.
111
In Kenya also, in order to 
maintain the quality of coffee, coffee farmers have been required to belong to cooperatives.
112
 In 
Kenya, a more systematic promotion of cooperatives was begun in the 1950s with the motive of 
encouraging commercialization of smallholder agriculture.
113
This was because cooperatives 
were expected to ease land dispute adjudication, improve rural infrastructure, introduce cash 
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crops, and provide easy marketing for the cash crops.
114
 In Tanzania, the Government intended 
to use cooperatives as a means of economic independence from control by non-African 
expatriates.
115
Foreign aid agencies have also been sponsoring a state-led cooperative 
movement.
116
 
 
Ethiopia 
Ethiopia introduced the cooperative concept in 1960s to indirectly intervene into the agricultural 
sector of the economy. In the 1960s, there were two pieces of legislation showing two sub phases 
of development. The first was the Imperial decree of 1960 which authorized the Government to 
organize farm cooperatives, and the second was the 1966 proclamation which recognized 
citizens’ right to operate collectively in order to solve their economic problems.  
The ultimate aim of the Farm Workers’ cooperative was to bolster the agricultural production of 
the country.
117
 The Government believed that cooperatives would be a good alternative to reduce 
the cost of production through economies of scale.
118
Additionally the cooperative was also 
thought to serve as a forum to promote modern farming, in which the cooperative could 
demonstrate to farmers the benefit of modern agricultural technology.
119
Cooperatives were also 
claimed to serve as a means to pull economic resources together – although paradoxically all the 
financial resources were to be obtained from the government and members were not required to 
contribute anything at all.
120
 
The formation of the Farm Worker Cooperative involved five steps. The first step was that the 
government designated the land available for transfer to the cooperative to be formed.
121
This 
might have implied that the next step would not be taken unless the Government was sure about 
the existence of land to be transferred. The second step was registering individuals who were 
willing to be farm workers in a cooperative. Although it was the responsibility of individuals to 
personally appear and register, it was self-evident that the Ministry of National Community 
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Development had to promote cooperatives and push individuals to apply for membership.
122
The 
third step was the formation of the cooperative group.
123
The Ministry of National Community 
Development was empowered to form a syndicate among the applicants registered.
124
 The fourth 
step was electing members of the executive committee and members of supervisory board 
including the appointment of a General Manager by the Ministry of National Community 
Development.
125
 The fifth step was giving juridical personality to the syndicate as a 
cooperative.
126
 
It was the Ministry of National Community Development which took direct responsibility for 
organizing the cooperative. The role of the member was simply to appear and register and 
participate in the organizing meeting.
127
Moreover, the Government used to transfer state owned 
land into the “rist”128 holding of members of the cooperative.129The members were required to 
contribute nothing to the initial capital. The State provided for all necessary expenses to begin 
the agricultural activity.
130
And, although this was provided in the form of a loan, it was on 
favorable terms with low collateral requirements, low interest rates and convenient repayment 
alternatives.
131
Furthermore, the cooperative was entitled to technical advice and assistance in the 
fields of agronomy, animal husbandry, marketing and related fields, free of charge.
132
 
Every member was to be issued an equal share, and if they did not want to supply their labour to 
the cooperative they would lose their entitlement to be a member.
133
Furthermore, even after 
joining the cooperative a member could be expelled if they refused to work on a common farm 
of the cooperative for a minimum of two hundred days in a year.
134
Moreover, although a 
member could sell his shares, he had to sell to a non-member employee of the cooperative if the 
employee desired to buy. 
                                                             
122 Ibid Art 5 cum Art 2 
123 Ibid 
124Ibid 
125 Ibid Art 9 and Art 33-35 
126 Ibid Art 10 
127 Ibid Art 5-10 
128The word ‘rist’ an Amharic word and does not have equivalent English translation but it represent a landholding 
that can be transferred only to a blood relative and not subject to market forces. 
129 Farm Workers’ Cooperative Decree No.44/1960, Art 11 
130Ibid Art 37 
131 Ibid 
132 Ibid Art 38 
133  Ibid Art 6(c) cum. 17(c) 
134 Ibid Art 19(d) 
21 
 
A member could not own more than, or less than, one share except by inheritance.
135
 Every 
member has only one, or less than one vote which has to be cast only in person
136
. These 
restrictions generally blocked the intrusion of capitalists seeking to buy into the cooperatives and 
ensured that they would not be able to benefit from the privileges intended for landless poor.  
The consent of the Ministry of National Community Development was necessary to sell 
machineries and equipment, the cooperatives were bound to accept a General Manager appointed 
by the Ministry to only borrow money from the Ministry, and accept the power of veto of the 
Ministry.
137
 
The proclamation No.241/1966 was the second and last phase of cooperative development in the 
1960s. The ultimate aims of the cooperatives were attaining social justice and the improvement 
of members’ income. Cooperative societies were expected to attain the latter objective by 
reducing the cost of production and consumption through economies of scale, by pooling capital, 
by sharing risks and sharing technological knowledge.
138
 After the initiators agreed on the rules 
or bylaws of the cooperative, they had to submit an application for registration to the Registrar of 
Cooperatives in the Ministry of National Community Development & Social Affairs.
139
 The 
cooperative would get legal personality upon registration. 
The benefits that cooperative societies could receive from the government were the allotment of 
government land and financial assistance (either in the form of loan, subsidies, ad hoc grants, 
standing as a guarantor to third parties for the payment of share capital or dividend).
140
 
The property of the society was distinct from the individual capital holders and could be 
distributed to members only upon dissolution.
141
Cooperative societies were not entitled to invest 
their money in a manner that would prejudice their ultimate purposes.
142
Accordingly, 
cooperative societies could not establish an investor owned firm or even purchase shares in such 
type of firm. Only ten percent of profit could be distributed as dividend. 
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The sole purpose of the Registrar, (to be appointed by the Emperor and accountable to the 
Minister of the Ministry of National Community Development & Social Affairs), was 
supervision and control of cooperative societies so that they would attain the objective for which 
they were recognized for by the Government.
143
The Registrar would refuse to register 
cooperative societies which did not recognize the purposes of cooperatives societies listed under 
Art 4 of the proclamation.
144
 The Registrar was required to supervise the daily activities of the 
society and if the society was found to have acted contrary to purpose of the cooperative, the 
Registrar had the power to remove the Executive Committee of the society.
145
 The Registrar 
could audit the account of the society and make any necessary inquiry to ensure that the relevant 
law was adhered to by the society.
146
 
The military government also had an intention to use cooperatives to interfere in the economy. 
The economic reasons for the government’s interest with agricultural cooperatives were the 
potential economies of scale, technology transfer and land fragmentation.
147
 It was believed that 
if peasants were organized they would more easily access the Government’s technical and 
financial support. Moreover, they were expected to serve as a model for other peasants so that 
the backward plough farm would be transformed into mechanized farming.
148
Furthermore, it was 
argued that smallholdings were less desirable than large scale farming and so land had to be 
consolidated by forming producer cooperatives.
149
 
C. Movement from the side: philanthropist’s movement 
Cooperative movements from the side have been manifest in Asia where cooperatives have been 
mainly used by philanthropists’ as an economic strategy to reduce poverty and to fight caste 
system.  
As stated above, the engine of the cooperative movement could be either the members 
themselves or the political state. Since the nature of the engine determines the purpose of 
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cooperatives, cooperative movements from below have had the objectives of either economic or 
social self-defense, whereas the cooperative movement from above had the objective of cultural 
or economic transformation with a political end-goal. There is a third engine of the cooperative 
movement- which this paper terms movement from the side simply because it is a movement by 
citizens to help other citizens: with an objective of charity. Although charity cooperative 
movements began in Britain to tackle the dangers of economic competition, it currently 
manifests itself in South East Asia to tackle poverty and the caste system. 
  Ending human misery 
The first charitable cooperative movement was Robert Owen’s village of cooperatives.150His 
ultimate purpose was to abolition competition, which, he thought, was the source of human 
misery. He believed that both the life of capitalists, the employees and society as a whole was 
made miserable due to fierce and merciless competition. According to him, competition-led 
human beings learn strong powers of deception and selfishness.
151
The competitive system 
enslaved not only workers but also the factory owners themselves.
152
Equally he believed that if 
workers were happier, healthier and received better character moulding education they would be 
more productive.
153
He also believed that crime, misery and poverty were, due to bad character of 
human beings shaped by competition.
154
 
To end such human misery he established a village of cooperatives with the ultimate aim of 
building the New Moral World that would be free of competition, full of cooperation and 
organized his workers in a community consisting of about a thousand persons occupying one 
thousand five hundred acres of land.
155
 He greatly improved the life of the workers by providing 
quality food and drinks in the factory shop and social facilities such as children’s education, 
contributory sickness benefit scheme and a savings bank.
156
 He introduced humanitarian 
practices to encourage more discipline among the labour force and he prohibited corporal 
                                                             
150Peter Davis and Martin Parker,‘Cooperatives, Labor, and the State: The English Labor Economists Revisited’ 
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punishment.
157
 He also reduced the working hour to 10
1
/2 hour per day, abolished summary 
dismissal (except for drunkenness) and allowed the workers to appeal against any disciplinary 
decision.
158
 
     Poverty eradication 
It is believed that access to loans would contribute a lot for poverty reduction. However, the poor 
could not usually have a chance to access loans from financial institutions, since banks usually 
do not extend loan to the poor, either because the poor never provide enough collateral or due to 
cost-inefficiency of the administration of a large amount of small loans. Thus, the poor would 
normally perpetually remain in a poverty trap.  
Muhammad Yunus, an economist and a philanthropist, realized this vicious circle of the poverty 
trap and developed the principles of a sustainable credit program for the poor.
159
He started the 
Grameen Bank of Bangladesh in 1976 which make capital available to very poor rural women 
who form small groups of borrowers from the same community.
160
The group serves as a 
collective source of collateral to compensate for individuals' lack of financial collateral.
161
 
“Professor Yunus applies the Rochdale Cooperative Principles in setting up his micro-credit 
system.”162The group is a true cooperative sustained by interest and saving deposits from its 
owners.
163
This micro-credit scheme has enabled millions to break the poverty trap.
164
 
 
    Caste eradication 
In India, NGOs have started to use the cooperative model to fight the caste 
system.
165
Although the Indian Constitution makes the caste system illegal, it remains the 
character of modern Indian society.
166
As a result, the lower caste communities have been 
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systematically excluded from all economic, political and social processes and institutions 
of the society.
167
 For example, the banking community has already stereotyped the lower 
castes as chronic loan defaulters.
168
 The lower castes have had no alternatives except to 
build their own institutions.
169
 Consequently, some lower cast NGOs began small 
programmes of women’s thrift and credit on the Grameen model.170 The success of these 
thrifts has implicated that the cooperative model movement would liberate the lower cast 
from the tyranny of the political and economic power of a small and corrupt elite class.
171
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1.2 Cooperatives losing their path 
 
In this sub-topic we do two things; first; we indicate the movement of cooperatives into the 
course of profiteering by showing the structural adjustment and modifications of cooperative 
principles. Second, we attempt to examine the factors that have pushed cooperatives into such a 
course. 
A. Cooperatives moving onto a profiteering path 
The cooperative movement has been declining since the beginning of twentieth century.
172
They 
lost market share in the twentieth century.
173
 Although indicators of the decline began to show at 
the beginning of the century,
174
it became very clear after World War II.
175
 After the 1970s, 
researchers also began to indicate that cooperatives have been unable to attain the objectives they 
intended.
176
 In Britain, the origin of modern cooperatives had by the 1990s seen cooperative 
stores shut down.
177
 Between 1995 and 2000 alone Britain lost 20 percent of its local economic 
outlets which were mostly cooperatives.
178
   
Such a dramatic decline in the market share of cooperatives gradually pushed forward a radical 
reformulation of the overall strategy of the cooperative movement.
179
In Western economies, 
many cooperatives have undergone profound changes.
180
 For example, some cooperatives partly 
or wholly exchanged collective ownership with individual ownership by investor owned firms 
Others have disappeared due to mergers or acquisitions.
181
A number of bankruptcies have 
                                                             
172John Walton, 'Commemorating the Co-op: Nostalgia, Identity and the Visual Traces of the Cooperative 
Movement in Twentieth-Century Britain' (2008) 24(2) Visual Resources159-172 
173Lawrence Black and Nicole Robertson(eds),Consumerism and the Cooperative Movement in Modern British 
History (Manchester University Press, 2009) 2 
174Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, The Consumers’ Cooperative Movement(Longmans, 1921) 235 
175 Black (n 173) 1 
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occurred.
182
Some cooperatives have sold a part of their business activities to investors, thus 
creating a hybrid-type cooperative.
183
Still others have converted into investor-owned firms.
184
 
.There also emerged a new generation cooperative movement especially in agricultural 
cooperatives.
185
In the new cooperative movement members were profit-driven.
186
To attain this 
objective, membership is limited
187
. This means the optimal operating capacity of the firm 
typically drives membership numbers. The cooperatives accept membership up until the profit 
margin reaches its maximum turning point. In true cooperatives membership is open to every 
body who could use and willing to use the service of the cooperative. Moreover; members is also 
closed.
188
 Membership becomes the result of freedom of contract. No one is entitled to join 
unless the existing members agree to accept him even in case the optimal operating capacity is 
not yet reached. Moreover, capital is an essential requirement for membership.
189
There are also 
stringent supply contracts that require every member to sell specified quantities of goods/service 
to the cooperative.
190
 
This has further led to the varied interpretation and adoption of cooperative principles. Some 
principles, such as open membership, mutuality principle (use of cooperative service as a 
criterion to share profit) and democratic control have been fading from cooperatives and a few 
new principles, (such as up-front investment of capital than gradual accumulation, profit on the 
basis of capital investment, membership open for investors) have been added. In short, 
cooperatives have continued to evolve and to reflect changes in society, agriculture and more 
directly the interest of its members.
191
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B. Factors pushing cooperatives onto a profiteering path 
The major factors that have caused cooperatives to divert their route towards profiteering are the 
changing role of the state, the emergence of efficient company owned hypermarkets, and 
consumer associations and also globalization. These are the external factors. They also have 
internal problems such as unmanageable sizes, disloyalty of members, clique, declining in 
cooperative education and a scarcity of capital. 
External Challenges 
 
As stated above the external factors are changing role of the state, the emergence of efficient 
company owned hypermarkets, consumerism and consumer associations, and globalization. Here 
below we briefly examine how they have affected cooperatives. 
 
Changing Role of the State 
Emergence of cooperatives in the nineteenth century in Europe and North America was to 
respond to market inefficiency inherent in capitalism burdened by a state unwillingness to seek 
redress.
192
 The main reason why the state did not respond to such problems was due to a 
political-economic ideology of the time- laissez fair. This ideology preaches that the state should 
never interfere with economic activities and suggests that the market itself should find a solution 
to the problems of the economy.  However, since competition of the time was not able to solve 
the problem; the only market solution of the time was cooperation between producers, consumers 
or workers in the form of a cooperative movement. 
 
However, this laissez fair ideology lost practical support after the First World War. States began 
to interfere in the economy either indirectly as regulator or directly as an investor. Protective 
labour legislation begun to be issued to improve the life of the working class and in some cases 
the state has become a major employer. Anti-trust laws have also been issued to fight market 
monopolies. Welfare systems have also been introduced in Western economies. Consumer 
protection laws have also emerged. State enforced standardization of quality of goods and 
services have also been the characteristics of the contemporary economy. This commitment of 
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the State to address the defects of market economy has forced cooperatives to justify themselves 
only on the basis of economic efficiency. In short state interference into the economy has taken 
away the not-for-profit objectives of cooperatives.
193
 
Emergence of efficient company owned hypermarkets 
However, the reemergence of the laissez fair ideology in the 1970s proved cooperatives 
economically inefficient unless reorganized along neoliberal lines.
194
 Laissez faire is more 
favorable to the private sector. As a result, bigger and better integrated companies appeared to 
challenge the market stature of cooperatives almost in all sectors of the economy.
195
The private 
sector has begun to challenge cooperatives by the beginning of the twentieth century.
196
But after 
the 1970s,“instead of monolithic corporation, many firms have reinvented themselves as 
networks of holdings, joint ventures, subsidiaries, contracts and outsourced services 
Globalization has also facilitated this trend of companies because it allowed for free movement 
of capital without borders. In addition to the issue of inefficiency compared with their 
competitors, cooperatives entered into heavy loans while they were attempting to expand their 
business with the intention of remaining competitive.
197
 
 
Consumer culture and consumer associations 
 
It has been asserted that the decline of consumer cooperatives is directly related to the emergence 
of neoliberalism (capitalism).
198
Capitalism is capable of creating a consumer culture on the basis 
of individual test influenced by advertisement than on the basis of collective solidarity or 
prudence.
199
 As a result, individuals do not usually have a sentiment to consume similar things 
and hence they prefer to purchase from multiple companies than cooperatives which usually 
provide goods on the basis of collective sentiment. This diverse sentiment is better protected 
through consumer associations that advocate for the rights of consumers than consumer 
cooperatives that provide goods and services. As a result, the consumer associations movement 
emerged and the state has also consolidated the movement by issuing consumer protection laws. 
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Internal challenges 
 
Major internal challenges have been an unmanageable size, disloyalty of members, emergence of 
cliques and the decline of cooperative education and scarcity of capital. 
 
Unmanageable size 
One of the features of the cooperative movement after WWII was the consolidation of 
cooperatives through amalgamation and merger.
200
This made cooperatives larger in size but 
fewer in number. This larger size posed the problem of the heterogeneity of interests of 
members, and the need for a sophisticated management. Heterogeneity of interest fueled by the 
consumer movement challenges the ability of the cooperative to satisfy members’ sentimental 
test of goods/services. Moreover, large size demands a sophisticated management. As the 
management gets more sophisticated it becomes more autocratic than democratic. Autocratic 
management is less transparent. Such a lack of transparency would make members lose trust in 
the cooperative. Researchers have shown that member’s trust in cooperatives and in each other 
has been declining.
201
 
 
In addition to the large number of members, the size of the business could also be unmanageable. 
If a consumer cooperative attempts to supply everything the members may buy, or producer 
cooperative attempts to sell everything the member may sell, or worker cooperatives have 
members with varied and unrelated skills, surely the cooperative will fail.  Investor owned firms 
do normally specialize in certain areas of consumer demand.  
 
Disloyalty of members 
The heterogeneity of interests, the increase of consumerism and the distrust of management, 
might have eroded the loyalty of members to the cooperative. Research indicates that one of the 
challenges to cooperatives has been lack of loyalty of members to their cooperative.
202
 Members 
avoid transactions with the cooperative or remain passive in the cooperative activities and do not 
participate in the decision making process of the cooperative.
203
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Emergence of cliques 
Another challenge for cooperatives has been the emergence of interest groups within 
them.
204
This problem is an extension of the problem of autocratic and opaque management, and 
passivity of membership. This problem is especially rampant in Africa where there is patrimonial 
political economy. 
 
Declining of cooperative education 
Cooperative education is essential to disseminate cooperative ideas and attract new members and 
public support. But researchers show that cooperatives have not been able to educate their 
members in particular and the public in general.
205
 
 
Scarcity of capital 
It is usual that cooperatives face capital scarcity since their members are not investors who have 
unutilized capital. This problem usually forces cooperatives to invite investors to be members. 
They may also be forced to compromise their autonomy by receiving funds from donors or state 
agencies. 
 
1:3   Conclusions 
Thus this Chapter shows that cooperative objectives have been transforming from not-for-profit 
objectives to for-profit objectives.   
In the past although there have been multiple cooperative objectives due to multiple engine of 
the cooperative movement, all those objectives were however; not-for-profit objectives. The first 
engine of movement has been from individuals. Economic self-help movements have been the 
major types of cooperatives especially in North America, Britain and Continental Europe and 
their ultimate objectives were to protect the small hold producers, consumers and workers from 
the ill effects of market economy. Individuals have also created cooperative ‘like’ associations 
and cooperatives to nurture ethical value and to ensure collective security. In this regard the 
collective life of early Christians, the associations of European Settlers in North America and the 
peasant cooperatives in South East Asia are worth mentioning. The second engine has been 
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Governments. Cooperatives have served colonial and post colonial governments of Africa to 
transform the culture of the local community. Communist governments including the military 
government of Ethiopia used cooperatives as forum to indoctrinate communism to the rural 
community. Colonial and post colonial governments of Africa including the imperial government 
of   Ethiopia have also used cooperatives as a spring board to intervene into the economy of the 
continent. The third source of cooperative movement has been the philanthropists who have 
decided to fight human misery, poverty and caste system. Robert Owen’s cooperative village, 
Mohammed Yunus’   Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, and lower cast communities’ NGOs in India 
have been typical examples. 
However; in recent times cooperatives have been adopting many of the characteristics of investor 
owned firms that pull them away from not-for-profit objectives but push them into for-profit 
objectives. This have been due to the widening of state responsibility to include individual’s 
economic challenges, emergence of efficient company owned hypermarkets, change of consumer 
culture that led to emergence of  consumer associations. These factors have taken off the ultimate 
objectives for which cooperative have been established in earlier times. Major internal 
challenges such as unmanageable size, disloyalty of members, emergence of cliques, and decline 
of cooperative education and scarcity of capital have been additional factors that have pushed 
cooperatives into profit-seeking objectives.  Thus cooperatives have become uncategorizable in 
terms of their identity when one attempts to distinguish them from investor-owned firms.  
 
In this chapter we have seen the move of cooperators into the idea of investor owned firms. In 
the next chapter we analyze the move of investors into the idea of cooperatives. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
COOPERATIVE AS AN INVESTOR-OWNED FIRM 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Ownership of a firm has two essential attributes.
1
These attributes are exercise of control and the 
receipt of residual earning.
2
 The exercise of control “is the authority to determine those aspects 
of firm policy that, because of high transaction costs or imperfect foresight, cannot be specified 
ex ante in a contract but rather must be left to the discretion of those to whom the authority is 
granted.”3 The residual earning indicates both the profit and the residual asset after liquidation. 
 
 The ultimate objective of this topic is to show that there is a possibility for profit-seekers to 
organize their business in the form of cooperative thereby blurring the distinction between the 
cooperative form of economic organization and the company form of economic organization. 
Thus it is argued that cooperatives may be the result of economic rationality of assigning 
ownership within the ambit of freedom of association. This is because the cooperative form of 
economic organization could possibly be a firm and a firm is the result of economic rationality. 
Furthermore; the structure of ownership in a firm (cooperative ownership/company ownership) 
may be solely the result of economic choice.  Still more the structure of ownership in a firm does 
not necessarily guarantee or hinder public purposes/profit-maximizing purpose: what really 
matters is the accountability of the management. This means, depending on the accountability of 
the management, there is a possibility that cooperatives may be utilized to maximize profits 
whereas companies may be utilized to protect the public interest. In short depending on the 
freedom of association
4
 and the freedom of contract,
5
 the cooperative form of organization could 
be utilized for profit-maximizing purpose.  
 
                                                             
1 Martin Ricketts(ed), The Economics of Modern Business Enterprise Volume II: Ownership and Scope (2008) The 
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To this effect the first subtopic shows that (A) firm is born out of nexus of contract to carry out 
economic activities; (B) the cooperative form of economic organization could be born out of 
nexus of contract ;(C ) individuals enter into nexus of contract out of economic rationality. The 
second subtopic shows that cooperative form of firm ownership (types of nexus of contract) 
could also be the result of economic rationality of parties to the contract. As a continuation of 
this economic rationality, the third subtopic intends to indicate that cooperative form of the firm 
ownership may be preferred depending on the extent of freedom of contract in determining the 
content of nexus of contract guaranteed by the law to cooperative form and other forms of 
economic organization (partnership/company).  
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2.1 The firm and theory of the firm
6
 
Here we discuss three interrelated points. The first point is to attempt to define a firm. A firm is a 
fictitious legal person that is born out of a nexus of contracts to carry out economic activities. 
The second point is to show that cooperatives are economic alternatives to investor-owned firms 
since all firms, including cooperatives, are owned by individuals that have transactional relation 
within the firm. The third point is show that firms are the result of economic rationality. 
 
A. The firm as nexus of contract 
A firm is a legal person coming out of a cooperative production agreement. According to 
economists, a firm is the result of nexus of contracts. In other words, a firm is a point at which 
multiple contracts such as contract of supply of raw materials, employment contracts, loan 
contract and purchase contracts are connected to each other.
7
Since a firm is contract that 
connects many contracts together, it has special features that distinguish it from ordinary 
contract. The two main features of the firm are the informal non-specific nature of the contracts 
and the consequent necessity for enforcing such contracts internally by the exercise of authority 
by some of the parties to the contract themselves.
8
 The law gives legal personality to the firm so 
that none of those who enter into each particular contract that form the firm would not be 
unnecessarily burdened with market risks. 
 
B. Cooperatives and investor-owned firms 
The word ‘firm,’ can refer to cooperatives and investor-owned firms. Much of their difference is 
in how they are owned. For example, producer cooperatives are owned by their suppliers. The 
cooperative pays the member owners a predetermined price for the product they supply. This 
price is set low enough so that the cooperative is almost certain to get positive net earnings from 
the resale of the goods with or without adding value to it. At the end of the financial year the 
cooperative’s net earnings are divided pro rata among the members according to the amount of 
goods they supplied to the cooperative during the year. All the voting rights are also apportioned 
among its producer members either according to the goods they supplied or more simply on a 
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1986) 66 (emphasis partly added) 
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one-member one-vote basis. Some or all of the members may have capital invested in the firm. 
In principle, however, this is unnecessary as the firm might borrow all the capital it needs. In any 
case even when the members invest in the firm, those investments generally take the form of 
debt or preferred stock that carries no voting rights and is limited to a stated maximum rate of 
dividends. Upon liquidation of the cooperative, any net asset’s value which may be derived from 
retained earnings or from increase in the value of asset owned by the cooperative is divided pro 
rata among the members, according to some measure of the relative value of their cumulative 
supply. The cooperative may purchase some portion of the supply of goods from non-members, 
who are simply paid a fixed price (which may be different from the price paid to members) and 
do not participate in net earnings or control.  
 
The structures of consumer cooperatives and worker cooperatives are similar to producer 
cooperatives except on the criteria of apportioning net earnings and votes. In consumer 
cooperatives, net earnings and votes are apportioned according to the amounts that members 
purchase from the cooperatives.  In worker cooperatives, the net earnings and votes are assigned 
in proportion to the value of labour that a member supplied to the cooperative. In consumer 
cooperatives, members are clients of the cooperatives. In worker cooperatives the members are 
employees of the cooperative. 
 
Similarly in investor owned-firms, the members are lenders of the firm. Each member lends it a 
given sum of money, which the investor-owned firm uses to purchase the equipment and other 
assets it needs to operate. It pays the members a fixed interest rate on their loans, set low enough 
so that there is a reasonable likelihood that the investor-owned firm will have net earnings after 
paying this interest and all other expenses. Its net earnings are then distributed pro rata among its 
members according to the amount they have lent, with distribution taking place currently, as 
dividends, or upon liquidation. Similarly, voting rights are apportioned among members in 
proportion to the amount they have lent it. To supplement the capital that it obtains from its 
members the investor-owned firm may borrow money from lenders who are not members, but 
who simply receive a fixed rate of interest (which may be different from the fixed rate paid to 
members) without sharing in residual earnings or control. In short, supplying capital is one form 
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of transactional relationship to which ownership is tied. Investor-owned firms are, in this way, 
lender cooperatives or capital cooperatives.  
 
Three major objections may be raised against this conclusion. The first objection is that, in 
investor-owned firms, the loan from members is usually perpetual; members can withdraw their 
capital only upon dissolution of the investor-owned firm while members of cooperatives are free 
to vary the volume of their transactions with the cooperatives overtime and even to terminate 
membership altogether. However, this objection is untenable since the individual members of 
investor-owned firms are also free to sell part or the whole of his or her interest in the investor-
owned firms to another person at any time. More importantly, investor-owned firms sometimes 
permit members to redeem their invested capital at specified interval or even at will. Conversely 
cooperatives often require their members make a long term commitment to remain member.  
 
The second area of objection concerns the assignment of voting rights. In investor-owned firms 
the general rule is one-share, one-vote; votes are apportioned according to the amount of capital 
contributed to the investor-owned firm. In contrast, in many cooperatives the rule is one-
member, one-vote with no adjustment to the amount of transactional relationship between the 
member and the cooperative. However, the difference is neither universal nor fundamental. The 
charter of many eighteenth and nineteenth century American investor-owned firms limited the 
number of votes an individual shareholder could exercise regardless of the number of shares 
he/she owned.
9
 Only in the twentieth century, did the practice of one-share, one-vote become 
nearly universal. There are also many cooperatives that allocate voting rights proportionate to the 
volume of transactions the member has had with the cooperatives.
10
  
 
The third area of objection is the claim that ownership is necessarily connected to capital in the 
sense that the owners of a firm, whether they are suppliers or customers or workers or whatever, 
                                                             
9Under Ethiopian Commercial code also partnerships in principle follow one member-one vote principle unless the 
contrary is expressly provided in the memorandum of association of articles of association.  Moreover; in a Private 
Limited   Company the law intends to combine one member- one vote and one share- one vote principles and in case 
the combination is not possible it gives the principle of one member-one vote precedence over the principle of one 
share- one vote. In a Share Company also although the principle is one share-one vote, the law reminds members 
their freedom to limit such voting rights. See Commercial Code Art 234, 407, 408 and 535 
10 See also  Christopher and Walzer, Norman (eds.) Cooperatives and Local Development; Theory and Application 
for the 21st   Century 2004  59-60 
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are the persons who effectively own the firm’s capital, such as its plant and equipment. But this 
is not necessarily true. The firm could rent rather than own the land, buildings, and equipment it 
uses. It could, in fact, have title to no physical assets whatever and yet still be a large and 
prosperous firm. It could even have no net financial assets, distributing all profits to members as 
they are earned and maintaining a line of credit at a bank sufficient to ensure that it can pay bills 
in periods when expenses temporarily exceed receipts. 
 
C. Theory of the firm 
Theory of the firm indicates that a firm is the result of economic rationality. A firm could resolve 
the problem of costliness, uncertainty, inflexibility, free riding, unenforceability problems that 
encircles other form of economic cooperation such as market, face to face relation and individual 
contracts.  
 
Economic rationality is concerned with choice. There is always a scarcity of resource. 
Paradoxically human desires are always infinite. The desires are both material and moral. First, 
individuals or a society have to choose which of these desires it wants to satisfy. Then he/she has 
to also choose ways of organizing the scarce resources in order to maximize the utility of the 
available resources. There are multiple alternatives of organizing resources. Agreement or 
contract plays central role in the process of organizing the resources.  The firm is one alternative 
of organizing resources on the basis of agreement.
11
 
 
A firm may be the results of an agreement to cooperate between persons to bring together 
available resources that are necessary to produce essential goods/services.
12
 For example, 
imagine a rural family in a village in Ethiopia where there is no mill. Since it is either impossible 
or uneconomical for each family to build a mill, the families in the village would have to pool 
their money and resources to build a mill. Specialization and exchange could also be a factor for 
cooperative agreements.
13
Investor-owned firms are usually the result of specialization and 
exchange where the entrepreneur contributes his ability to initiate the cooperative 
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13 Ibid 7  
39 
 
agreement/business ideas, the capitalists contribute capital necessary to bring the business idea 
into reality and the managers contribute their ability to monitor the enforcement of the contract.
14
 
It may be argued that the problem of specialization would be solved by market exchange, but 
such a transaction at an individual level would be enormously costly.
15
Hence, one major reason 
why firms are formed and survive is transactions costs on individual level.
16
Firms may also use 
alternative methods of risk management. An entrepreneur may opt for a firm to implement his 
new ideas even when he possesses sufficient capital to finance the introduction of the new ideas 
himself. This is because an innovative idea is a risky asset, as he does not want to exchange his 
relatively safe property with a new, riskier asset. He wants to get someone else to share the risk.  
 
One may argue that the above benefits of a firm may be reaped through informal relations among 
the concerned individuals. However, the necessary cooperation burdens the individuals with 
moral hazard, lack of certainty and a lack of flexibility. “Moral hazard exists when the 
probability of a given ‘state of the world’ occurring is influenced by one of the parties to the 
contract but when the behaviour of this contractor cannot be observed.”17 This means there is a 
possibility for an individual to cheat in the cooperation. He may become superior by not 
conforming to the behaviour required for the cooperative solution.
18
Firms reduce this hazard by 
providing for a well specified and complete agreement and monitoring mechanism. The 
memorandum and articles of association transforms informal cooperation into a formal one 
which can easily be invoked in the court of law by aggrieved party. Even when rights and duties 
are incomplete or unspecified due to the parties’ inability forecast the future, management would 
fill such gaps. More importantly in a firm there is a third party, a manager, which monitors 
compliance with the agreed deal and punishes a party to the cooperative agreement who cheats. 
Firms also allow flexibility, since a party could withdraw from the cooperative agreement by 
selling his shares without it leading to the possibility of total collapse of the cooperative 
agreement. It is economic rationality to adjust one’s own economic activities to continually 
changing conditions and to utilize new information. 
 
                                                             
14Muller (n 7) 62-65 
15 Ricketts (n 1) 17 
16 Ibid 17 
17 Ibid 34&43 
18Muller (n 7) 55 
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2.2 Theory of firm ownership19 
 
This subtopic intends to show that the cooperatives may be solely the result of economic choice. 
These are rational choices such as the cost of contracting (transaction costs) and cost of 
ownership (management and risk bearing costs).  
 
 2.2.1 Ownership to those having a transactional relationship with a firm 
It is possible to imagine that a firm is owned by someone who has no transactional relation with 
the firm. For example, the entrepreneur who initiates the business idea may organize the firm by 
borrowing capital from lenders, by purchasing inputs and selling output on the market.  
However, such a type of a firm is likely to be quite inefficient, especially when there is no 
effective competition. In an imperfectly competitive market, the party that has a dominant 
position would exploit the weaker party. If the seller of a raw material is in a dominant position 
he will under normal market conditions abuse his position to the detriment of the firm. This is the 
cost of transaction.
20
 This cost may be minimized if the firm is assigned to (or if the firm owners 
are) the suppliers of the raw material. To assign ownership to someone who has no transactional 
relation with the firm would waste the opportunity to use ownership to reduce transaction costs. 
Cost minimizing is an issue of survival for a firm. Higher cost forms of organizations tend to be 
driven out of business by their lower cost competitors. If a particular form of ownership is 
dominant in a given industry, this is a strong indication that this form is less costly than another 
form of ownership would be in that industry. 
 
2.2.2 Cost of Contracting and Cost of Ownership 
We have seen that ownership of a firm should be assigned to those who have a transactional 
relation with the firm, but since there are multiple parties that have transactional relationship 
with the firm, it is also important to choose among those parties. If all become owners of the firm 
it turns to a subsistence production only for the daily need of the owners. Since this form of 
production does not recognize specialization it is carried out at low level of economic 
development at a family level.  Moreover, making everyone an owner increases the cost of 
                                                             
19Unless otherwise expressly stated all discussions under this subtopic are adapted from Ricketts (n 1) 26-56 
20  Here the phrase ‘transaction cost’ is used in its wider sense. For further details see Ricketts (n 12) 27-38 
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ownership, since participants are likely to have radically diverging interest.
21
Therefore, only 
some of those who have transactional relation with the firm should be its owners.  
 
A. Cost of contracting 
Cost of contracting would be minimized if ownership is assigned to those who become losers, 
when price is determined by normal market mechanisms. They may be a loser in the market 
because of market failure due to one or more of the following reasons. 
 
     Unfair trade practices
22
 
Frequently exposed to unfair trade practices that affect them, clients of the firm have an incentive 
to own the firm and thereby avoid price exploitation. Some service sector economies such as 
electricity, water, sewerage, and telecommunications industries are prone to monopoly control. 
The firm owners may unfairly exploit consumers. In these areas it minimizes cost to organize the 
firm as consumer cooperatives. Moreover, where there is only one buyer (firm) and many 
suppliers (a monophony) the suppliers would be motivated to become owners. Many nineteenth 
century agricultural marketing and processing cooperatives in North America were the result of 
monopsony. In such circumstances, cooperatives would strengthen the future of consumption of 
the consumers by enabling them to save money that they would have paid to the dominant firm. 
Moreover, low prices would encourage the consumer to consume more and excess consumption 
may affect savings. 
 
     Gradual labour specialization &immobility  
When an individual joins a labour market for the first time there are likely to be many employers 
that offer employment. This is because a new entrant into the labour market is mostly a 
generalist that can fit to the demand of many firms. Even when the market is not available for his 
skill he can take training to fit with the market demand. He could also be flexible about the work 
place which increases the number of firms that compete for his labour. 
 
                                                             
21Cost of ownership is further discussed under the next sub-section 
22Unfair trade practice includes abuse of market dominance, cartel, merger of business enterprises and unfair 
competition. See Trade Practice and Consumers’ Protection Proclamation No. 685/2010 
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However, after he has taken a job with a particular firm and worked for a number of years his 
skills are likely to become specialized to the firm he works for. The worker might have invested 
in his skill for specialization in the area he has been working. Thus he may be substantially more 
productive at this present firm than he would be elsewhere.  The age of the employee may also 
reduce his incentive to retrain. Moreover, the worker may have made important personal 
investments in the community where his employer is located, investments that cannot be 
recouped if he leaves that community.
23
His spouse may be employed there, his child may attend 
the local school system, and his entire family may have developed strong personal ties with other 
members of the community. This inflexibility would give the employer the opportunity to exploit 
the employee. 
 
The employee, who realizes such a problem affects him, is likely to insist on higher initial wages 
or refuse employment with a firm that, though otherwise an attractive if the employer cannot 
effectively bind itself not to act exploitatively in the future. Likewise, after accepting 
employment with the firm he will have suboptimal incentives to take firm specific trainings that 
are valuable to that firm. Such may substantially reduce the productivity of his labour. He also 
lacks the necessary incentive to buy a house that suits his special desire but might be difficult to 
resell. The worker may not be incentivized to interact with the society. This means the workers 
remains unsatisfied and the local community also loses the opportunity to benefit from his 
participation in public life. Social solidarity would also be loosened and the culture of the 
community would be eroded. Such costs would be minimized if workers have ownership 
assigned to them since what they lose as an employee, they would recoup as an owner.  
 
    Inflation  
Firms and their clients often prefer to enter into a long term contract in order to avoid the 
opportunistic behavior that arises due to transaction-specific investments. Long term contracts 
could also be taken as a means of risk-sharing between the parties. It also mitigates the 
possibility of adverse selection.  
                                                             
23
In Ethiopia there is a social solidarity called “Edir.” People of the same  village in urban areas and the same 
Kebele in rural area form an association that perform burial ceremony. Members make monthly contribution in cash 
or in kind. A member can receive benefit if his family member dies. Moreover; in Ethiopia there is a wide spread 
custom of preparing their own tomb in the locality church. 
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However, inflation is a serious challenge to long term contracts. As conditions change during the 
terms of the contract, the price(s) specified in the contract can produce substantial windfall gain 
for one party and a corresponding loss for others. Making clients the owners of the firm 
eliminates much of this risk. What the client loses as a client he gains as an owner and what he 
loses as an owner he gains as a client. 
 
   Asymmetric information 
Contracting can also be costly when the firm has better information than its clients concerning 
the matters that bear importantly on transactions between them or, conversely when the clients 
have better information than does the firm. For example, a firm often knows more than its 
customers about the quality of goods or services that it sells. This is especially common when the 
contracts for goods or services are complex or difficult to inspect. The firm then has an incentive 
to deliver a lower quality performance than it promises. Customers, in turn, have an incentive to 
distrust the firm and may offer to pay only the value of the worst possible performance or decline 
to purchase at all. The result is inefficient transaction. Although the customers may be getting 
just what they are paying for, and the firm is getting paid no more than it is necessary to cover 
the cost of the quality of the performance it is providing, both the customers and the firm would 
prefer a higher quality performance and a higher price. Firms can sometimes manage this 
problem by investing in a reputation for quality, but that strategy generally takes time and can 
often provide at least a partial palliative. Customers’ ownership reduces such cost. 
 
 B. Cost of ownership  
Ownership of a firm has two major costs. These are management costs and cost of risk bearing. 
Management cost can further be classified into agency costs and collective decision making 
costs. All these costs can vary substantially in magnitude from one class of ownership to another. 
 
  Agency Costs 
This cost relates to the control of the board of directors and managers. Usually owners of large 
firms delegate substantial decision making powers to board of directors who in turn delegate 
most of such powers to hired managers. The owners necessarily incur costs in their effort to 
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control this agent’s monitoring costs. There are also costs that result from the failure to monitor 
managers with perfect effectiveness which can be known as the managerial opportunism cost. 
 
In order to monitor the manager, the owners need information about the operation of the firm. 
They have to communicate this information among themselves and also persuade each other to 
reach a decision. Finally they have to apply the decision. This is the monitoring cost. This cost is 
less for those who have frequent transactions with the firm. Moreover, cost of communicating 
among the owners would be reduced if all or most of the owners are residing in the same 
locality. This means cooperative form would reduce monitoring cost. 
 
Whenever monitoring is not carried out to the expected level, managers probably abuse their 
decision making power. Although managers self-dealing and laziness may be controlled by legal, 
contractual, moral and market mechanisms, it is difficult to control excessive retention of 
earnings. Excessive retention is likely to bring approval to the manager both from inside (from 
workers of the firm) and outside. Retentions benefit a manager by creating a buffer against 
adversity and by increasing the size of the firm that he controls. The invisible hands of the 
market selection tend to support excessive retention since retention enhances the survival of the 
firm. But retentions are costly to the firm’s owners if the rate of return on the retentions is less 
than the return available on investment outside the firm or if regardless of the rate of return the 
retention brings, the fund retained can never be recovered by the current owners.
24
 Such cost 
may be reduced by assigning ownership of the firm at least partly to the manager.  
 
 Collective decision making costs 
This cost is the cost that emanates from heterogeneity of interests among owners. Heterogeneity 
of interest may lead to decisions whose outcomes fail to maximize the aggregate welfare, or 
surplus of the owners as a group. Decisions are made by vote schemes, with votes assigned either 
on the basis of democratic principles or in proportion to the transactional relationship the owner 
                                                             
24For example, Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 does not clearly indicate whether a member who 
leave the cooperatives or dismissed from membership collect the share capital he paid or whether he is entitled to the 
capital gains of his investment. The law leaves the matter to be decided by the majority. See Art 15 of the 
Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998. The only option that he has is to sell his share. See Ibid Art 19. 
Even in that case the fact that only residents can become a member and the membership has to be accepted by the 
general meeting clouds the right to transfer the share thereby making excessive retention too painful to the owners. 
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has with the firm. If we assume that owners are rational egoists who do not want to sacrifice 
even tiny benefits of their own to the benefit of other owners, then there is a possibility that the 
majority would pass a decision that benefits them but may affect the aggregate outcome. 
Heterogeneity of interest increases when the owners are suppliers or purchasers or employees of 
the firm. This means this cost is high in a cooperative form of ownership and less in investor-
owned form of ownership.  
 
There are also the costs of the decision making process itself. To make a rational vote an owner 
has to invest based on information concerning the firm and about the preference of other owners. 
There are also costs of meeting and implementation of effective decisions. 
 
 Risk bearing costs 
In addition to management cost ownership is also associated with risk bearing cost. One class of 
persons having a transactional relationship with the firm may be in a much better position than 
others to bear those risks. Although investor-owned firms are usually considered efficient in 
reducing risk by bearing costs, consumer cooperatives may also be in a good position to bear the 
risk of enterprises. This is particularly true where the goods or services involved are a small 
fraction of the customer’s budget or where the customers are themselves firms that can pass the 
risk on to their own owners or customers. 
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2.3 Governance of investor-owned firms 
 
Here governance is intended to refer to the management organs and their powers, responsibilities 
and accountabilities. One of the important points that distinguish firms from other contracts is 
the existence of governing bodies. The governing bodies complete and specify when the time 
reaches, rights and duties which may be incomplete or unspecified due to the inability of human 
beings to properly forecast the future. More importantly in a firm there is a necessity for 
enforcing such contracts internally. Governance is completing and specifying incomplete and 
unspecified rights and duties (decision-making) and also enforcing the contract. Thus it is an 
extension of ownership right and fall in the theory firm ownership. 
 
The decision-making is mainly the power and responsibility of shareholders and the board of 
directors. Enforcing or executing the contract is the power and responsibility of the manager. The 
management may be designed to the ultimate benefit of the owners of the enterprise, the 
management personnel, or the public depending nature of shareholding, economic, legal, cultural 
and political mechanisms.
25
 
 
This subtopic intends to show that the choice of the form of ownership could also be affected by 
the legal limitation imposed by the law on owners to manage their firm. A firm works towards 
public purpose if its management is accountable to the public. This is shown by showing that 
investor-owned firms could be made to work for the benefit of the public if its management is 
made accountable to the public than to the shareholders. This implies that cooperatives may end 
up in profit maximizing mission if the management is made accountable to the members only 
without having any form of public accountability. 
 
A. Separation of Ownership from Control Thesis
26
 
According to separation of ownership from control thesis set out by Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means in Modern Corporation, business had undergone an evolution from control through 
complete ownership, to majority control, to control through legal device, to minority control, and 
                                                             
25 See Lorraine Talbot, Critical Company Law (Routledge-Cavendish,2008) 107 
26 Unless otherwise expressly stated all discussions under this subtopic are adapted from Talbot  Ibid 106-190 
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finally to managerial control. Historically, capitalism in the United States began with individuals 
or partnerships of individuals who fully owned and controlled the business. Gradually, corporate 
ownership became widely dispersed and there were no shareholders who had a majority share in 
the capital. At this time shareholders were trying to protect their interest through the application 
of law and contract. Over time the majority of shareholders lost interest in control of the 
corporation. This opened a room for minorities to influence the management. In the twentieth 
century, shareholders became too powerless and too passive due to the further dispersal of 
ownership. This was the final stage of evolution of control which resulted in a shift of power 
from those that owned the corporation, shareholders; to those that controlled it, the board of 
directors and managers. 
 
B. Implication of separation of ownership from control
27
 
If corporations are not controlled by owners, then they are controlled by professional managers. 
Rights and duties which were not completed and/or not specified in the memorandum of 
associations are to be completed and specified by the management. This implies that the policies 
of corporations are made by professionals. This has three alternative effects. The first effect is 
that managers would be loyal to owners and make policies that maximize profits which go to the 
owners. The second alternative is that the management may make policies and decisions that 
benefit the management personally. The management members may even be shareholders 
themselves but pro-management decisions such as large bonuses and excess retentions would 
benefit them more than pro owners’ decisions would benefit them. The third alternative is that 
the management exercises its control powers to attain social goals. The alternative that the 
management chooses depends on the business culture, political, economic and legal 
circumstances.  
 
In a business culture, where there are high ethical standards that individuals are committed to 
follow, the management would less probably pass self-serving decisions. In such a culture, self-
serving decisions would be taken as a betrayal of one’s own world. So the management would 
either be pro-owners or pro-social goals. Political circumstances would also matter a lot. The 
management would be influenced by public opinion and government interferences. In a liberal 
                                                             
27
Unless otherwise expressly stated all discussions under this subtopic are adapted from Talbot.  Ibid 106-190 
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political system, the managers would probably be pro-owners. In an egalitarian political system 
the management would incline to social goals such as customer welfare, employee benefit and 
environmental issues. The existence of a high rate of unemployment for professionals or the lack 
of a competitive labour market may also discipline the management into working towards the 
interest of the owners’ goals or social objectives.  
 
Legal mechanisms are the most important disciplining factors. In a liberal economy, the law is 
designed to protect the interest of the owners. This law provides all possible mechanisms that 
would safeguard the interest of owners including, but not limited to, a duty of good faith, liability 
of the owners for failure to act properly and timely, dismissal notwithstanding contractual terms, 
and liability to creditors. Generally, such law makes the management answerable to the interest 
of the owners’, which is best expressed as an objective to maximize profits. On the other hand, in 
a state controlled economy, the law does everything to make sure that the corporations are public 
organizations that safeguard the interest of those who deal with it, either as suppliers of raw 
material, suppliers of labour, as purchasers or as a community where the investor-owned firm 
functions. The management is accountable to the public not to the owners. This means the 
investor-owned firm could be made to serve the public purpose. If the law is 
silent/vague/ambiguous on the accountability of the management and, more importantly, if the 
judiciary is partial, inefficient and the state administrative machineries are corrupt, the separation 
of ownership would highly probably lead to the sequestration of the firm by the management 
personnel to their own benefit. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
Thus this Chapter shows that there are valid economic reasons that may push entrepreneurs to 
organize their business in the form of cooperatives. This could be understood from the definition 
of firm, theory of firm, theory of firm ownership.  
 
Firm is a nexus of contract. This means it is a series of transactional relationship between the 
parties to the contract. Cooperatives could possibly one type of firm. This because the 
characteristics of a firm are that there is transactional relationship between the firm and owners 
of the firm. Normally investor owned firms parties to the next are lenders of the firm that means 
they have given certain amount of money to the firm and receive the interest in the form of 
dividend. Likewise, in producer cooperatives members are suppliers of goods to the cooperatives 
and receive interest on their supply in the form of surplus. Similarly, in consumer cooperatives 
the members are purchasers of goods/services from the cooperative and receive interest on their 
purchase in the form of surplus. The same could be said for workers cooperative. So both in 
investor owned firms and cooperative owners (parties to the transactional relationship) receive 
benefit from the firm on the basis of the amount of transaction they have made with the firm in 
the previous accounting year. Investor owned firms are nothing more/less than lenders 
cooperatives. 
 
Firm is the result of economic rationality. It reduces transaction cost that may exist on individual 
level of transaction. It also distributes risk among the members. Moreover; firm highly reduces 
the risk of non-compliance that exists in the individual level of transaction. Firms reduce this 
hazard by providing for a well specified and complete agreement and monitoring mechanism. 
 
Once individuals decide that it is wise to have a firm, they proceed to decide what type of 
transactional relationship they need to have. Such decision also depends on theory of economic 
rationality. They choose the relation that best advances their economic interest. The choice either 
to become a money lender or supplier of goods or purchaser of goods/services or supplier of 
labour is an economic choice. Transaction cost, ownership cost and management cost are major 
points to be considered in such choices.  For example cooperative form of transactional 
relationship may be more appropriate choice to reduce unfair trade, to avoid the risk of 
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asymmetric information, to reduce the negative consequence of inflation and labour 
specialization. Lender-borrower relation may be preferred to reduce cost of ownership such as 
agency cost and collective decision making cost.  
 
As an extension of ownership cost, the extent of management freedom given to the owners by 
the law also matters a lot in making the choice. Normally in investor owned firms (lender- 
borrower relation) the law gives wider power to the owners to manage the firm and control the 
management body. But that may not always true specially in a legal system that inclines to give 
the government power to control the private sector. If in such legal system cooperative form of 
transaction gives wider autonomy to the owners such transactional relationship may be an 
economic choice.  
 
In Chapter One we have seen that for various reasons cooperators have been borrowing many of 
the ideas of companies thereby overlapping cooperatives on companies. In this Chapter we see 
that entrepreneurs may overlap companies on cooperatives. In the subsequent chapters (Chapter 
Three to Eight) we examine whether the Ethiopian Legal System is capable of avoiding or at 
least reducing the possibility of such overlapping. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
COMPREHENDING COOPERATIVES UNDER ETHIOPIAN 
COOPERATIVE LAW
1
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
True Cooperatives are half way between associations and investor-owned firms.
2
 Associations
3
 
are the main mechanism by which free citizens in a free society can participate in the public 
sphere of the society, whereas investor-owned firms are the means for free citizens to participate 
in the free economy.
4
Charities are one form of association where people act collectively to solve 
public problems such as poverty, illness, crime and illiteracy. Like charities, cooperatives are 
working for those who are economically disadvantaged and the ultimate objective is to enable 
that disadvantaged individual to get out of poverty, or to obtain a fair share of the free economy; 
profit maximization is not their ultimate agenda. Moreover, like charities, in cooperatives there is 
also a sense of assisting and supporting others, although in the former the assistance is to non-
members and in the latter the assistance is to members only, and the assistance has to be 
reciprocated. Like investor-owned firms, cooperatives raise capital from those who ultimately 
and directly benefit by the establishment and existence of the cooperatives. Much like investor-
owned firms, cooperatives have profit and loss accounts or balance sheets. In some small way 
this indicates that the laws governing cooperatives needs to be a balanced hybrid of the law of 
charities and the law of investor-owned firms.  
                                                             
1Notice that the issue of federal vs. state jurisdiction may be raised at this juncture although this research has no 
intention to answer such issue. This research assumes this law as a law applicable to all cooperatives in Ethiopia for 
three main reasons. Firstly, jurisdiction is not an issue in this research. Secondly, cooperative laws are universal. 
And thirdly, Ethiopian federalism inclines to unitary state structure because of vanguard party system where EPDRF 
and its allies rule all member states with almost no opposition parties both in the federal and state legislation and 
which does not seem to change very soon. 
2Christopher Merrett and Walzer, Norman (eds),Cooperatives and Local Development; Theory and Application for 
the 21st  Century(ME Sharp, 2004) 24 
3 An association is a grouping formed between two or more persons with  no view of securing direct financial 
benefits but  with a view to obtaining exclusively charitable purpose  or with a view of  promoting  the rights and 
interest of its members. The Civil  Code  of Ethiopia of 1960 Art 404  in combination with Charities and Societies 
Proclamation  No.621/2009 Art 14 and 55 
4 Ibid 
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This chapter intends to show that although the special privileges given by the Government to 
cooperatives leads one to believe that there should be distinction between cooperatives and 
investor-owned firms, reference to the definition, the ultimate objectives, formation or liability of 
cooperatives do not assist in establishing such a distinction. I argue here that this is a logical 
conclusion when the comparative analysis of the law relating to both cooperatives and investor-
owned firms is taken into account.  
To that effect I examine the special privileges, definitions, ultimate objectives, formation and 
liability of cooperatives on the basis of the Cooperative Society Proclamation 
No.147/1998.Academic literature is used to elucidate the concepts that are incorporated in the 
Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998.  
 
3.1 Special privileges of cooperatives in Ethiopia 
The main reason why we need to keep clear the distinction between true cooperatives and 
investor-owned firms is because the Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 recognizes 
special privileges for cooperatives. In order to justifiably get such special benefits, a cooperative 
has to enable the public to attain certain defined objectives. It is difficult to imagine that the 
privileges are arbitrarily given. If the cooperatives’ end up having the same profit maximizing 
objectives as the investor-owned firms they should no longer receive these privileges. So the 
special privileges account for society’s belief that cooperatives are different from investor-owned 
firms. 
 
This subtopic is intended to show that there are special benefits designed for cooperatives in 
exclusion of investor-owned firms. As the Ethiopian Government has been in power, it is an 
interventionist government and there are benefits for investors.
5
 These benefits are conditional 
upon policy considerations such as export promotion, import substitution, poverty reduction, 
wealth inequality reduction and possibility of curving outflow of profit from foreign direct 
investment.
6
 In these cases, the form of organization for the investment is of no significance; it 
                                                             
5  The incumbent government of Ethiopia claims to be developmentalism. See further discussion in Chapter six 
6The benefits include among other things, land allotment, access to loan, tax holiday/exemption, and preference in 
government procurement. Although in principle urban land is accessible only through auction, manufacturing 
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may be sole proprietorship or investor-owned firms, public enterprises or cooperatives.
7
The 
benefits we discuss here is only those benefits that depend solely on the form of the organization 
of the investment-cooperative form of investment. These benefits are: priority claim, set-off, 
freedom from attachment, longer period of limitation of action, and government assistance. 
These are discussed in detail below.  
A. Priority Claims 
The issue of priority claims becomes important when a debtor has plurality of creditors and there 
is a possibility that his asset is not worth enough to pay all his creditors. To avoid such a risk of 
insolvency for the debtor, creditors may get priority claims on identified properties of the debtor 
either by a contract, a law, a judicial decision or a will.
8
The priority claim extends to the property 
indicated by the legal mechanism used to transfer its right. A creditor having such a priority right 
is paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the property before all other creditors.
9
 
 
The law that gives priority claims for the creditor (state) on all properties of the debtor is 
Ethiopian tax law.
10
 It is obvious why the tax obligation takes priority over all other obligations 
because tax is the major source of revenue for the Government who has the legislative power to 
determine its payment priorities. If the State does not collect enough revenue, it is difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
enterprises and “projects having special national significance” may be given land by allotment at a bench mark 
(lowest) lease price. See Urban Land Lease Holding Proclamation No.721/2011 Art 7(2), 12, 14 & 2(11). Rural 
Land is made available to any investors who want to invest in agriculture and has received investment permit. See 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation No.456/2005 
Art 5(4(b)) cum Investment Proclamation No. 280/2002. Foreign investors are privileged to open and operate 
foreign currency accounts and they have the right to make remittance out of Ethiopia.(Ibid Art 19). Investor that 
engages in manufacturing, agro-industrial activities or the production of agricultural products and exports at least 
fifty percent of his product or supplies at least seventy –five percent of his product to an exporter as production 
inputs is entitled to tax holidays. See Investment Incentives and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors 
Council of Ministers Regulation No.84/2003 Art. 4-7.There is also custom duty exemption for import of capital 
goods. (Ibid Art 8-9). If a resident company or partnership reinvests the profit it earned to raise the capital of another 
company or partnership such amount shall be deductible from its taxable income. See Income Tax Proclamation 
NO.286/2002 Art 27(1). Export oriented investments are also charged VAT at a zero rate. See Value Added Tax 
Proclamation No.285/2002 Art 7(2).  In government procurement a preference margin of up to 15% for goods 
produced in Ethiopia and up to 7.5% for works carried out by Ethiopian are granted in the evaluation process. See 
Determining Procedures of Public Procurement and Establishing its Supervising Agency Proclamation No.430/2005 
Art 19. Micro and small scale enterprises are also privileged to technical training and certification, industrial 
extension services, government assistance to search for alternative market, facilitation  by government  of access to 
loan etc. See Micro and small scale enterprises development strategy support and implementation strategy(in 
Amharic , Jan 2011 p 36-52) 
7 See Investment Proclamation No. 280/2002 Art 10 
8 See Civil Code of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1960 Art 2825, 3041 and 3117 Pledge and antichresis arise out of 
contract only where as mortgage may arise from contract, law, will or judicial decision.  
9  Ibid Art 2857 and 3076-3080 
10 See Income Tax Proclamation No.286/2002 Art 80  and Value Added Tax Proclamation No.285/2002 Art 32 
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imagine the enforcement of other rights. However, the State’s priority claim respects the prior 
secured claims of creditors, and the tax authority has to inform any person, who is in possession 
of movable property or the organ that registers a mortgage interest of its intention to get priority 
right on the property.
11
 
 
Although the claim of a cooperative over a member’s property does not have priority over the 
Government’s tax claim, it has priority over the prior secured claims of other creditors.12The 
priority claim recognized for cooperatives on the property of a member is even wider than the 
priority claim of the tax authority. A cooperative is not expected to inform a person who is in 
possession of movable property,  or inform the organ that registers the mortgage, its intention to 
get priority right on the property.
13
 It is very difficult to imagine justifications for such a priority 
claim especially over the right of prior secured creditors unless a cooperative does not have a 
significant distinction from investor-owned firms in its ultimate end, in the business it carries 
out, and by the ethics under which it carries out the business.
14
  
 
If the cooperatives were limited by the law to user owner, user control and user benefit principles 
the priority claim might have been justified by analogy to the concept of maintenance 
allowances. Maintenance allowance is the minimum means to feed, to lodge, to cloth and to care 
for the health of a creditor in a decent manner including funeral expenses having regard to the 
social condition of the interested persons and local custom.
15
It appears reasonable if a person 
who provides such a maintenance allowance gets priority over all other creditors for the amount 
of maintenance allowance he gave.
16
 The priority right would also be justified if the debt of a 
member is a debt he owes to a consumer cooperative that supplied him goods/services on credit 
basis.  A membership contribution to collective producer cooperatives for subsistence may also 
be justified to get priority over other debts.
17
 
 
 
                                                             
11 Ibid  
12Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 Art  28 
13 Ibid 
14 These points are discussed in chapters that follow. 
15  See Civil Code of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1960 Art 807 and 824 
16  Ibid Art  816(3) 
17  See Civil Procedure of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1965 Art 404(b) 
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B. Set-off in Respect of Shares or Benefits of Members 
Set-off is possible under the Civil Code which governs the obligation, in spite of the source of 
the obligation and parties to the obligation.
18
 However, there are positive and negative conditions 
of set-off.
19“The positive conditions are liquidity, maturity and fungibility.”20Set-off shall not 
occur unless both debts are money debts or relate to certain quantity of fungible things of the 
same species and both debts are liquidated and due.”21Negative conditions are, that there are 
debts which can never be set-off such as the maintenance allowance, wages, tax obligations, 
things unjustly deprived or acquired as a result of a bailment.
22
 
 
Now we may ask, is the set-off privilege under the Cooperative Society Proclamation subject to 
positive and negative conditions provided under the civil code? If the answer is yes, it is no more 
a special privilege to cooperatives. The fact that Art 29 of the Cooperative Society Proclamation 
No.147/1998 allows set-off only against shareholding and benefits, seems to support this positive 
conclusion. However, such a conclusion may make the Article unreasonably redundant since it 
adds nothing to the civil code.  
 
C. Share or benefit not liable to attachment  
In principle, the performance by a debtor of his obligation shall be guaranteed by all his 
properties and claims.
23
 This means without prejudice to priority rights of other creditors, any 
judgment creditor may demand the attachment and sale of any property or claim of the debtor as 
a satisfaction of the judgment. However, properties that are used to maintain the debtor, such as 
for his family, are considered necessary to enable subsistence, could not be liable to attachment 
and sale.
24
Moreover, benefits of employment injuries cannot be attached.
25
In short, properties 
and claims that relates directly or indirectly to maintenance are immune from attachment and 
sale for the satisfaction of debts. 
                                                             
18  Ibid Art 1675-677 and 1831 
19Ibid Art  1832 and 1833 
20  Ibid Art 1832 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid Art 1833 
23 Civil Code  of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1960 Art 1988  
24Civil Procedure Code of the Empire of Ethiopia Art 404  Also see Civil Code of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1960 
Art 816 
25 Labour Proclamation No.377/2003  Art112 
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Are shares and benefits of a member in a cooperative limited directly or indirectly to 
maintenance of a member? It would be difficult to believe that cooperative production is 
necessarily limited to subsistence production. Worker cooperatives’ pay subsistence wages to 
member employees and hence any additional benefit a worker may receive from the cooperative 
in the form of profit is beyond subsistence. The same logic applies but is more clearly relevant to 
producer and consumer cooperatives. However, the Cooperative Society Proclamation 
No.147/1998 relieves any investment in a cooperative from attachment in spite of its amount and 
purpose.
26
 In a situation where cooperatives are free to work towards profit maximization 
objectives, such a privilege would make cooperatives a beyond the law relating to creditors. 
 
D. Administrative ease  
Compared to investor-owned firms, cooperatives are entitled to some administrative simplicity 
such as temporary certification, operation without trade license, prolonged period of limitation of 
action. The detail is provided as follows: 
 
Temporary certificate possible 
To begin operation cooperatives have to be registered.
27
Equally investor-owned firms need to be 
registered.
28
In addition to serving as a permit to operate, registration is the source of legal 
personality both for the cooperatives and investor-owned firms.
29
To get registered both 
cooperatives and investor-owned firms have to fulfill certain conditions.
30
However, cooperatives 
may be registered and be given a temporary certificate without fulfilling some of the registration 
requirements.
31
They would be given one year to fulfill the unfulfilled requirements.
32
Similar 
flexibility does not exist for investor-owned firms. 
 
                                                             
26 Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 Art 30 
27 Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998  Art 9(1) 
28 Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation No. 686/2010 Art 6(1) and Commercial Code Art  
219 
29 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998  Art 10(1), Commercial Registration and Business Licensing 
Proclamation No. 686/2010 Art , Commercial Code Art 223 
30 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998  Art 9(2) and Commercial Registration and Business Licensing 
Proclamation No. 686/2010 Art  11 and 12 and Commercial Code Art 221 
31 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998  Art 9 (7) as amended by Proclamation No.402/2004 
32 Ibid  
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No Business License 
Another point of administrative simplicity in favour of cooperatives is the dispensation from 
obtaining a business license.
33
Registration is enough for cooperatives to engage in any business. 
It is not necessary to secure an additional trade license. However, unlike cooperatives, no person 
shall carry on commercial activities without obtaining a business license.
34
 
 
Notice that if cooperatives are limited to engaging in non-commercial activities exempting them 
from the requirement of a business license is justified. According to Ethiopian Commercial Code 
an activity is a commercial activity if it is carried on for the purpose of making profit.
35
That 
means any economic activity that goes beyond providing means of substance and intend to 
increase the wealth of the operators is a commercial activity.
36
This benefit is justified if 
cooperatives are limited to subsistence economic activities or are expected of different ultimate 
object than expected of investor-owned firms. 
 
Limitation of Action 
Article 1845 of the Civil Code of Ethiopia provides a ten year general period of limitation for 
any action.
37
Any claim of rights which has not been brought to court within ten years from the 
day when the right could be exercised is extinguished by limitation of action. Other parts of the 
Civil Code and other laws, may provide a different period of limitation of action. A right to 
invalidate a contract affected by defects in consent extinguishes within two years.
38
Similarly 
actions of non-contractual liability and insurance contract extinguish within two years.
39
 An 
action of “Petitio haereditatis” is barred after three years from the date the claimant become 
aware of the death of the deceased and is absolutely barred after fifteen years from the date of the 
death of the deceased.
40
An action arising from an employment relationship is barred by 
                                                             
33 Ibid Art 9(6) 
34Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation No. 686/2010 Art 31(1) 
35 Commercial Code Art 5 
36 Ibid Art 6-10 
37 Civil Code Art 1845 
38 Ibid Art 1810-1813 
39 Ibid Art 2143 and Commercial Code Art 647 When the non-contractual liability arises from the commission of  a 
criminal offence the period of limitation provided under criminal law applies. The criminal period of limitation 
ranges from a minimum of two years to the maximum of twenty-five years. See the Criminal Code of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia  Proclamation No.414/2004 Art 217 and 218 
40 Civil Code Art 1000  
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limitation after one year.
41The right of the tax authority to amend a tax payer’s declaration of tax 
obligation expires after five years.
42
However, in case where the taxpayer has not declared his 
income or has submitted a fraudulent declaration, no time limit is provided.
43
 
 
The Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 provides a special and comparatively a 
longer period of limitation in favour of a cooperative.
44
Any right emanating from the contract 
concluded by a cooperative is barred by limitation of action after twenty years.  We can notice 
here that the period of limitation applies when a cooperative claims against a debtor .i.e. it 
applies only when a cooperative is a claimant/creditor; it does not apply when a cooperative a 
debtor and somebody is a claimant/creditor against the cooperative. 
 
E. Income tax exemptions 
Under Ethiopian Income Tax Laws investor-owned firms including public enterprises pay 
income tax at 30% rate.
45
However, the Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 exempts 
cooperatives from income tax obligation.
46
This income tax exemption would be justified only if 
a cooperative acts as an agent of its members to buy or sell on behalf of each individual 
member.
47
 
 
F. Government assistance 
All the privileges discussed in the preceding sections are privileges given by the legislature. In 
addition to these privileges the legislator mandates and authorizes the executive to make 
additional privileges to cooperatives. The areas of mandate are among other things: access to 
land, access to loans, technical assistance, audit and inspection services, court fees and legal 
services.
48
 
                                                             
41 Labour Proclamation No.377/2003 Art 162 Reinstatement claim expires after three months whereas payment 
claims expire after six months. 
42 Income Tax Proclamation No.286/2002 Art 71 Other tax legislations contain the same period of limitation. 
43Ibid 
44Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 Art  31(4) as amended by Proclamation No.402/2004 
45 Income Tax Proclamation No 286/2002 Art 19(1) 
46 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998  Art  31(1) 
47 See infra foot note 104 
48 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998  Art 31(1(back) & 2), 36-39 
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In Ethiopia land is very expensive.
49
The problem with accessibility to land is its expense and 
shortage of supply. One can legitimately get access to land only from the Government. 
Government supply of land is very small. So access to urban land is not only a matter of money 
but also a matter of luck. Accessing land from the Government is a great privilege for 
cooperatives. 
 
The Government may also facilitate access to loans. In Ethiopia, the financial sector is highly 
regulated, and the state prioritizes projects. Coupled with the scarcity of capital in the country, 
getting the Government’s blessing either directly or indirectly is very crucial to get access to loan 
either from banks or from micro and small scale financial enterprises.  
 
Cooperatives could also get training and advice for free. They could also get audit and inspection 
services for free. The cooperative commission may also institute a claim on behalf of a 
cooperative against those who might have embezzled the cooperative. Although, unless 
pauperism is proved no statement of claim can be admitted by a court before the prescribed court 
fees are paid,
50
 the Council of Ministers may exempt cooperatives from court fees.
51
One of the 
major aims of cooperative commission is to assist cooperatives in all possible respects including 
searching for alternative markets.  
 
In order to benefit from these privileges an economic organization has to be able to show that it 
is a cooperative. In the following subtopics and successive chapters we are going to examine the 
Cooperative Society Proclamation to see whether or not distinguishing cooperatives from 
investor-owned firms is an easy task in Ethiopia. We consider almost all provisions of the law to 
search for one that clearly distinguishes between cooperatives from investor-owned firms. 
 
 
 
                                                             
49 For example in the fifth round lease auction of December 2013 the land lease price in Addis Ababa ranges from a 
minimum of two thousand five hundred(2500) to thirty-one thousand one-hundred and ten (31110) birr per square 
meter. See Addis Lisan News Paper (2006) 21(1) E.C.10-14 
50 Civil Procedure Code Art 215 
51Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 Art  31(3) as amended by Proclamation No.402/2004 
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3.2 Definition 
The definition given to cooperatives by the Cooperatives Society Proclamation No.147/1998 
pushes cooperatives closer to investor-owned firms than charities. This is because individuals 
can become a member only if he/she contributes money to the capital. Furthermore, profit/loss 
seems to be the concern of members despite the fact that cooperatives are merely organizational 
means to enable individuals to collectively solve common economic and social problems. 
The proclamation defines Cooperative Society as follows: 
“Cooperative Society’ means a society52 established by individuals on voluntary basis to 
collectively solve their economic and social problem and to democratically manage 
same.”53 
There are five basic concepts in this definition that need detailed explanation in order to 
understand what cooperatives are. These elements are individuals, voluntariness, collective 
action, economic and social problems and democratic control. 
A. Individuals 
The first important element of the definition is the word ‘individuals.’ Here the word 
‘individuals’ must have been intended to refer to both physical and juridical persons because Art 
2(3) of the Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 which define ‘member,’ and Art 6(1) 
of the same proclamation, which talks about levels of cooperatives, impliedly recognizes that 
cooperatives may establish other cooperatives. This is more clearly provided in the Council of 
Ministers Regulation No.106/2004 Art 3 which classifies cooperatives into Primary 
Cooperatives, Unions, Federations and League. The idea of creating one big cooperative 
community from combination of smaller cooperative communities has emerged with the 
                                                             
52Art 2(1) of Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998   uses the word ‘Society’ to refer to a cooperative 
which received registration certificate from concerned government organ. Although there is some inconsistency, the 
word ‘society’ is used throughout the proclamation to refer to cooperatives after registration and the phrase 
‘cooperative Society’  is used to refer to cooperatives until registration. For sake of clarity the word ‘cooperative’ 
should have been enough to refer to unregistered ones and the word ‘association’ should have been used in place of 
society in the definition of cooperatives. 
53 The Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 
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emergence of Cooperatives.
54
Cooperatives are established by two or more persons either 
physical persons or artificial persons or a combination of both. 
B. Voluntariness 
The second important element of the definition is voluntariness. Voluntariness primarily means 
the free and unrestrained will of a person to be bound by an obligation.
55
This indicates that 
cooperatives are the result of an agreement where a person decides to be a member after making 
his own personal judgment about the benefits and responsibilities of becoming a member. No 
one is forced to be a member; membership depends on freedom of choice.
56
However, unlike 
investor-owned firms, this freedom of choice is limited by the principle of open membership, 
which means that individuals would be members of even if the bylaws prohibit admission of new 
members already.
57
 
Voluntariness also means commitment to carry out certain obligations without consideration or 
with insignificant consideration.
58
This indicates that there is some element of philanthropy in the 
cooperatives. Those who are a little bit better off either in terms of wealth or skill/knowledge 
could agree to help other fellow members. Usually in early cooperatives, the fact that distribution 
of profit, if any, never depended on contribution to the capital, and the principle of democratic 
management may partly indicate that those who have money agreed to help those who have less 
or none.
59
The principle of open membership and cooperation
60
 could also be justified on the 
basis of voluntariness. Early cooperatives were the result of philanthropists in early nineteenth 
century Britain out of which they gradually developed into mutual self-help which still contained 
some form of philanthropy.
61
In the contemporary period, there are cooperatives organized by 
                                                             
54Arnold Bonner, British Cooperation The History, Principle and Organization of the British Cooperative 
Movement(Co-operative Union Ltd, 1961) 28 
55Henry Black, Black’s Law Dictionary(4th edition, West Publishing Co, 1968) 1747 
56For further discussion on state action that may impend freedom of choice see our discussion on principle of 
voluntarism infra. 
57For detail see our discussion on principle of open membership in chapter four. 
58 Black (n 54) 1747 
59 However; these matters may be taken as a technical nationalization of private property in the communist ideology 
which makes voluntariness an empty concept. In a system where there is protection of private property it is possible 
to justify democratic management and disregard capital contribution in profit sharing as charitable action. See 
further discussion under principle of voluntarism.  
60 These two principles are discussed in a little more detail under principles of cooperatives. 
61 Peter Davis and Martin Parker, ‘Cooperatives, Labor, and the State: The English Labor Economists Revisited’ 
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philanthropists but owned and managed by members.
62
This concept of voluntariness is the one 
main features that distinguishes cooperatives from investor-owned firms. In investor-owned 
firms, profit distribution and management depend on share capital. Members of investor-owned 
firms compete not only jointly against other investor-owned firms but also internally against 
each other. Cooperatives do not normally compete jointly against others or individually against 
each other. 
However; the Ethiopian legislator must have used the word ‘voluntary’ to refer to freedom of 
choice only and not to commitment to help other members. This is because although the freedom 
of choice is recognized throughout the whole text of the Cooperatives Society Proclamation 
No.147/1998, there are provisions in the proclamation that obfuscate the commitment to help 
other members. One of these provisions is Art 5(2) which declares profit distribution to be on the 
basis of share capital.
63
  The other provision is Art 13(2) which makes contribution to a capital a 
mandatory requirement to be a member of a cooperative; only those who able to pay share 
capital and registration fee can become a member (willingness to use the service of the 
cooperatives and declaration to pay share capital latter on is not enough).In investor-owned firms 
contribution to share capital and profit share proportionate to share capital are building blocks.
64
 
C. Collective solution 
This concept further reinforces the necessity of members’ commitment to help other members. 
Cooperation is one of the three alternative ways of achieving goals.
65
The other two alternatives 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 (2011) 39(4) Review of Radical Political Economics 522;Hebe Spaull, The Cooperative Movement in the World 
Today (Barrie and Rockliff,1945) 16 
62 See our discussion in chapter one. 
63 For further analysis of this issue see our discussion Principle of Cooperatives.  
64 See Art 252, 270, 295, 345(2), 510 of the Commercial Code of Ethiopia.  However; two points need to be noted 
here. The first is that in partnership the law presumes equal distribution of profit unless otherwise agreed.. In 
partnership members are mostly family members or close friends where there may be some form of assisting each 
other (cooperating to solve family economic problems) rather than pure profit earning objectives. Secondly, 
contribution is also according to the means available to each member and that is why the law allows contribution of 
labour as capital which is not possible in company. These two points by themselves make the Ethiopian 
Cooperatives closer to company than partnership thereby reducing the possibility of quasi charity concept in 
cooperatives. See Art 229(1), 295, 303, 304, and 312 
65Richard Williams, The Cooperative Movement: Globalization From Below(Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2007) 38 
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are competition and individual effort.
66
 These are the three alternative models of doing carrying 
out economic activities. 
Cooperation is ‘a game in which all players attempt to accumulate points for the entire group by 
using their unique capabilities and talents.’67Cooperativism presupposes that everybody has 
some potential and no one is complete by himself. If everybody properly utilizes their potential 
then everybody benefits. Likewise, if someone fails to properly utilize their potential, all the 
other members would lose some of the benefits. In a cooperative, collective action is core and, 
for a cooperative goal to be achieved, members have to help and encourage each other.
68
This 
further implies that in cooperatives the most important thing is individual members themselves 
rather than the money they bring in to the cooperatives as a working capital. This is the 
cooperative model. 
In contrast, the competition model, which is the main characteristics of the action of investor-
owned firms, renders the collective action of shareholders/members unimportant. What is 
important here is that each member has to carryout her own contractual obligation as indicated in 
the partnership agreement and other legislation.
69
 The success or failure of the 
shareholder/member does not depend on the success/failure of other shareholder/member. To the 
contrary, sometimes the failure of some shareholders may even be an implication of success of 
other shareholders/members. Collective action is necessary in investor-owned firms until the 
partnership agreement is signed. Even this initial cooperation is not necessary in a model of 
individual effort of attaining goals.
70
This last model is the characteristics of sole traders. 
In the Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 the element of collective action makes a 
clear distinction between cooperatives and investor-owned firms. As indicated under the 
objectives of cooperatives, they are expected to be established to solve problems that necessitate 
collective action.
71
The emphasis of individual ethics is also an implication of collective action 
                                                             
66 Ibid 
67 Ibid emphasis added 
68 Ibid 39 
69 A Partnership agreement is a contract whereby two or more persons, who intend to join together and to cooperate, 
undertake to bring together contributions for the purpose of carrying out activities of an  economic nature and of 
participating in the profits and loss arising out thereof ,if any. See Art 211 of the Commercial Code. 
70 Ibid 
71Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 4   Further discussion on objectives of cooperatives is made 
infra. 
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since collective action is better governed by ethical rules than pure legal or contractual 
rules.
72
The general meeting
73
 is empowered to dismiss a member who has not been behaving 
properly, and hence negatively affecting the collective interest,
74
 and a member is admitted by 
the decision of the general meeting.
75
The principle of the education and training to members and 
even to non-members,
76
 and the principles of cooperation internally among members and 
externally among cooperatives
77
are indications of the need of collective actions in cooperatives. 
Article 46 in Cooperatives Society Proclamation No.147/1998 which makes conciliation and 
arbitration a mandatory mechanism of dispute resolution among members and between members 
and the cooperatives
78
 also implies the existence of collective action in cooperatives. In investor-
owned firms, since their relationship is governed by contract and hence never depends on 
individual behaviour and diligence, no member can be dismissed by the decision of shareholders’ 
meeting.
79
Since there is free transfer of shares in investor-owned firms,
80
 and the share is an 
incorporeal chattel, it is considered as things capable of making up the inheritance.
81
Thus, 
anybody who happens to be an heir under the law of succession automatically becomes 
shareholder. 
                                                             
72Williams (n 65) 38  
73Further discussion about general meeting is made under Ownership and Management in Chapter six. 
74Cooperatives Society Proclamation  No. 147/1998 cumulative reading of Art 13(3), 15(2) and 20(10) 
75 Ibid Art 19(2&3) 
76 Ibid Art 5(5) 
77 Ibid Art 5(6) 
78 Ibid Art 46 
79See Art 261 279, 295, 303, 425, 464(2) and 536 of the Commercial Code. Expulsion is possible in ordinary 
partnership and joint venture. Even in these cases it can be done by the court only. As indicated under footnote 
Supra No.13 ordinary partnership is created by family members or close friends who considers personal etiquette 
important element of the organization. Incidentally Ordinary partnership is not a trader. This means it does not give 
unnecessary attention to profit making. See Art 213 of the Commercial Code. 
80 However, free transfer of share applies to public (share) company and private limited company only. See Art 
333(2) of the Commercial Code.  In partnership and limited partnership membership can be transferred only up on 
the consent of other members. In ordinary partnership the consent of all other members has to be obtained to transfer 
membership rights and duties. In Joint venture and General partnership also unanimous consent is required unless a 
majority decision is agreed upon in the memorandum of association. In limited partnership a majority vote of all 
partners is enough.  In private limited company there is no limitation on internal transfer but for a transfer outside 
the company the consent of majority holding at least seventy five percent of the capital is necessary. See Art 
250,274, 282(2), 302 and 523(2)  But we need to bear in mind that  the principle of open membership in 
cooperatives which implies that the decision of general meeting to admit or not to admit someone as a member 
relates to his etiquette only as far as he consent to use the service of the cooperatives. In contrary in partnership the 
concern of the partners goes beyond the etiquette and may include unwillingness to share the profit with the new 
comer or doubt on  her solvency since partnership has unlimited liability and partners are guarantor to each other. 
81Civil Code of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1960 Art 826(2) cumulative Art 1128 cumulative Commercial Code Art 
325, 524 and 715  Notice here that the issue of succession has no place in partnership since the death of a member 
dissolves the partnership(Art 260(1), 295 &303). 
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D. Economic and social problems 
This phrase contains three different but interrelated words: economic, social and problem. Robert 
Owen created his village of cooperatives to replace the competitive and market oriented 
economic system with a cooperative form of economy.
82
The Owenite movements involved 
business enterprises in which the workers decided to trade with each other
83
and they were the 
result of the advocacy of British Labour Economists who believed that the separation of 
ownership of the means of production from labour was the root cause of labour’s dependency 
and poverty.
84
The immediate objective of Rochdale Pioneers, which is a model of many modern 
cooperatives in all corner of the world, was “to free themselves from adulteration and credit 
system of the little shop keepers and the ‘truck shop’ of the employer.”85In North America, early 
cooperatives were formed to enable small farmers to adapt to the market economy of the 19
th
 
century.
86
Generally, like investor-owned firms, cooperatives are undertaking economic activities. 
However, unlike investor-owned firms and like charities, cooperatives intend to address social 
issues.
87
From the very inception of the idea of the cooperative, cooperatives have been 
struggling to solve social problems such as poverty, economic inequities, crimes and social 
segregations. Robert Owen had a belief that cooperatives could be a solution to two very crucial 
social issues of his time namely mass poverty and moral impurity.
88
 The Owenites, Rochdale 
Pioneers, and the latter British Cooperative Movement had the social objectives of attaining 
among other things economic equality, fair price and quality products.
89
In North America 
“cooperatives were a way to contest the meaning of modernity-farmers protesting urban centred 
policies, regions  or classes resisting economic domination by others, idealists fighting secular 
values, or citizens revitalizing  their  communities in the face of adverse forces.”90 
                                                             
82Bonner (n 53) 11 
83Davis (n 61) 528-532 
84 Ibid 528, 530 and 532 
85 Sidney Webb, The Consumers’ Co-operative Movement (Cornell University Library, 1921) 1. See also Stephen 
Yeo (ed), New views of Co-operation (Taylor and Francis, 1988) 48 
86Merrett (n 2) 24 
87 By social issues we mean matters that may affect directly or indirectly any member of a society or the stability of 
the general political set up. 
88Bonner (n 6) 9-18 
89 Lawrence Black and Nicole Robertson(eds),Consumerism and the Cooperative Movement in Modern British 
History: Taking Stock(Manchester University Press, 2009) 69 
90Merrett(n 2) 24 
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Some nineteenth and early twentieth century cooperative thinkers also had an intention of using 
cooperatives as more effective weapons in the working class struggle against capitalism and 
attaining a classless and democratic political order.
91
Cooperatives may also serve as an 
instrument to solve housing problems both in urban and rural areas.
92
They may also serve as a 
medium to subsidize the low income earners to reduce poverty.
93
Even some of those 
cooperatives established by colonial powers in Africa were intended to solve social problems by 
using economic activities as their entry gate. For example, the French Colonial Administrators 
were using cooperatives as a means to assimilate the Africans with the French culture and the 
Belgians were attempting to create paternalist relationship between the Belgium rulers and the 
Africans.
94
Even the British model of cooperatives in colonial Africa, which was intended to 
encourage white settlers to produce cash crops for export,
95
had a social objective of increasing 
and deepening white settlement. The transformation of the social life of rural communities was 
the main objective of cooperatives under the communist governments of the past.
96
 The United 
Nations also sees cooperatives as good alternatives to reduce poverty and deepen grassroots 
democracies in developing countries. 
In Ethiopia, cooperatives also have had social objectives since their inception in beginning of 
second half of 20
th
 century. During the imperial era, cooperatives were thought, among other 
things, to promote modern farming (by serving as a demonstration place for farmers to learn the 
benefit of modern agricultural technology) and social justice (by improving income of 
members).97 Removing the remnants of feudalism and semi-capitalism in the country throughout 
the country, especially in rural areas, were the ultimate objectives of cooperatives during the 
military regime.
98
 Poverty reduction has been the central concern of cooperatives since 1990s.
99
 
                                                             
91 Ellen Furlough and Carl Strikwerda (eds), Consumers against Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in Europe, 
North America and Japan 1840-1940(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,1999) 116 
92 Ibid 43 
93 Ibid  
94 Frederick Wanyama, ‘Reinventing the Wheel? African cooperatives in a liberalized economic environment’ 
(2009) 80(3) Annuals of Public and Cooperative Economics 361 
95 Ibid  
96M Digby, Cooperatives and Land Use (Basil Blackwell, 1957) 61 
97Cooperative Society Decree No. 44/1960 Art 3(e), 6. 14, 19 and 37 See also the preamble and Art 4 of the  
Cooperative Societies’ Proclamation No.241/ 1966 
98 See the preamble of Cooperative Society Proclamation No.138/1978  
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The word ‘problem’ is also very important in the definition of cooperatives. The purpose of a 
cooperative is to solve the existing economic problems, social problems or to enable members to 
be able to achieve subsistence living; it is a matter of survival or self-preservation. In contrast, 
the economic purpose of an investor-owned firm is to enable members to have properties or 
wealth beyond what they normally need for survival. Its principal function is to expand private 
wealth rather than to produce goods people require for survival. In short, investor-owned firms 
are means of taking offensive (take more wealth from the market than members need for daily 
life) measures whereas cooperatives always take counter-offensive measures. The Cooperatives 
Society Proclamation No.147/1998 expects cooperatives to solve problems of members.
100
 
E. Democratic control 
Democratic control is one of the most important elements that apparently distinguish 
cooperatives from investor-owned firms. Democracy implies that everyone has equal decision 
making power regardless of other factors such as property. In investor-owned firms, the extent of 
participation in the management of the enterprise depends on the number of shares a member has 
in the share capital.
101
Democratic control or management is the expression of collective 
action/solution. Furthermore, democracy implies that individual members are more valuable to 
the ultimate objective of the cooperatives than their capital contributions. In short, in investor-
owned firms capital decides, while in cooperatives individuals decide; investor-owned firms are 
associations of capitals whereas cooperatives are associations of individuals. Cooperatives 
Society Proclamation No.147/1998 not only includes this democratic control in the definition but 
also makes it a guiding principle of cooperatives and also expressly states that every member has 
only one vote regardless of the number of shares he/she has.
102
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
99The preamble and Art 3(6) of Agricultural Cooperative Society Proclamation No.85/1994 See also the preamble  
cum  Art 2 cumulative Art 4 of Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998. However; see our discussion in 
chapter seven to learn that the Ethiopian government has no public objective to attain through cooperative. 
100Cooperatives  Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 4 
101See Commercial Code Art 407 and 534   For Ordinary Partnership the Commercial Code provides for democratic 
control unless other is provided in the partnership agreement. See Art 234   For other forms of partnerships (joint 
venture, general partnership and limited partnership) the code is silent and hence it is left to the partnership 
agreement and in the absence of the agreement the court may apply democratic rule for non-commercial partnership 
and share capital for commercial partnerships. 
102Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 5(2) and Art 18 
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 However, the definition of cooperatives under the Cooperatives Law is silent about profit and 
loss sharing.
103
 This may lead to two alternative interpretations: profit is not a concern of 
cooperatives or profit is the central concern of cooperatives. The latter interpretation, a radical 
and unexpected position, merges cooperatives with investor-owned firms. 
The first is that profit is not the concern of cooperatives and hence they may even function at 
zero profit. This makes a cooperative a commission agent of its members (with the necessary 
changes having been made). 
104
 “In the absence of a stipulation in the contract, the agent shall 
not be entitled to remuneration unless he carried out the agency within the scope of his 
professional duties or where such remuneration is customary.”105 Even where he is entitled to 
remuneration such remuneration may be fixed by agreement to a bare minimum.
106
Investor-
owned firms do not represent shareholders in any sense. The relation is that of lender and 
borrower where the lenders expect interest and the borrower repay the loan with interest. 
Commercial loans are entered into when the borrower believes that he would earn a profit which 
exceeds the interest of the money he borrows thereby making profit and loss the core concept of 
investor-owned firms. Generally, since cooperatives are commission agents (cooperative buys or 
sells by its own name but on behalf and for the benefit of members) profit and loss is not an 
issue. 
                                                             
103 See Art 211 of the Commercial Code which expressly mentions profit or loss sharing as a core element in the 
definition of partnership agreement 
104 “The commission to buy or to sell is a contract of agency whereby the agent, called the commission agent,  
undertakes to buy or to sell in his own name but on behalf of another person, called the principal, goods, securities 
or other fungible things.”“Where the commission agent who is himself entitled to act as buyer or seller notifies the 
principal of the carrying out of a transaction without naming the person with whom he contracted, he shall be 
deemed to have assumed the obligations of buyer or seller on his own account”. (Emphasis added). See Art 2234(1) 
and 2249 of the Civil Code of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1960. Based on the relationship between members and the 
cooperatives, cooperatives can be classified into consumers’ cooperatives, producers’ cooperatives and workers 
cooperative. Consumers cooperatives are cooperatives which provides goods/service to members: cooperative is 
seller; members are buyers or consumers. Consumer cooperatives serve as buying commission agent. The sale may 
be either service including financial service or supply of goods of any type. Saving and credit cooperatives, housing 
cooperative, retailer cooperatives, and a suppliers cooperatives are examples. Producer cooperatives are those which 
serve their members as selling commission agent. The members are sellers to the cooperatives and the cooperatives 
purchase goods from members and sell to others by its own name but for the benefit of its members. Members of 
producer cooperatives are producers of primary products such as minerals, cereals, cash crops, fish etc. In Workers’ 
Cooperatives members are employees of the cooperative: cooperative is employer, members   are employees but at 
the same time the cooperative also serves as a selling commission agent. Notice however; that the concept of 
commission agency would apply to cooperatives only if profit sharing is entirely dependent on the amount of goods 
purchased or offered for the sale or labour service supplied.  
105 Civil Code) Art 2220(1) 
106Ibid Art  2234(2), 2220(1), 2243, 2244 and 2245 
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The second interpretation is that the law has made profit/loss a core element of cooperatives. 
This can be revealed from the Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 Art 5(2), which 
lays down guiding principles of cooperatives and Art 33(2), which governs allocation of profit. 
The former, provides that profit shall be distributed proportionately to the share capital each 
member holds in the cooperatives thereby completely merging cooperatives with investor-owned 
firms, whereas the latter provision dictates that profit distribution has to take into account both 
the shareholding in the capital and use of the cooperatives services thereby creating a hybrid type 
of business enterprise (a mid between cooperatives and investor-owned firms). Furthermore, 
there is a possibility that a person who may not provide goods/service or may not purchase 
goods/services may have a shareholding in the cooperatives
107
implying profit and loss. The 
necessity of raising capital also indicates the possibility of profit/loss.
108
 
3.3 Objectives of cooperatives 
The word objective may indicate a mission, goal or vision. Mission indicates the activities and 
the way of carrying out such activities. Goal is the problem that is to be solved by accomplishing 
the mission. Vision indicates the ultimate benefit expected of solving the problem. In other 
words, the mission of cooperatives is the collective engagement in economic activities. Their 
goal is to meet challenges that are difficult to do on an individual basis. Their vision is 
ascertaining economic and social justice. Whereas the mission of investor-owned firms is 
gathering money from capitalists and investing it, the goal is obtaining large amounts of capital 
and to maximize profit. Under this sub-topic, the word objective is used to refer to the mission 
and goal of cooperatives. Since the vision  of cooperatives is a more general outcome and is 
either a matter of public policy, or ultimate objective that exist in the mind of cooperators and 
manifest itself in different ways, we may not find it in the law or in the by-laws of cooperatives. 
Thus the following discussion concerns only mission and goal and vision is discussed under 
chapter six infra.
109
 
                                                             
107 Cooperative Society  Proclamation No. 147/1998 Art 16(6-7) as amended by Proclamation No 402/2004 
108Ibid Art 16(1) and Art 10(2) 
109Since the vision of investor-owned firms that is in the minds of the founders is known to everybody that it is profit 
making the law need not provide it expressly. Moreover; the founders do not usually mention it in a memorandum of 
association or articles of associations. Sometimes they would rather state public policy issues such as employment 
and import substitution as their own vision. The law does not also bother about the goal of investor-owned firms and 
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A. Mission of cooperatives 
Cooperatives have two missions, carrying out economic activities and encouraging collective 
actions. The first mission makes cooperatives similar with investor-owned firms and the second 
mission is to distinguish cooperatives from investor-owned firms. 
The Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 provides that the mission of cooperatives is 
to carry out economic activities.
110
Some of these economic activities are agricultural, industrial, 
handcrafts, financial, fishery, mining and retailing.
111
Since the law lists these activities, one may 
also add education and health services into the list. Cooperatives could engage into any form of 
economic activities that are not expressly reserved to government only.
112
 The intention of the 
law is not to limit cooperatives to certain types of economic activities but to emphasize that the 
mission of cooperatives can never be non-economic activities of whatever nature. By so doing, 
the law puts cooperatives in perfect equality with investor-owned firms, which is right. 
However; in addition to carrying out economic activities, cooperatives are expected to encourage 
each member to be active in the process of economic activities either as a supplier, employee or 
purchaser (consumer of goods/service supplied by the cooperative) or in organizing collective 
action. In investor-owned firms, there is no need to organize individuals because there is no 
cause for collective action and ensuring members pay the agreed capital can be done with the 
support of regular courts. However, in cooperatives, it may not only be contrary to the law,
113
 but 
also impractical to get the assistance of court to make members of the cooperatives carry out 
their obligations to collectively act in a certain manner. For example, in the case of producer 
(suppliers) cooperatives, the cooperatives become inoperative if members do not supply their 
product and members cannot be forced by the law to sell their products. Even if there might be a 
contract of supply, it may be terminated
114
 or the member may not produce the intended product 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
leaves the matter to the founders themselves. The founders mention their real goal and vision to the capitalists who 
are expected to become a member or a money lender. 
110Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 2(1) See also Art 4(9) which impliedly provides education 
and training as a mission of cooperatives. 
111Ibid 
112See Investment Proclamation No. 280/2002 Art 5(1&2) and Art 10(1d) 
113In the normal course of things members of a cooperative may refuse to supply or purchase or work in the 
cooperative. 
114Some cooperatives may provide in their bylaws that members shall always supply to or purchase from or work for 
the cooperatives. It is difficult to enforce such terms in the court of law in case the member has not produced 
anything or does not want the services/goods or does not want to work for. Since such bylaws are creating contracts 
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either intentionally or for reasons outside his control. Both cases would make the cooperative 
inoperative. The case would be even more serious in case of consumer and worker cooperatives. 
If members refuse to consume the goods/services of the cooperative, or workers show tardiness 
or terminate their employment contract, the cooperative becomes inoperative. Generally since 
collective action is the key element for the success of cooperatives, the good will and enthusiasm 
(moral and psychological element) of members and management committee are determinant of 
cooperatives success. 
 
B. Goals of cooperatives 
The goal of cooperatives is withstanding challenges that are difficult on an individual basis.
115
 
The challenges may be economic, social or technological. Under the Cooperative Society 
Proclamation No. 147/1998, cooperatives are not entitled to have political or religious 
goals.
116
Article 31 of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia recognizes 
the right to freedom of association for any cause or purpose. However, the second paragraph of 
the same article further provides that this constitutional right has to be exercised only in 
accordance with the specific legislation governing the type of association. 
 
The primary goal of cooperatives is to withstand economic challenges.
117
These challenges 
include shortage of resource, marginal cost of small scale production, risks and market failure. 
Cooperatives aim to help members to withstand these problems by enabling them to pool 
resources to benefit from economies of size and by distributing risks among 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
for indefinite period the member may terminate at any time by giving default notice. See Art 1821 of the Civil Code 
of the Empire of Ethiopia of 1960 
115 See Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998  Art  4 
116Cooperatives may have politics or religion as their goal. For example in North America cooperatives among 
farmers were frequently connected with political activities.(See Merrett(n 2) 30). The British Cooperative 
Movement also established Central Cooperative Parliamentary Representation Committee in 1917. (See Bonner (n 
53) 143) The Cooperative Societies established by Christian Socialist Movement in 1850s Britain had a religious 
goal of attaining order of mutual love and fellowship and to create a community  that actually lives  under Christ  “in 
which no man  has a right to call anything he has his own,  but in which there is spiritual fellowship and practical 
cooperation” (Ibid p.61). Cooperative collectivization in communist countries had a political objective of 
transforming the community from feudal/capitalist culture to socialist culture.. There were also Socialist and 
Catholic Cooperative Societies in Italy. See  Diarmid Coffey, The Cooperative Movement in Jugoslavia, Rumania 
and North Italy(Oxford University Press, 1922) 73  
117 David Cobia (ed),Cooperatives in Agriculture(Englewood Cliffs,1989) 122; and Cooperative Society 
Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 4(5) 
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themselves.
118“Resource pooling could be made through contribution to the capital in the form of 
share or in the form of savings and credit.”119By pooling resources, cooperatives would enable 
members to benefit from technologies, such as trucks to transport their products or refrigerators 
for dairy products. Moreover, pooling of resources may lead to benefiting from economies of 
size. “The existence of economies of size up to some size, which is often larger than a typical 
proprietorship, encourages firms to expand horizontally.”120Since “fixed costs of management 
are spread over greater volume, larger machines use less labour per unit, larger storage structures 
cost less per unit of capacity, and so on.”121Economies of size are not limited to technologies 
only. It also helps members to access better markets for their products by using the cooperatives 
as either selling or buying commission agent.
122
 By so doing members would successfully resist 
market monopoly and brokerage. They would also add value to their primary product. Generally 
cooperatives intend to improve the income of members either by reducing production or service 
costs or by finding better prices to their products or by distributing risks.
123
These economic 
benefits would be the goals of investor-owned firms although members of investor-owned firms 
never get access to the properties of their company.
124
 
 
But what really distinguishes cooperatives from investor-owned firms, is the possibility of 
contributing labour as a major source of capital. In cooperatives, individuals can contribute their 
special knowledge to solve their economic problems, such as joblessness and lack of finance. For 
example, in housing cooperatives, members may contribute their labour to reduce the cost of 
production. In investor-owned firms, contribution of skill is not permitted except in the case of a 
partnership.
125
 Even for partnerships, labour contribution is an exception. In short, cooperatives 
can mainly be a cooperation of labour, but investor-owned firms are mainly and necessarily a 
cooperation of capital. However, the Ethiopian Cooperatives Law does not make such distinction 
clear because it makes capital contribution a mandatory requirement for membership.
126
 
                                                             
118 See Cooperatives Law Art 4(1,2 &8) 
119 Ibid Art  16, 4(7) & 2(1e)  
120 Cobia (n 119) 122 
121 Ibid 125 
122 See our discussion supra note 104 
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Art  245 
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The second goal is dissemination of technology.
127
 The economies of size and resource 
mobilization further help cooperatives to utilize modern technologies. In addition to improving 
the production and then the economy of members in particular and the country in general, 
technology can be developed within a cooperative. Cooperative can also become the bridge to 
import technology to the members and then to the general public.  
The third major goal of cooperatives is addressing social issues.
128
Robert Owen had in his mind 
at least three major social goals to establish cooperative societies. These social goals were 
reducing poverty, persuading the public and politicians to do away with competition in general 
and market economy in particular and nurturing moral values.
129
 The latter British Cooperative 
Movement concentrated very much on the protection of members against the capitalist market 
economy. Socialist Cooperative Societies of Western Europe had economic equality as their 
social goal.
130
Nineteenth century American farmer cooperatives had a social goal of representing 
the interest of farmers in the parliament.
131
Since the goal of the cooperative is defined by the 
cooperators within the limit of the law, cooperatives could have varied and specific social goals 
of their own.  
 
The social goals of Ethiopian cooperatives are provided for in the Cooperative Society 
Proclamation No.147/1998. Cooperatives in Ethiopia can have the social goal of culturally 
transforming the whole society,
132
 developing psychological self-reliance in the individuals 
mind
133
and protecting group interest.
134
 Cultural transformation is intended to be attained by 
educating the masses and by making cooperatives exemplary examples to the people.
135
 The 
success of cooperatives would build the individual and group psychology of “I or we can do it by 
my/ourselves.” Finally producers, employees or consumers could combine against their 
economic opponents.  
 
                                                             
127 Ibid Art 4(6) 
128Cooperatives Society Proclamation No. 147/1998  Art 4(3,7&9) 
129Bonner (n 53) 10 
130 See for example Coffey (n 118) 74  
131Merrett (n 2) 31 
132 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998  Art 4(9) 
133 Ibid Art 4(3) 
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135 Ibid Art 4(7&9) For example credit and saving cooperatives could become a practical example to enhance the 
saving and loan culture of a society. 
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Finally, we need to notice that all the goals including the social goals seem to have been intended 
to enhance and protect economic interest. There is no clear indication that the law wants 
cooperatives to attain social transformation such as equality of sex, elimination of harmful 
traditional practices, crime prevention, and sanitation and so on as a goal in itself.  
3.4 Formation and liability of cooperative 
Formation is a process that enables a cooperative to get legal personality. Legal personality 
entitles a cooperative to become subject to rights and duties. There are two major phases in this 
process. The first phase is the coming together of important components, that being the essence 
of a cooperative. These include membership, management and by-laws. The cooperative’s name 
and the minutes of the founders’ meeting, may also be included into this first phase. The second 
phase is the phase that makes the cooperative known to the public. Publicity is made through 
registration. Since registration exposes the cooperative to rights and liabilities, this subtopic 
examines formation and liabilities cooperatives. It concludes that the formation and liabilities of 
cooperatives circumscribe with the formation and liabilities of investor-owned firms. 
 
A. Essence of a cooperative 
The Ethiopian Cooperatives Law considers membership, by-laws, management, and name and 
minutes of founders’ meeting as substantive elements that have to be fulfilled in order to 
establish a cooperative. 
 
Membership 
Cooperatives are associations of persons. Therefore, the existence of members is self-
explanatory. Rather the most important points are number of members, and criteria for 
membership. Since there is principle of open membership, the requirements of membership 
provided by the law are exhaustive requirements. Additional requirements that may make 
admission into a cooperative more difficult may not be introduced by the founders’ meeting or 
by the by-laws or general meeting. Membership in a cooperative is not the result of partnership 
agreement. 
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The minimum number of members in a primary cooperative is ten.
136
The minimum number of 
members in secondary cooperatives is not determined by the law but by definition it should be at 
least two. The maximum number is normally indefinite due to the principle of open membership. 
The minimum and maximum number of members in investor-owned firms is dependent on the 
type of investor-owned firms. The minimum number for partnership and private limited 
company is two.
137
 A minimum of five persons are required to establish a share company.
138
The 
maximum number of members is indefinite for partnerships and Share Company.
139
 But private 
limited company may not have members exceeding fifty.
140
 Since there is no principle of open 
membership in investor-owned firms, the maximum number of members may be defined in 
memorandum of association or articles of association.  
 
There are criteria that a person has to fulfill to become a member of a cooperative. These criteria 
are legal, financial ability and ethical reputation.
141
Locality and collective objectives (are also 
indispensable requirements.
142
 However, these criteria are equally indispensable for investor-
owned firms also. Proof of legal personality is necessary for artificial (primary cooperatives that 
want to be a member of union/federation/league).
143
 Legal personality of human is irrefutably 
presumed.
144
 Human beings are subject of right and duties from moment of birth to death and 
such is recognized everywhere.
145
A physical person can become a member of a cooperative only 
if she attains the age of 14.
146
 There is no express age limitation for membership in investor-
owned firms although a minor is prohibited to carry out any trade.
147
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137Commercial Code Art 211 and 510(2) 
138 Ibid Art 307(1) 
139 Ibid Art 211 and 307 
140 Ibid Art 510(2) 
141 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 13 
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 The other important point for membership is financial ability.
148
 A person who wants to join a 
cooperative has to agree to contribute a certain amount of money to the capital of the 
cooperatives. He has to also pay at least a quarter of this money before he is recognized as a 
member.
149
When we compare this with investor-owned firms in Ethiopia, cooperatives are closer 
to investor-owned firms than partnerships. It is only in private limited companies and share 
companies, that contribution of skill is not recognized. In partnerships, a member can contribute 
his skill,
150
but that does not seem possible under cooperatives since the cooperatives raise capital 
for starting the business
151
which probably excludes skill. Still more, since a payment of a quarter 
of the share capital before getting membership also excludes the possibility of labour to be 
contributed.
152
 Financial ability may even be more challenging for membership in a cooperative 
than in company form of investor-owned firms. This is because the Ethiopian Cooperatives Law 
leaves the minimum capital to be determined by the founders’ meeting.153This meeting may fix 
‘big’ capital and divide it into shares of equal number and par value. Poor individuals may, 
therefore, be intentionally excluded from membership. Moreover, the general meeting may, at 
any time after the formation of the cooperative, increase the capital of the cooperative and 
require the members to increase their share capital.
154
A member who is unable to purchase new 
shares may be dismissed from membership for failure to obey the decision of the cooperative.
155
 
In investor-owned firms no member is required to increase her share capital without her consent 
and no member can loss her membership for failure to contribute to the increment of capital.
156
 
 
Ethical reputation is another requirement for membership. Under Ethiopian Cooperative Law, 
this requirement may be inferred from four different points. The first is dismissal of a member 
for repeated fault. A member could be dismissed from membership due to repeated faults.
157
This 
may be taken to imply that this measure may even be taken before a person becomes a member-
refusal to admit. Preventive measures are better than curative. The second point is the need of the 
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decision of the general meeting to admit heirs as members.
158
 Having in mind the principle of 
open membership the general meeting discusses nothing but the ethical reputation of the 
applicant. The third point is the requirement of ‘willingness.’ According to Art 13(2) of 
Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998, any individual may become a member of a 
cooperative where he is willing to implement his obligation, and to observe the objectives and 
by-laws of the cooperative. It may not be taken to mean only the individual’s declaration to be 
bound since such declaration can be clearly inferred from his mere application to become a 
member.  
 
Locality is also a requirement for membership in primary cooperatives.
159
 Members of 
cooperatives should be residing in the same locality. This is because producer and consumer 
cooperatives are associations of individuals who are collectively searching for an alternative 
market. Producers bring their product together for collective supply. If members are living long 
distances from each other, it is costly to bring their products together. Consumer cooperatives 
distribute goods and services to members. Such a distribution is to be difficult and uneconomical 
where members are living far apart from each other. Worker cooperatives are also feasible only 
if members are living in the same locality, since it is difficult to determine a convenient work 
place for all members. In addition to the issue of economic feasibility, locality is also important 
to strengthen the solidarity between members. Social solidarity is one of the goals of 
cooperatives. However, Ethiopian Cooperatives Law opens room for violation of locality 
requirement since it allows the sale of shares to persons living outside the local area of the 
cooperative.
160
 Membership in investor-owned firms, do not require locality since investor-
owned firm is mainly the association of money. It does not also have social objective of social 
solidarity.  
 
By-Laws 
By-laws perform the same role for cooperatives as Articles of Association do for investor-owned 
firms. Articles of Association and other resolutions and agreements may collectively called 
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Constitution of investor-owned firms.
161
 Thus by-laws may be called the constitution of a 
cooperative. 
Memorandum of Association is a contract that governs the relationship between the shareholders 
(investor capitalists) and creditors of the investor-owned firms and the investor-owned firm and 
its creditors. It indicates persons who would be responsible for the business risk, extent of such 
responsibility and the name of persons through which the investor capitalists are acting. This is 
evident from that fact that it contains the name and address of the investor-owned firm, the name 
(including address) of members and amount of capital contribution of each member, the names 
of the agents and extent of that agency (management organs including auditors in case of 
companies), business purposes (indicators of extent of the power of representation) and profit 
sharing (this is an important information for third parties to deal with the investor-owned 
firm).
162
 Articles of Association are supplementary and subordinate to Memorandum of 
Association.
163
 They are contractual terms that govern the relationship between the shareholders 
and the investor-owned firms and shareholders and management.
164
 The relationship between 
shareholders and the management may be equated to an agency contract which governs the 
relationship between the principal and the agent. 
 
Under the Ethiopian Commercial Code only Share Companies and Private Limited Companies 
are expressly required to have Articles of Association in addition to Memorandum of 
Association although partnerships could also draw their own Articles of Association.
165
However, 
Memorandum of Association is an essential requirement for all investor-owned firms. 
 
Like a partnership, Ethiopian cooperatives law does not require cooperatives to have Articles of 
Association. However, the close examination of the content of the by-laws implies that the by-
laws governs not only the relationship of the members of the cooperatives with creditors of the 
cooperatives and cooperatives with its creditors it also governs the relationship between 
members and the cooperatives and members and the management. This is inferred from the fact 
that the by-laws has to contain the name & address of the cooperative, the name (including 
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address) of members and amount of capital contribution of each member, name of agents and 
extent of the agency  business purposes  and profit sharing.
166
Besides it has to contain rights and 
duties of members, criteria for membership, and conditions for withdrawal and dismissal from 
membership.
167
 
 
Name of the cooperative 
An organizations name is an attribute of legal personality. There is plurality of legal persons. As 
a result, it is difficult to imagine rights and duties of a legal person without a name given to that 
legal person. The name serves as a means of distinguishing one legal person from other similar 
legal persons. Physical persons have family name, first name and patronymic name.
168
State and 
its Administrative Organs, Political Parties, Charities & Societies, Public Enterprises, and 
investor-owned firms also have a name that distinguishes them from other similar legal persons. 
Similarly a cooperative also has a name that distinguishes it from other cooperatives.
169
 
In the case of investor-owned firms, in addition to distinguishing it from similar legal persons, 
the name also shows the extent of liability. The name of a share company should include the 
phrase “share company.”170 A share company is a company whose capital is fixed in advance and 
divided into shares and whose liabilities are met only by the assets of the company.”171Members 
are liable only to the extent of their shareholding.
172
 Similarly the name of Private Limited 
Company has to contain the phrase ‘Private Limited Company.’173 Members of Private Limited 
Company are liable only to the extent of their contribution.
174
In a partnership, the name has to 
indicate whether the partnership is general or limited.
175
In a general partnership, all members are 
joint guarantors of the debt of the partnership.
176
 In a limited partnership, some members are 
liable only to the extent of their contributions.
177
 The name of the partnership also indicates the 
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partners who guarantee the debt of the partnership.
178
 The name of a cooperative plays exactly 
the same role as the name of investor owned firms. It has to contain the phrase ‘Cooperative 
Society and Limited Liability.’179 A cooperative is not liable beyond its total asset.180 Members 
are liable only to the extent of their contribution. The inclusion of the phrase ‘Cooperative 
Society’ in the name also conveys some message to third parties about the liability of 
cooperatives. 
 
Minute of founders’ meetings 
Membership, by-laws, management and name may be taken as the physical organs of human 
being. Whereas, minute of founder meeting breathes life into the physical body, so that it could 
have soul like God gives life to human beings. Soul is the essence of personality. Founders’ 
meeting is the decision of members to breathe life into physical organ so that it becomes legal 
person. Minutes of founders’ meeting may also be equated to declaration of willingness 
(consent) of members to be bound by the by-laws. In partnerships and Private Limited 
Companies, the law does not require special form of expression of willingness to be bound.
181
It 
is enough if the members sign the memorandum association and/or articles of 
association.
182
However, like cooperatives, share companies are required to have minute of 
founders’ meeting.183 
 
 
B.   Registration  
Registration is equivalent to birth. Birth is the beginning for legal personality for physical 
person.
184
 Likewise registration is the beginning of legal personality for cooperatives.
185
The 
same is true for investor-owned firm as well.
186
 
 
                                                             
178Ibid Art 281 and 297 
179 Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 Art 8(2) 
180 Ibid Art 10(2) 
181 See Civil Code Art 1681, Commercial Code Art  221(2), and Commercial Registration and Business Licensing 
Proclamation No. 686/2010 Art  6(7) and 11(1)b) 
182Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation No. 686/2010 Art 6(7) 
183 Ibid 12(1(c) 
184 Civil Code Art 1 
185 Ethiopian Cooperatives Law Art 10(2) 
186Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation No. 686/2010 Art 9(1)  
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Before registering cooperatives, the Commission,
187
the federal Government organ that registers 
cooperatives in the federal level, has to ensure that substantive components are fulfilled.
188
The 
Commission also requests the work plan and description of the land on which the cooperative 
intend to operate.
189
 Although investor-owned firms are not required to produce their work plan, 
they are required to produce authenticated document that shows their working premises.
190
 Once 
the cooperative is registered it becomes a legal entity from the moment of its registration. 
 
C. Limited liability  
Registered cooperatives have legal personality. This means the existence of cooperatives is 
distinct from its members. Legal personality by definition implies rights and duties. Cooperatives 
enter into contract and own property. This implies that they may have contractual and/or extra-
contractual liabilities. They have to meet these liabilities by their own assets and claims. This 
means the members are not liable to the debts of the cooperatives. There are no legally 
recognized relationships between creditors of the cooperatives and its members.  The creditors of 
the cooperatives can claim against the members only on behalf of, and by the name of, the 
cooperatives. This is also true for shareholders of companies. This is the concept of limited 
liability.  
 
Like companies cooperatives have limited liabilities but unlike companies there is no minimum 
capital fixed by the law. Capital is a security to creditor. Cooperatives are free to determine the 
amount of such security. Share Company shall have a minimum capital of fifty thousand birr.
191
 
Private Limited Company’s shall have a minimum capital of fifteen thousand 
birr.
192
Furthermore, unlike a company there is no clear indication in cooperatives law about the 
liability of founders and management organs to creditors of a cooperative.
193
Still more, unlike 
                                                             
187The Federal Cooperative Commission (Commission) is a federal organ established in 2002 with the objective of 
promoting and registering cooperative that can be established in the federal level. See Proclamation 274/2002  
188 See Cooperative Society Proclamation Art 9(2) 
189 Ibid Art 9(2)(g) and (2)(j) 
190Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation No. 686/2010  Art 10(7), 11(1(e), and 12(1(f) 
191 Ibid Art 306(1)   Currently one pound is about thirty one birr or one Dollar is about twenty birr. This means fifty 
thousand birr is about one thousand six hundred pound or two thousand five hundred dollar. Exchange rate varies on 
daily basis. 
192 Ibid Art 512(1) 
193 Ibid Art 309, 366, 380 and 530 
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companies in cooperative there is no requirement of verification of valuation of contribution in 
kind.
194
These differences could even be taken as special privileges of cooperatives. 
 3.5 Conclusion 
In Chapter One we have seen that cooperators are pushing cooperatives from cooperation and 
social objective model into the realm of investor owned firms (partnership/company)-
competition and profit-maximizing model. Similarly in Chapter Two we have also seen that 
cooperative form of economic organization may serve the competition and profit-maximizing 
model. 
In this Chapter we have examined whether the legislator have conceptually limited cooperatives 
to cooperation and social objective model. However; we have found out that the legislator have 
failed to distinguish cooperative form of economic organization from investor owned firms 
thereby opening a wider room for cooperative form of economic organization to be utilized for 
competition and profit-maximization purposes.  
This is evidenced from the legal recognition of special privileges to cooperatives only. The 
special privilege  apparently seem to distinguish cooperatives from investor owned firms but 
when critically examined would  reveal that it opens a wider room for entrepreneurs to prefer the  
cooperative form of economic organization to benefit from the special privileges  unless there is  
a clear legal mechanism that bars investors to move into cooperatives. The special privileges 
such as freedom from attachment for debts, income tax exemptions and government such as easy 
access to loan and land grant are in fact very tempting benefits. 
 Moreover, in addition to the absence of concept of philanthropy and not-for-profit motives in the 
definition of cooperatives the legal inclusion of capital contribution as a mandatory membership 
criterion indicates the failure of the law to distinguish cooperatives from investor owned firms. 
Still more, the content of the by-laws is mainly left to the decision of the founders’ meeting or 
general meeting as it is generally the case in investor owned firms. The similarity between the 
liabilities of cooperatives with the liabilities of investor-owned firms further exacerbated the 
problem. 
                                                             
194 Ibid Art 315and 517(f) 
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Although the law includes the concept of collective solution to a collective problem in the 
definition of cooperatives and also provided mission and goal of cooperatives, such is 
insufficient to keep entrepreneurs away from cooperative form of economic organization. The 
mission of cooperatives is carrying out economic activities since such activities are not limited to 
certain sector of the economic activities and do not implicate the role of the members of the 
cooperative in the economic activities. 
The next Chapter examines whether the Cooperative Principles recognized by the law is capable 
of distinguishing cooperatives from investors. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLES UNDER ETHIOPIAN 
COOPERATIVE LAW 
4.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that the cooperatives principles under Cooperative 
Societies Proclamation No.147/1998 do not sufficiently distinguish cooperatives from investor-
owned firms. This is because the principle of open membership is not recognized and the 
principle of user ownership, user control and user benefit is impliedly excluded by the principle 
of distribution of profit on the basis of share capital.  Moreover; the distribution of profit on the 
basis of capital contribution can make almost other cooperative principles ineffective and dull. 
This is because profit distribution on the basis of capital invites investors into the cooperatives 
who may use all possible means such as lobbying to neutralize the actual effect of other 
principles such as democratic control.  
In Ethiopian Cooperative Law, the Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 prescribes 
the missions and goals of cooperatives. It has also laid down cooperative principles/ethics that 
would help guide them. Cooperative principles are rules which the cooperative has to observe in 
all its activities if it is to attain its goals.
1
A change of cooperative principles would mean a 
change in the cooperative goal.
2
Furthermore, many people believe that cooperatives could 
operate effectively in a capitalist market economy if only their principles were properly 
understood.
3
 Cooperative principles are the means to an end.
4
 Cooperative principles are what 
distinguish cooperatives from other forms of businesses such as investor-owned firms.
5
Investor-
owned firms do not have guiding principles to attain their goals. This is because they do not have 
                                                             
1 Arnold Bonner  British Cooperation The History, Principle and Organization of the British Cooperative Movement 
(Co-operative Union Ltd, 1961)292 
2 Ibid 
3Cobia, W, David (ed.)  Cooperatives in Agriculture 1989 (Prentice Hall.inc. 1989) 21 
4 Ibid p. 26  See also objectives of cooperatives in chapter one and chapter three above 
5 Ibid 
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a common societal goal that they aim to meet and each investor-owned firm is free to attain its 
own goals through its own business purposes.
6
  
However; although the Ethiopian Cooperatives Law apparently mainly adheres to the 
Contemporary School of cooperative principles
7
; the critical examination the law reveals that 
they are modified to push cooperatives into investor owned firms and hence could not guide 
cooperatives in the direction of cooperation and social objectives. This chapter examines the 
extent of the modification of these principles and the possible implication of such modification 
on the distinction between cooperatives and investor owned firms. 
 
4.1Voluntariness 
As we discussed under definition of cooperatives
8
, voluntariness mean two things: firstly, free 
and unrestrained will of a person to be bound by an obligation and secondly; commitment to 
carry out certain obligations without consideration or with insignificant consideration. Let us 
make some detailed examination of these two concepts of voluntariness one after another. 
Voluntariness in its first sense is equivalent to consent. This is for three major reasons. The first 
reason is that it is possible to argue that an agreement to form a cooperative(minute of founders’ 
meeting)
9
 is a contract among the persons agreed to form the cooperative(cooperators/founders) 
                                                             
6  However; this by no way means that there is no common business ethics for investor-owned firms to operate. For 
example there is business ethics of trust, good faith and corporate social responsibility. 
7See Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 5.There exist significant disagreements as to what 
constitutes a correct set of cooperative   principles (Cobia supra note 3. P.21) There are four major schools of 
cooperative principles; namely the Rochdale, Traditional, Proportionate and Contemporary Schools.(Ibid) .(Notice 
that some literatures do not mention proportional and contemporary schools; they rather substitute these schools by 
20th Century and ICA principles,. It seems that the discrepancy arises from the fact that the former author has 
excluded the ICA principles from the list whereas the latter fails to mention the contemporary (cooperative 
principles that emerged after 1980s. The principles are divided along the property rights specification for ownership, 
control, distribution and derivation of benefits and others. The Rochdale class was developed and widely practiced 
in the nineteenth century and its central tenets were voluntariness, open membership, democratic control, 
cooperation and education. The traditional school was developed and widely practiced in the 20th c and is almost the 
same with Rochdale schools. The proportional has been introduced in the 20th c to bring cooperative more closely to 
investor-owned firms so that they could be effective in market economy but never become popular. The 
Contemporary schools are implied or express restatement of essential elements of traditional principles and most 
cooperative leaders adhere to traditional principles. (See Christopher Merrett and Norman Walzer (eds.) 
Cooperatives and Local Development; Theory and Application for the 21st   Century 2004( M.E. Sharpe. Inc. 2004 )   
59-64 
8 See supra pp.60-62 
9According to Art 9(2(a) of the Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 those who signed the minutes that 
establish the cooperative are called founders. 
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as an agreement to form investor-owned firm is a contract among the members/shareholders 
(founders).
10
A contract is an agreement that involves an obligation of a proprietary nature.
11
 
Membership to a cooperative imposes obligation of proprietary nature either in the form of 
capital contribution or at least ways of sharing of surplus. Consent is a central idea of contract. 
Secondly, since the Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 does not contain a definition 
of voluntariness contract law provisions that talk about consents may be utilized to understand 
voluntariness.
12
Thirdly, even if the minute of the founders’ meeting is not a contract it can still 
be maintained that voluntariness is equivalent to consent since like consent, voluntariness is an 
expression of intention to be bound by an obligation. So for these three reasons the concept of 
consent could be utilized to elaborate voluntariness. 
 
Consent is the most crucial element for validity of contract.
13
 A person is said to have agreed to 
be a member of a cooperative if they have given their consent after realizing that such consent 
would produce legal consequences,
14
since sometimes a person may sign a document simply to 
indicate he positively sees the establishment of cooperatives.
15
Furthermore, there should not be 
any defect in consent such as mistake, fraud, duress and false statements.
16
These matters are 
about unnecessary interference by individual persons in the freedom of choice of the person who 
is to be a member. Such defects in consent are practically less important. 
The second limb of the principle of voluntariness is that of assisting each other.
17
 In addition to 
lending a hand to a needy member, this concept also implies that each member has to convince 
themselves that they carry out their obligation with full responsibility. A member should not 
                                                             
10The Commercial Code Art 210 states that investor-owned firms are results of partnership and Art 211 defines 
partnership as a contract. According to Art 307in public (share) company founders are persons who sign the 
memorandum of association and subscribe the whole of the capital or persons who sign the prospectus, bring in 
contributions in kind or are to be allocated a special share in the profits including non-members who has initiated 
plans or facilitated the formation of the company. Partnership agreement is the sum total of memorandum of 
association and articles of association. The minute of the founders’ meeting of the cooperatives is equivalent to 
memorandum and by- laws are equivalent to articles of association. See also Commercial Code Art 221(2), 313, 
314, 516, 517 and 518 and Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation No. 686/2010 Art 11(1b) 
and 12(1d) 
11 See Civil Code Art 1675 
12 Ibid Art 1677 
13 Ibid  Art 1678(a) 
14 Ibid Art 1679 
15 Ibid Art 1687 
16 Ibid Art 1696-1710 
17 See supra p.4 
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expect someone to direct or remind him to carry out his obligations and activities, necessary for 
the promotion of the cooperatives. Although there is a management committee to carry out 
certain management activities members should carry out their obligation out of being self- 
motivated and guided by a moral code. The earnest cooperator “believes that in working for the 
common good man’s highest qualities are enlisted and developed; and in the employment of 
these qualities the man himself becomes a better man and the quality of the human race is 
improved.”18Investor-owned firms rely on the contract, and the legal system, to make 
members/shareholders carry out their obligations. The strength of the judiciary in particular and 
the legal system in general, is the guarantee for the investor-owned firms to ensure that 
members/shareholders pay the subscribed capital. Likewise members/shareholders also rely on 
the contract and the legal system, to be sure that they would get the fruit of their investment. But 
in cooperatives the members depend mainly on the voluntariness of members to diligently, 
honestly and efficiently carryout their obligation. Members of cooperatives are expected to carry 
out their legal obligations and to go further. Thus, in general the principle of voluntariness 
indicates that members agree to whole heartedly carry out their obligations which includes legal 
and moral obligation. This means voluntariness of members in cooperatives exists both during 
formation of the cooperatives and during its continuation but investor-owned firms need 
voluntariness of members/shareholders only during formation. 
However, the Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 5(1) does not make any 
reference to members’ declaration of willingness for self- regulation. The only provision that 
seems to imply the existence of voluntariness is the dispute settlement mechanism.
19
Even these 
Articles may be taken as an indication of state interest to control cooperatives, rather that 
imposing a moral obligation on a member.  There are no other provisions in the law that clearly 
expects members to take moral responsibility to carry out their obligations and to support the 
cooperatives. Generally, since Ethiopian Cooperatives Law obviously emphasizes the law, more 
than the moral commitment of the members to enforce member obligations, it merges 
cooperatives with investor-owned firms. It should have at least opened a room for a court to read 
moral obligations into the obligation of the cooperator. In general the nature of cooperatives 
membership involves higher levels of duties but the Ethiopian Cooperative Law has failed to 
                                                             
18 Bonner (n 1) 293 
19See Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 46-52  
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emphasis such duties. Such failure may be interpreted to limit the meaning of voluntariness to 
the contractual concept of defect free consent and undermines the member’s duty of self-
regulation. Cooperatives without members self-regulation is either dysfunctional or equivalent to 
investor owned firm. 
4.2 Open Membership 
Open membership means everybody that can use the services of the cooperative and voluntary to 
become a member, can become a cooperative on formation, or when already established, without 
any need to get the consent of the other members (at the general meeting of the 
cooperative).
20Bonner argues that, “without this principle cooperatives would lose their 
cooperative character and degenerate into a profit-making concern.”21Consumer cooperatives 
may limit membership and make profit from the purchases of non-members. Worker 
cooperatives may also employ large numbers of non-members and make profit from their 
labour.
22
 Producer cooperatives (selling agents of individual producers of goods and even 
sometimes their labour such as supplying security guards and maidservants) may sell products 
from the labours of non-members and make profit thereof. The original cooperators like Owen 
                                                             
20Notice that principle of open membership is more that non-discrimination on the basis of religion, political 
opinion, race, ethnic origin, colour, sex, language, disability or other similar status. Even investor-owned firms are 
prohibited from discriminating peoples on the above grounds; or else they end up perpetuating Hitlerism or 
apartheid. Therefore; when a public (share) company is established by public subscription as indicated on Art 317 of 
the Commercial Code any person who fulfill the requirement under Art 319 of the same code is automatically 
entitled to be a member/shareholder. Similarly investor-owned firms are entitled to choose their customer only on 
the basis of the price the customer offers to buy or use their goods/services. Article 25 of the Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopian which prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion, political opinion, 
race, ethnic origin, colour, sex, language, disability or other similar status, applies not only to the government but 
also to individuals and all forms of associations. Probably the reason why Art 5(1) the last limb expressly repeats the 
constitution is only a cautionary remark against discrimination by cooperatives (not in any way impliedly allowing 
investor-owned firms to discriminate) since there has been practical experience that cooperatives may be established 
by members of the same religion/culture in order to create a religious/cultural community of their own. For example 
the in the British South Africa only white settlers were allowed to become members of cooperatives (See Wanyama, 
O Fredrick Supra Note No.45 p.361-392).There were also cooperative societies in North America which were 
established on the basis of ethnicity, occupation and socialist politics.( Merrett, Christopher and Walzer, Norman 
(eds.) Cooperatives and Local Development; Theory and Application for the 21st   Century( M.E. Sharpe. Inc. 2004 ) 
29 There were also Christian Cooperatives in Europe such as in Italy (See Coffey, Diarmid, The Cooperative 
Movement in Jugoslavia, Rumania and North Italy 1922 p. 73).  The  Kibbutz  of Israel  was also open only to 
Israel-born individuals.(see Margaret  Digby Cooperatives and Land Use (FAO Agricultural Development Paper 61, 
Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 1957) 28 
21 Bonner (n 1)296 
22 Ibid 
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believed that profit was derived from stealing of the labour of others.
23
 Open membership is a 
remedy to such problem. Moreover, open membership keeps the cooperatives’ capital unlimited 
since new members are required to take up shares.
24
New shares are taken at the original par 
value and the value of share never rises above their par value and there are no capital gains or 
speculations in cooperative shares.
25
 Cooperatives are not therefore “composed of persons whose 
primary aim is to make gains from other persons.”26 Therefore, cooperatives that do not strictly 
adhere to the principle of open membership are often pseudo-cooperatives.
27
 Pseudo-
cooperatives are economic organizations that overtly appear to be cooperative but have a hidden 
agenda of competition and profit-maximization. 
However, membership may be closed for justified reasons.
28
For example, economies of size may 
be a justified reason for limiting membership to a certain size. If a cooperative becomes too 
large, management efficiency declines and the cooperative may be less innovative and less 
flexible and unable to compete in a free market economy. More importantly, in cooperatives 
individual ethical discipline is very important and this may be best if members know each other 
so that they control each other. Membership also needs to be closed when the cooperative is a 
collective farm on a specified land size since the land may be unable to support persons beyond a 
certain limit. When cooperatives are available in all localities, locality may be a justified reason 
to refuse admission into membership. Finally the ethical discipline of the person applying for 
                                                             
23For example Robert Owen believes that profit is stealing of the labour of others. See Bonner supra note 1 p.13-14. 
However; there are New Generation Cooperatives (NGC) which are established to maximize the profit margin of 
members.(Fairbairn, Brett , (n.2) 64). It is believed that such NGC should be organized under ordinary company 
law. (See Surridge and Digby A Manual of Cooperative Law and Practice ( 3rd  edn Hefer & Sons LTD 1967 )  5 
24 Ibid 
25 Ibid 
26J.B. Surridge and Margaret Digby A Manual of Cooperative Law and Practice ( 3rd  edn     Hefer&Sons LTD 1967 
) 5 
27 Ibid 
28Notice that Owen’s village of cooperative community would have consisted of about thousand persons. See 
Bonner supra note 1 P.14 Notice also that cooperatives which are called New Generation Cooperatives restrict 
membership to the point where the greatest net profit and best chances for success  can be attained.( Merrett, 
Christopher and Walzer, Norman Cooperatives and Local Development; Theory and Application for the 21st   
Century (( M.E. Sharpe. Inc. 2004 ) 64). However; pure and democratic cooperatives limit membership to keep cost 
to the minimum not to maximize profit. 
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admission may bar him from membership.  In short, the principle of open membership intends to 
eliminate profit and capital gain
29
but does not intend to hinder the efficiency of cooperatives. 
However, Ethiopian law is vague on principle of open membership. Firstly, the FDRE 
constitution does not recognize open membership in cooperatives. There is no constitutional 
guarantee of open membership in investor-owned firms, charities,
30
 as well as cooperative 
societies
31
 although there is recognition of open membership in political organizations, labour 
unions, trade organization, employers’ associations and professional associations (societies).32 
Secondly, the Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 has subsided the principle of 
open membership under the principle of voluntariness. The law states seven guiding principles 
under seven consecutive and independent sub articles but principle of open membership is stated 
under a sub-article that mainly talk about principle of voluntariness.
33
 
Thirdly, the limitation of capital in cooperatives absolutely blocks admission of new members. 
The general meeting decides the capital and the number of shares to be sold.
34
This in fact sounds 
quite clear, it doesn’t allow open membership. This means the general meeting may limit the 
number of members of the cooperatives. Additional shares shall be sold only when there is a 
need for additional capital
35
 
Fourthly, the necessity of paying share capital within four years in general and the mandatory 
payment of at least one-fifth of the capital and registration fees before getting recognition as a 
member
36
exclude the poor from membership. There are three methods by which cooperatives 
may raise capital. These are direct investment, retained dividend and deduction from the price of 
                                                             
29 Sidney & Beatrice Webbs The Consumers’ Cooperative Movement (Longmans, Green and Co. 1921) 8-9 
30 Charities are institutions which are established exclusively for the benefit of indefinite persons composing the 
public or some part of the public with out exclusion of those in need.( Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 
621/2009 Art 14) 
31   Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 5(1) and FDRE  Constitution Art 38(2) 
32 Societies are associations of persons organized on non-profit making and voluntary basis for the promotion of 
rights of its members and to undertake other similar lawful purposes as well as to coordinate with institutions of 
similar objectives.( Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 Art 55(2) 
33 See Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 5 
34 Ibid Art 6(2&4) and Art 16(1) as amended by Proclamation No. 402/2004.However; one may say that the former 
article implies that in principle the maximum number of member is indefinite and the latter article implies the 
number of share each member shall buy and its par value and has nothing to do with number of members.   
35 Ibid Art 16(3) .This may also be interpreted to imply only economies of size where there is economic down turn 
after certain large size. 
36Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art  13(2), 14(2c), and16(1&2) as amended by Proclamation 
No.402/2004 
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products supplied to the cooperatives.
37
Since direct investment is purchase of share in cash or in 
kind
38
 it excludes those who do not have cash or property. Moreover, the by-laws of the 
cooperatives may severely limit purchase of shares in kind,
39
 thereby limiting membership only 
to those who afford cash. The principle of open membership would fairly be maintained if 
members were given the chance to make a contribution to the capital from the surplus return they 
may get from the purchases they make in the cooperatives,(in the case of consumers’ 
cooperatives) or from the sale price/salary they receive from the goods/labour they supply to the 
cooperatives(in the case of producers’/workers’ cooperatives). If a cooperative is made to start 
business by the capital of those who have, and were willing to pay the initial capital necessary to 
start the business, the concept of voluntariness would be reinforced. This would also encourage 
the social psychology of solidarity and self-reliance.
40
 Special cooperative privileges of 
cooperatives
41
 could also be used either to encourage members to contribute initial capital or to 
obtain a government loan. We should also not forget that cooperatives are formed to solve 
collective economic problems which cannot be solved on an individual basis. So it is rational for 
the relatively wealthy, to provide the initial capital and initiate others to join the cooperative and 
promise to pay the necessary share from future dividend or sale price. This is especially true for 
consumer and producer cooperatives. Charities could also be an alternative source of working 
capital. Yet by making contributions to the initial capital of the cooperatives a mandatory 
requirement for membership, we are equating cooperatives with investor-owned firms. In 
investor-owned firms, especially in companies, contribution to the capital is a mandatory 
requirement for membership. Indeed, it is what makes a member a member
42
 
4.3 Democratic Controls 
Cooperatives are democratic organizations. Each member has an equal right to decide on 
cooperative affairs. The number of shares a member holds is of no significance to decide on the 
fate of the cooperatives. Cooperatives are not controlled by the people who have the most money 
                                                             
37Cobia (n 3)247 
38 Ibid 
39 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998Art  16(4) as amended by Proclamation No.402/2004 
40Those who contributed the initial capital can sufficiently be rewarded by receiving fixed interest. 
41 Ibid Art  28-31 
42Commercial Code Art 211 215(2) , 229, 295, 303,312(1), 510(2) 
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in the organization.
43
 Democratic control means one member one vote. The control of the 
cooperatives is vested in a committee elected by all members on the basis of one man one 
vote.
44
In investor-owned firms, control of the organization is in the hands of shareholders who 
control the majority share in the capital. The board of directors or the management of investor-
owned firms is appointed and controlled by majority investors in the organization.  
Democratic control is intrinsic to cooperatives. Firstly, unlike in investor-owned firms, in 
cooperatives members are financially interested in their capacity to transact with the cooperative 
which is at the time of voting.
45
This means what worries each member of a cooperative is not the 
amount of money he invested in a cooperative, rather the amount he purchases from a 
cooperative (consumer cooperative) or amount he supply to the cooperative(producers 
cooperative) or the length of time he work(worker cooperative). The total transaction made by 
each varies from time to time and cannot at any moment conveniently ascertained.
46
 This 
practical inconvenience therefore leads to a democratic vote.
47
 
 
Secondly, in cooperatives, the members with greater investment in the share capital do not have 
any better interest on the surplus of the cooperatives since such surplus is distributed on the basis 
of transaction. Capital in a cooperative is paid a fixed interest.
48
In investor-owned firms, 
members are interested in share capital since profit is distributed on the basis of share capital.
49
 
Thirdly, the principle of democratic control is a manifestation of cooperative intention to remedy 
the defects of competition and private property ownership.
50
 Fourthly, cooperatives are 
associations of persons who have a collective economic interest. Such interest requires the 
collective action of members rather than capital. In investor-owned firms, members do not have a 
collective economic interest. Fifthly, most cooperatives have attempts to reduce the effect of 
                                                             
43 J.B. Surridge and Margaret Digby A Manual of Cooperative Law and Practice ( 3rd  edn     Hefer&Sons LTD 1967 
) 5 
44 Ibid p. 6 See also Webbs(n 29)7 
45Webbs (n 29)6 
46 Ibid 7 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid 8 
49 Notice that in a company with a limited liability, taking decision on the basis of share is logical since every body 
loses what he contributes and hence those who contribute has to worry. In fact this logic also equally applies to 
cooperatives with limited liability. 
50 Ellen Furlough and Carl Strikwerda (eds.) Consumers against  Capitalism? Consumer Cooperation in Europe, 
North America, and Japan 1840-1990(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers INC , 1999).67 
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economic inequality. So in cooperatives every member has one vote regardless of share capital, 
time of membership, sex and other factors.
51
 
 
Coming to the Ethiopian Cooperatives Law principle of democratic control, it is not sufficiently 
safeguarded against the influence of capitalists. Article 5(2) provides that cooperatives are 
democratic organizations where every member has one vote. However, surplus distributed on the 
basis of share capital
52
would possibly erode the democratic control in practice, since those who 
have more shares would have more concern for the surplus of the cooperatives and they would 
do their best to influence others. Similarly, the limited liability of cooperatives
53
 would also 
create similar tensions since those who invested more would lose more. One may argue that such 
an effect would be minimal since no member shall hold more than 10% of the total share capital 
of the cooperative.
54
However, such a limitation applies only on those who want to invest from 
their pocket where dividends could be used to purchase an unlimited percentage of share capital. 
4.4 Principle of dividend on share capital 
One of the areas where Ethiopian Cooperative Law expressly merges cooperatives with investor-
owned firms is its clear stipulation of distribution of profit on the basis of capital investment. 
Members receive dividend from profit according to their shares and contribution to the capital.
55
 
Art 33 of the Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 that had the power to cast doubt on 
this principle was amended probably to avoid the doubt. This article combined principle of 
dividend on share capital and dividend on purchase/sale/labour supply. Art 5(3) of the same 
proclamation reads “(M) embers shall receive dividends from profit according to their shares and 
contribution...” The combined reading of these two articles may lead one to believe that the word 
contribution in Art 5(3) was intended to imply principle of mutuality (share of surplus on the 
basis of purchase/sale/labour supply). However, Art 33 was amended.
56
 It is now the power of 
the general meeting to determine whether to distribute profit on the basis of share capital or 
                                                             
51Webbs (n 29)7 
52Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 5(3) cum 33(2) as amended by Proclamation No.402/2004 
53 Ibid Art 10(2) 
54 Ibid 16(5) as amended by Proclamation No.402/2004 
55Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 5(3) 
56  Cooperative Society (Amendment) Proclamation  No.402/2004 Art 4 
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mutuality principle or the combination of the two.
57
There is very less possibility for a 
cooperative to choose the mutuality principle since the guiding principle requires profit to be 
distributed on the basis of share capital.
58
This eliminates the most accepted definition of 
cooperatives: “…a user-owned and user controlled business that distributes benefits on the basis 
of use.”59This means a cooperative becomes pure profit making entity. 
“Pure” or “true”60cooperatives have the objective of eliminating profit. This could be done in 
two alternative ways. The first alternative is trading goods at their production cost. But fixing 
cost of production was doomed to failure.
61
The cost of production does not necessary indicate 
the market price of a good/service and price fluctuates as a result of many causes other than cost 
of production. Disregarding market price would be counter-productive since it is a key signaling 
mechanism in market economy which indicates which needs are most urgent.
62
History provides 
a solution to this problem. The Rochdale Pioneers devised the second alternative, dividend on 
purchase mechanism.
63
This mechanism enabled members to purchase from, or sell to, or be 
employed in, a cooperative at a current market price. But, if that price showed a surplus, a 
member who was the cause for the surplus would take the surplus in the form of refund. This 
retains consumer freedom of choice, free price mechanism and yet abolishes profit on 
transactions.
64
Any money that a member gets because of his purchase from a consumer 
cooperative is not a profit. It is rather a result of saving money by purchasing in a lower price. 
Dividend is therefore; the money that the consumers/producer/labourers would have lost to a 
capitalist but has been saved because of their collective action. For the purpose of this research 
this way of distributing the surplus of a cooperative is called mutuality principle 
Abolishing the mutuality principle (dividend on purchase) may even affect the effort of raising 
capital. Firstly, if people would not get anything in return for the transaction they make with the 
cooperative they would not be encouraged to become a member. Secondly, cooperatives could 
attract members if the prospective members feel that they are creating their own shop. Thirdly, in 
                                                             
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid Art 5(3) is a guiding principle and has not been amended. 
59See, Christopher Merrett and Norman Walzer, (eds.) Cooperatives and Local Development; Theory and 
Application for the 21st   Century ( M.E. Sharpe. Inc. 2004 ) 62 Emphasis added. 
60 Ibid 62 
61 Bonner (n 1)305 
62 Tony Cleaver  Economics :The Basics (2nd ed  Routledge 2011) 47 
63  Bonner (n1)305 
64 Ibid 
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addition to giving economic benefits dividend on purchase would be in conformity of the moral 
value of those who feel that profit making is stealing the wealth of others.
65
Fourthly, surplus 
distribution on the basis of share capital would also be a challenge for a government or charities 
to support cooperatives. 
The mutuality principle would even help to accumulate capital
66
 better than profit on share 
capital. A member may be made to accumulate the surplus he receives. Savings and share capital 
accumulation are made simultaneously. There is no psychological burden on the person to first 
open saving bank accounts and then go to purchase share in a cooperatives. By one transaction, a 
person does three things: purchase house hold consumption/sale his product/work as employee, 
save money and purchase share capital. But if the cooperatives follow the principle of dividend 
on share capital, only those who already have saving can buy the share capital. Others who could 
possibly contribute to the capital through the surplus return are excluded. There is less of a 
possibility for them to save, and then to purchase the share capital either, there might not be 
proximate bank to save, the person may not have an awareness about saving, he may be tempted 
to consume all his income at his deposal, his income is insufficient to pay profit to the capitalist 
and to save to buy share capital of the cooperatives. In Ethiopia, the banking service is 
unavailable for rural peasants. The income of most Ethiopians is very small.  
Dividend on share capital would also discourage collective action of members. Collective action 
in consumer cooperatives is purchasing from the cooperatives. Selling one’s product to the 
cooperatives is taking collective action in producer cooperatives. Working for the cooperatives 
(willingness to be employee) is the collective action in Worker cooperatives. Contributing 
working capital is not the central concern of cooperatives; the central concern is the collective 
action of members. So it is wiser for cooperatives to give priority to collective action than capital 
accumulation. Such is possible only if the mutuality principle is strictly adhered to. Member 
moral responsibility and active participation in other affairs of the cooperatives would also be 
highly affected. There is no better way to encourage members to glorify the collective action. 
                                                             
65 In addition to pure cooperatives and socialists, there are religious authorities who consider profiteering as one 
form of sin. For the Christian fathers, St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas equate profit with sin. Muslim scholars 
do also suspect investor-owned firms of excessive pricing and speculation. See, Steven G. Medema The History of 
Economic Thought: A Reader (Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group 2004) 18 and Roger E. Backhouse The Penguin 
History of Economics (Penguin Books 2002)34 &36 
66 Bonner (n 1)307 
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Still more, the mutuality principle is the basis of principle of democratic control and open 
membership.
67
 If surplus is to be distributed on share capital the collective interest would be 
given less attention and private interest takes the center stage. Such would lead to direct or 
indirect influence on election of representatives who manage the cooperatives. Moreover, 
restrictions would be imposed on principle of open membership since the already existing 
members may fear that the additional members would be coming to share from the existing 
profit.   
Finally sharing surplus on the basis of capital would deny the cooperative the logical basis to 
escape profit tax. Profit tax is imposed on an income which is the result of entrepreneurial 
activity. Purchasing for one’s own consumption or selling one’s own primary product at a better 
price or working as employee is not entrepreneurial activity. Cooperatives remain outside of the 
realm of entrepreneurs if only if they act as ordinary agents of consumers/producers/workers. 
This ordinary agency exists when surplus is distributed according to mutuality principle. If 
surplus is distributes on the basis of share capital it becomes entrepreneurial income (profit). 
4.5 Principle of autonomy 
Cooperatives are self-help organizations.They were established by those who realized their own 
problem and choose cooperation (mutual aid) as a solution and raised the necessary capital 
themselves without the interference of the government or philanthropists.
68
Accordingly, each 
member is committed to solving the collective problem and has to take responsibility for the 
solutions to collective problems. The Owenites were the first to develop awareness of their 
worsening position as their skills were replaced by deskilled factory processes.
69
They grouped 
their efforts by experimenting with many different forms of alternative organizations, among 
them cooperative workshops.
70
These were self-help business enterprises established by the 
workers with the view to liberate themselves from the capitalists.
71
As noted earlier, the Rochdale 
Pioneers were the first successful self-help business enterprises. In contrast, Robert Owen’s 
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69 Jenny Thornley Workers’ Cooperatives: Jobs and Dreams (1st edition, Heinemann Educational Publishers, 1981) 
70 Ibid 
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Villages of Cooperation project was criticized since it did not recognize the ability of members 
to solve their own problems by their own initiatives.
72 
If cooperatives ever need the assistance of philanthropists or the state, care has to be taken that 
the government or philanthropists do not force their agenda onto the cooperatives. In the process 
of responding to problems cooperatives have gained invaluable insights. So it may be counter-
productive to accept an external solution.Where cooperatives are promoted by the state there is a 
danger that the power of members to determine rules for their collaboration is limited or even 
totally eliminated.
73
This happens through the imposition of model bylaws, detailed regulations 
and direct interference that leaves little room for self-regulation. For that reason, all cooperatives 
must be vigilant in developing open, clear relationships with governments.Cooperatives are not 
government agencies. So governments should not use cooperatives as an instrument to 
implement its policies. Cooperatives are not charities bound to work in accordance with the 
attitudes of its donors. 
However, autonomy does not mean political neutrality. Cooperatives usually disregard political 
neutrality. In Great Britain most societies are affiliated to the Cooperative Party and this party 
had a close relation with the Labour Party.
74
There have been socialist cooperatives in Western 
Europe.
75
 
Ethiopian cooperative law expressly recognizes the principle of autonomy. Article 5(4) of   the   
Cooperative Society Proclamation provides as follows: 
“Cooperative societies are autonomous, self-help organizations controlled by 
their members. If they enter into agreement with other organizations; including 
governments, or raise capital from external sources, shall do so on terms that 
ensure democratic control by their members and maintain their cooperative 
autonomy.” 
 
                                                             
72 Bonner(n 1) 26-27 
73Munkner  H.H., Ten Lectures on Cooperative Law 1982 p.48 
74 Bonner (n 1)308 
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98 
 
4.6 Principle of education 
Cooperative education has three major objectives. The first objective is training its members to 
have a required level of education for the cooperative business. This is technical training such as 
the art of salesmanship, business management, accounting, and advertising. This makes sure that 
all those who are associated with cooperatives have the skills they require in order to carry out 
their responsibilities effectively. The second is ethical training of members. Members should 
develop an attitude of self-help, self- responsibility, solidarity, democracy, equity, honesty, 
social responsibility and caring for others. These are fundamental cooperative values that each 
member has to adhere to. The third is dissemination of the idea of cooperation. The cooperative 
idea should be made available to the public in general. This would help the cooperatives to get 
more members. “Effective membership must be based on effective education about the mission 
and values of cooperation”.76 It would also help to build the public image of cooperatives. 
The Ethiopian Cooperatives Law recognizes technical training and dissemination of the 
cooperative idea. Article 5(5) states that the cooperatives provide education and training for their 
members, elected representatives, managers and employees so they can contribute effectively to 
the development of their cooperatives. Moreover, they inform the general public, particularly 
young people and opinion leaders, about the nature and benefits of cooperation. However, the 
law fails to include or at least gives very less attention to the ethical training for members. 
Educating members is quite a substantial difference to the purely financial transaction of 
companies.  
4.7 Principle of cooperation   
Cooperation is the philosophical and ideological foundation of cooperatives. Being emotionally 
disturbed by the miseries of workers as well as employers, Robert Owen proposed cooperation as 
an alternative economic system to competition. For Owen human misery was the result of 
competition and cooperation was the solution. Cooperation is also the manifestation of the 
cooperative values of voluntariness (caring for others) and solidarity on cooperative level.  
Cooperatives are mutual associations. There is neither internal (among members) nor external 
                                                             
76, Richard C. Williams The Cooperative Movement: Globalization From Below, (Ashgate Publishing 
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competition. Assisting one another both among members and among cooperatives is the basic 
ideology that distinguishes cooperatives from investor-owned firms. Investor-owned firms’ basic 
philosophy and ideology is competition both internally and externally. 
Moreover, cooperation can practically facilitate the marketing and educational efforts much more 
effectively.
77
For example, cooperatives can become trading partners. Producer cooperatives and 
consumer cooperatives may form a trading partnership with the former as a supplier of goods 
and the latter as market alternatives. Similar relations could also be established between producer 
cooperatives and worker cooperatives; the former supplies raw materials that the latter may need. 
By doing so, they could effectively remove intermediaries. That is one way of reducing the cost 
of production. The principle of education would also be better facilitated through community 
association of cooperatives than by the individual effort of each cooperative.
78
It is also crucially 
important for different kinds of cooperative to join together when speaking to government. 
There has been cooperation among British retail cooperatives and the Cooperative Whole Sale 
has been the result of such cooperation. In the United States the National Cooperative Business 
Association (NCBA) helps to achieve this principle on national level.
79
 The International 
Cooperative Alliance is also responsible for facilitating the principle of cooperation at an 
international level.
80
In addition to these organizations, there are several websites intended to 
coordinate cooperative movement.
81
 
Ethiopian Cooperatives Law expressly states the need to have cooperation among cooperatives. 
Cooperatives are expected by the law to work together through local, national, regional and 
international structures so that the cooperative movement could be strengthened.
82
 In order to 
have effective cooperation, the law allows cooperatives to be established in the form of a primary 
cooperative, unions, federations and league.
83
 Primary cooperatives are established by 
individuals who live or work in the same area or engage in the same profession.
84
These primary 
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cooperatives having similar objectives then establish a union.
85
The unions having similar 
objectives then establish federations, and the federations finally establish leagues at a national 
level.
86
Unions facilitate cooperation between primary cooperatives, federations facilitate 
cooperation among unions and league facilitates cooperation among federations in the national 
level and also represents Ethiopian Cooperatives in the international level. 
4.8Principle of sustainable development 
Ethiopian cooperative law stipulates a principle of sustainable development as one of the 
principles of cooperatives. It requires the cooperatives to make sure that their economic activities 
shall be environmentally friendly.
87
 
 
This principle is a new addition to cooperative principles. The other principles are essentially the 
original Rochdale principles.
88
This principle is developed to protect the environment. In recent 
times, environmental problems such as atmospheric pollution, marine pollution, global warming 
and ozone depletion has become a serious challenge to the world community. The correct 
balance between development and environmental protection is now one of the main challenges 
facing the international community. Some claim that it is the investor-owned firms who are the 
major causes of such environmental problems because they are only concerned with short-term 
returns. In contrast, cooperatives are concerned with long-term development. Cooperatives 
remedy the defect of competition since they are by the people for the people.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
In short, the discussion in this Chapter evidences that although cooperative principles are what 
distinguish cooperatives from other forms of businesses such as investor-owned firms 
cooperative principles stipulated under Ethiopian Cooperative Law do not distinguish 
cooperatives from investor owned firms. This is because Cooperative Society Proclamation 
No.147/1998 has impliedly and expressly modified many of the concepts of the cooperative 
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principles that distinguish cooperatives from investor owned firms. The law impliedly limits the 
principle of voluntariness to defect free consent although this principle extends to the members’ 
commitment to help each other and to high sense of ethical self-disciplining in carrying one’s 
obligation towards the cooperative. More importantly, the law has also effectively ruled out the 
principle of open membership by (1) failing to state it as an independent principle (the law 
merges the principle of open membership with principle of voluntariness), (2) empowering the 
general meeting to limit the capital of a cooperative, (3) making payment of share capital a 
mandatory membership criteria. The principle of democratic control could also be neutralized by 
the recognition of distribution of surplus on the basis of capital contribution and the limited 
liability of cooperatives. More surprisingly, the law has expressly substituted the principle of 
mutuality by Principle of dividend on share capital. The principle of education, as stated by the 
law, also fails to give sufficient attention to the ethical training of the members. 
We see in the next Chapter whether these defects of the law are remedied or are further 
exacerbated by the provisions of the law governing ownership and management of cooperatives. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF COOPERATIVES UNDER 
ETHIOPIAN COOPERATIVE LAW 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The ultimate purpose of this chapter is to show that cooperatives in Ethiopia are in Ethiopia are 
indistinguishable from investor-owned firms by the ownership and management criteria. The 
purpose of this is to continue to develop my thesis that the Cooperative Society Proclamation 
No.147/1998 has failed to keep distinction between cooperatives and investor owned firms. This 
is done by comparing the relevant provisions of Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 
with their counterparts in the Commercial Code.  
 
Ownership of cooperatives in Ethiopia is closely related to the ownership of investor-owned 
firms. The Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 does not impose sufficient limitation, 
and even impliedly widen ownership rights by giving unlimited power to the founders’ meeting 
and the general meeting. The law fails to expressly state the type of transactional relationship 
between the owner(s) and the cooperative. It also authorizes the sale of shares to investors. Still 
more, the law has dispensed cooperatives from principle of open membership and mutuality.  
The founders’ meetings of a cooperative are almost entirely free to determine the owners of the 
cooperative since the capital of a cooperative and the minimum share capital that each member 
shall buy are determined the founders. This means they choose who the members are. Moreover, 
the general meeting of a cooperative may ease some of the restrictions ownership right such a 
indivisibility of cooperative assets and legal reserve fund by the bylaws. This also means that the 
general meeting determines what the nature of that ownership is.  
 
The set of powers associated with a general meeting also makes the management of the 
cooperatives similar with the management of investor-owned firms. Management powers in 
Ethiopian Cooperatives could be utilized under the law either for profit maximization ends or the 
personal interest of the management, and in this regard, are therefore often much less likely to be 
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used for the public interest. This is because the exercise of management powers to determine the 
objectives of a cooperative are not restricted nor controlled by the law. 
 
In order to demonstrate these points we identify direct and indirect legal restrictions 
(disincentives) to become member of a cooperative. We also analyze provisions governing 
transfer of share. The freedom over objectives, the appointment, removal, powers and 
accountabilities of directors will also be discussed. Although our focus is on Cooperative 
Proclamation No.147/1998 incidental comparisons would be made with the provisions of the 
Commercial Code and Public Enterprise Proclamation No.25/1992.
1
 
 
5.1 Ownership under Ethiopian cooperative law 
 
Under this sub topic we deal with two points. The first point identifies direct and indirect legal 
restrictions (disincentives) to becoming a member of a cooperative under the Cooperative 
Society Proclamation No.147/1998. It is proved that the proclamation directly and/or indirectly 
encourages profit-seekers rather than discouraging them. Secondly the owner could transfer his 
share with very less inconvenience. We begin our discussion by showing characters of profit-
seeking ownership and proceed to analyze the legal possibility of these characters to be 
manifested in cooperatives in Ethiopia.  
    5.1.1 Encouraging Factors 
Here we intend to prove that the proclamation directly and/or indirectly encourages profit-
seekers to use cooperative form of economic organization as a competition and profit-
maximizing model rather than discouraging them. We begin our discussion by showing 
characters of profit-seeking ownership and proceed to analyze the legal possibility of these 
characters to be manifested in cooperatives in Ethiopia.  
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Public Enterprises are wholly state owned firms. They carry on economic activities such as manufacturing, 
distribution, or service rendering activities with the goal of maximizing profits. However; the ultimate objectives of 
public enterprise may not necessarily be profit maximization; it may be either acting as a catalyst of competition or 
acting as consumers’ agent.  
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A. Characteristics of profit seeking ownership 
In order to identify the nature of ownership in particular cooperatives under Ethiopian 
Cooperatives Law, it is important to examine the transactional relationship (membership criteria) 
between owners and the cooperative; which includes having either an open or closed 
membership, number of shares available to members, investing in investor-owned firms. The 
criteria for membership directly relates to the nature of ownership. The other factors listed above 
could indirectly reveal whether the owners of a cooperative are profit seekers (entrepreneurs, 
capitalist, and professional managers) whose ultimate objective might be profit maximization 
rather than the promotion of public purposes. 
 
In a firm that ultimately intends to maximize profits, membership is considered closed until new 
capital is required. Only persons who accept the offer of the owner of the firm can become a 
member. Even more importantly, the entrepreneur makes his offer discriminately to those 
persons whom he wants to be his business partners. No one can join his business without his 
persons whom he wants to be his business partners. No one can join his business with out his 
(entrepreneur’s) consent. Once formed, investor-owned firms do not usually admit new 
members. Even in cases where the door is opened, entry comes at a higher price for those new 
entrants than the initial investors paid to form the same investment.  Owners do not want to share 
profits with new investors. Investor owned firms are the result of a contract initiated by an 
entrepreneur. 
 
However, in the case of a true cooperative, the reverse is true. The ultimate purpose of the true 
cooperatives is protecting the public interest. As a result, the cooperative is open to all those who 
are in need and can benefit from its economic activities.
2
So the door is usually open for those 
who need and can benefit by joining the cooperative at any time, and if they decide to join the 
cooperative, the price of entry reflects the original contribution of its members. Members benefit 
from the collective action rather than from the dividend that they can receive at end of each 
financial year. If membership is ever closed to members, it is closed with the objective of 
optimizing the result of collective action by those who are current members. 
                                                             
2 Compare this with the definition of charitable purposes under Art 14(3) of Charities and Societies Proclamation 
No.621/2009 
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Usually investor-owned firms do not impose limitations on the percentage of shares in the capital 
one investor can gain: in the capitalist culture governing investor-owned firms investors are 
usually invited to invest as much as they can. For example, under the Ethiopian Commercial 
Code, the capital of a share company established by public subscription would be approved by a 
meeting of the subscribers.
3
Even after formation, a firm may further increase its capital if 
investors are willing to invest their capital in the firm.
4
 
 
 However, in ‘true’ cooperatives which are not concerned with profit maximization objectives, 
the equality of its members is maintained by limiting shareholding in the capital i.e. each 
member may only hold a limited amount. Such limitation also protects the cooperatives from 
being intruded by capitalists. 
 
The other factor that may implicate whether a cooperative is owned by profit seekers or real 
user
5
 is the possibility of reinvestment of profits from the cooperative in an investor-owned firm. 
The ultimate purpose of profit seekers is to search for all options that can maximize the end 
return of their investment. This means if the owners of profit seeking firms are convinced that 
reinvesting the annual profit income of the firm would increase their future dividend they would 
authorize the firm to buy shares in another profit seeking firm. But the ultimate purpose of true 
cooperatives is to increase the quantity and quality of service they receive from the firm. So they 
invest any surplus of their firm in the expansion of infrastructure of the firm so that the quantity 
and quality of service they receive from the firm increases. Any money that may be left from 
infrastructure expansion would be used for future reserve and social service. True cooperatives 
also have charitable tendencies. 
 
                                                             
3  Commercial Code Arts 318-322 
4 In exceptional cases, however, since investor-owned firms are the result of freedom of contract, the agreement that 
creates them (memorandum and articles of association) may limit the shareholding of members. Sometimes the state 
may also limit shareholding of members by law so that the state is able to regulate the activities of the firm. For 
example, in order to regulate the financial sector of the economy, the Ethiopian Government issued banking and 
insurance regulations which prohibits an individual from holding more than ten percent of the share capital of a bank 
or insurance firm. Banking Proclamation No.83/1992 and Insurance Proclamation No.84/1992 
5Here the word ‘users’ is used to indicate producers of primary product in producer cooperatives, consumers and 
labour suppliers to workers cooperatives. 
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Another indirect indicator of whether the cooperative is owned by the profit seekers or real users 
is the nature of its cliental. Profit seekers may be organized in a cooperative form as far as they 
believe that such a form would make them more profitable.
6
Thus, owners of a profit seeking 
cooperative may be suppliers of raw materials/labour to the cooperative or purchasers of the 
goods/services of the cooperative. However, the cooperative could still continue to buy raw 
material/labour from non-members or sells its goods/services to non-members. It is not usually 
ready to admit these clients as its members since it makes profit from these clients. Membership 
is closed. But in true cooperatives the service is available to members only. Any person who 
wants the service has to become a member. Profiteering from the transaction of non-members is 
unacceptable. 
 
Let us now turn to the analysis of the Ethiopian cooperative law and determine whether the law 
opens the door to profit seekers or whether it assists in deterring them.  
 
B. Transactional relationships between owners and the cooperative (membership criteria) 
Here we examine the transactional relationships
7
 that the Ethiopian Cooperatives Law allows to 
exist between the owners of the cooperatives and the cooperatives itself.
8
  
      
   Lender-Borrower Relationship possible 
Without doubt, Ethiopian cooperatives law allows, and may even encourage, owners to have 
supplier/purchaser transactional relationship with the cooperatives (user ownership). This can be 
easily inferred from Art 2(1) which enumerates types of cooperatives. The inclusion of the 
concept of collectivity in the definition of cooperatives could also be taken as an additional 
indicator.
9
The missions and goals of cooperatives, as indicated under Art 4, may also show user 
ownership. A cooperative could be owned partly by producers (suppliers of raw materials or 
marketable goods), partly by consumers and partly by workers. This is because the cooperatives 
may engage in production, services or both.
10
 
 
                                                             
6 See our discussion in Chapter Two 
7 The concept of transactional relationship has been discussed under Chapter Two supra pp.35-38, 40-45 
8See detail discussions of membership criteria in Chapter Three. 
9 See Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 2(2) 
10 Ibid Art 7 
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However, the law’s failure to expressly state the type of transactional relationship between the 
owner(s) and the cooperative opens the door to profit-seekers who wish to hide under the guise 
of a cooperative. It does not expressly rule out the possibility of lenders and borrower 
transactional relationship between the owners and the cooperative. This leaves an opening for the 
lenders of the cooperative to become its owners, though this opening may not be wide enough to 
allow entry comfortably due to the general understanding about concepts of cooperatives. 
However, the principle of dividend on share capital makes the opening wide enough for lenders 
of capital to become owners.
11
The fact that it is necessary for a member to pay share capital 
when it is decided in a general meeting further widens the opening.
12
However; in user ownership 
capital contributions are not a mandatory condition to joining a cooperative, a member may 
gradually accumulate his share of capital by having continuous transactions with the 
cooperative.
13
 
The legal authorization of selling shares to non-members may even be taken as a clear 
permission of the intrusion for profit seekers to enter into the ownership of cooperatives. 
According to Art 16(6) of Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998, whenever a 
cooperative faces a shortage of capital it “may sell certain shares to a person who is not a 
member of the (cooperative) without contradicting the principles of the (cooperative).
14
If we take 
this article to mean that the general meeting sells shares only when it wants to sell i.e. 
membership is closed then we contradict the principle of open membership. So the safest way of 
construing this article is to allow profit seekers to have ownership rights in a cooperative 
whenever users are unable to raise the necessary capital. This construction is also supported by 
the principle of dividend on share capital.
15
The by-laws may lay down procedures and criteria 
that invite profit seekers.
16
 In short, the law opens the door for lender cooperatives. 
                                                             
11 For details see Chapter Four. 
12 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 13(2) and Art 16(1&2) as amended. Notice that, before Art16 
was amended, capital was to be collected to expand the activities of the cooperatives but after amendment the capital 
is to start its function. 
13See for details of alternatives of obtaining capital to start in Chapter Four. 
14 Emphasis added and the brackets are substitution of the word ‘society’ with the ‘cooperative.’ 
15 Before it was amended by Proclamation 402/2004 Art 16 did not authorize the general meeting to sell share to 
non-members. It was also by amendment of sub-article 1 of Art 33 that deduction from net profit is limited only to 
legal reserve fund. Before the amendment the deductions were to be made not only for legal reserve but also for 
expansion works and for social services. It was also by amendment of sub-article 2 of the same article that the 
distribution of dividend on the basis of shares the members have in the society and on amount of goods effected for 
the sale to the cooperatives or goods purchased from the cooperatives by the member of the cooperatives was 
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    Closed membership possible 
In profit seeking enterprises, membership is closed. In partnerships, and sometimes in private 
limited companies, personal identity is indispensable. Thus, an offer for membership is open 
only for persons identified in advance. Once a partnership or a private limited company is 
formed, no one is allowed to join. As an extension of this closed membership members are not 
entitled to transfer their shares to non-members without the consent of other members.
17
 
Although personal identity may not be very important in public companies, it may be formed 
between individuals who know each other without giving any opportunity for those who have 
intentions to become a member.
18
It is up to the entrepreneur whether or not to offer the share to 
public.
19
 Once the company is formed, membership is closed and it could be reopened in the 
future by the decision of the extraordinary meeting of shareholders to increase the capital of the 
company by selling new shares. Although transfer of shares may allow new shareholders to join 
the company, the memorandum or articles of association may impose certain limitation on such 
transfers.
20
 
 
When we come to Ethiopian cooperatives law, it provides almost the same thing with the 
commercial code. Firstly, it gives less attention to the principle of open membership.
21
Secondly, 
it empowers the founders’ general meeting to determine the total number of shares to be 
sold.
22
Thirdly, it also assumes that there is fixed capital.
23
 If the general meeting wants more 
capital, it would open a door for new membership.
24
 Such authority derives the founders to offer 
membership to persons identified in advance. User cooperatives could not normally fix capital 
levels, since frequent changes due to principle of open membership makes the capital indefinite. 
Furthermore, members of user cooperatives may not necessarily contribute capital. Fourthly, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
repealed and the general meeting was given full power to determine the criteria to distribute profit. See Proclamation 
402/2004 These changes altogether may imply that the amendment was made in order to enable cooperatives to 
resolve their financial problems by appealing to capitalists/profit seekers. 
16Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 16(7) as amended by Proclamation No.402/2004 
17 See Commercial Code Art 250, 282, 302, 522 and 523 
18 Ibid Art 316 
19 Ibid Art 317 and 318 
20 Ibid Art 333 
21 See our discussion in Chapter Four 
22 Ibid Art 16(1) cum. (2) cum (3) cum(5) 
23 Ibid Art 16(2) cum (3) 
24 Ibid Art 16(3) 
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mandatory requires every member to contribute initial capital. Capital contribution may also 
serve as a means to block the poor from joining the cooperative. 
 
No Share Limitations 
As it can be expected, the Ethiopian Commercial Code does not provide for a maximum ceiling 
on the percentage of individual shareholding. Only in the banking and insurance sectors of the 
economy does Ethiopian Law provides limits for individual shareholding at a maximum ceiling 
of ten percent of the capital, though, the memorandum or articles of association may provide for 
a maximum individual holding. 
 
Almost the same is true in a cooperative. In principle, Ethiopian cooperative law limits the 
individual shareholding at maximum of ten percent of the capital.
25
However, if a member is 
reinvesting the dividend he received from the cooperative; such a limitation may be 
waived.
26
Moreover, since there is no legal mechanism to control nominal members, there is a 
possibility that some of the members may actually hold more than ten percent of that capital. 
Thus, legal limitations may be an apparent limitation only. 
 
Investing in profit seeking firms 
It is not expected from the Ethiopian Commercial Code to impose any limitation as to where a 
firm reinvests its profit. A firm can reinvest its profit in any business activity and/or any kind of 
firm provided the highest management organ authorizes such investment.
27
 
 
Although the Ethiopian Cooperatives Law is expected to impose limitation on the reinvestment 
of the profit of the cooperatives, there is no express or even implied limitation in the law. So the 
                                                             
25 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 16(5) In ‘true’ cooperatives members usually have equal 
share in the capital and it is difficult to fix percentage of shareholding in a capital in advance since the capital is 
expected to moves up ward due the principle of open membership. 
26 Ibid Art 33(3) Although it is possible to argue that a member could reinvest his dividend until his total 
shareholding reaches ten percent of the capital such argument is implausible since it makes this article ineffective 
when seen in light of Art 16(5).  
27
Since agency power is interpreted narrowly (see Civil Code Art 2181(3) and managers who enter into contract 
(purchasing shares from firms) are agents (see Commercial Code Art 216) and most of the time the memorandum 
and articles of association do not expressly authorize directors/managers to reinvest the profit, the owners of the firm 
have to expressly authorize the reinvestment of the profit. 
110 
 
general meeting of a cooperative may authorize the executive organ to buy shares in profit 
seeking firms. It is suggested that this in turn makes the cooperative a profit seeking firm. 
 
Service to non-members 
It would have been surprising if the Commercial Code had expected the firm to trade with its 
owners. Profit seeking firms intend to make profit by supplying goods/services to others at a 
price that exceeds cost of production of the goods/services. In contrast consumer cooperatives 
are intending to provide goods/services to members at the cost of production.
28
Similarly 
producer/worker cooperatives are intending to sell the product/labour of members at its real 
market price. This means that Ethiopian cooperatives are expected to limit the consumer 
cooperatives to the supply of its goods/services to members only; and producer/worker 
cooperatives to purchase merchandisable goods/service or labour from members only. However, 
the law neither expressly nor impliedly contains such a limitation. Even more; the law seems to 
impliedly authorize a supply to non-members or purchases from non-members. This is because 
the law declares distribution of profit on the basis of shareholding as a guiding principle of 
cooperatives. Thus consumer cooperatives in Ethiopia may make profit by selling goods/services 
to non-members at a price that exceeds the cost of production.
29
Similarly producer/worker 
cooperatives in Ethiopia could make a profit by buying goods/labour from non-members and 
reselling it at a price that exceeds its cost of production. Thus, Ethiopian cooperative law never 
recognizes the basic idea of users-owners and users-benefits that clearly distinguish true 
cooperatives from profit seeking firms.  
 
5.1.2 Legal limitations on ownership rights in a cooperative 
 
Under the subtopic ‘theory of the firm,’ we saw that the cost of contract and the cost of 
ownership affect the assignment of ownership in a free market economy. By the term ‘free 
market’ it is intended to mean a situation where almost every price of goods/services is 
                                                             
28
Any price collected in excess of cost of production is returned to the purchaser at the end of the financial year. 
29 Profit could also be derived from members since members could not get share of dividend in accordance of the 
transaction they made. 
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determined by supply and demand. In such economic systems, freedoms of contract and 
ownership rights are very wide. 
 
However, in practice, the state influences the supply and demand side of the economy by its 
policies and laws. State interference in the economy is designed to protect certain interests. Such 
interests may be either the interest of the majority in a democratic system or the interest of a 
powerful few in the case of non-democratic states. Depending on the type of interest, the state 
intends to protect itself using law as an instrument. The law may encourage one form of 
ownership assignment and discourage another by either widening or limiting freedom of contract 
and ownership rights. The law would therefore create additional costs on assignment of 
ownership. 
 
Here we intend to show that the Ethiopian Cooperatives Law creates insignificant costs on the 
assignment of ownership. This may have implications in respect of enabling profit seeking.  To 
this effect, the extent of the indivisible property of a cooperative and considering the amount of 
legal reserve and its use, the profit sharing principle, shareholders’ rights (such as voting, 
transfer of shares, non-expulsion, access to grievance hearing organ) and restriction on 
borrowing and on loans are discussed. 
 
Collective ownership Not Necessary  
The value of goods depends on the extent of legal entitlement to utilize such goods to the 
satisfaction of human desire.
30
 The legal entitlements on a good are called property rights. 
Depending on the details of a legal entitlement, property rights can be classified into possessory 
rights and ownership rights. A person who has possessory rights on a good is entitled to 
administer and use the good.
31
 A person who has ownership rights can administer, use the good 
and its fruits and dispose the good and its fruits. Ownership is the widest right that may be had 
                                                             
30
 Martin Ricketts (ed), The Economics of Modern Business Enterprise: The International Library of Critical 
writings on Economics Series (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008) 87 
31 See Civil Code Art 1140-1150 
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on a good.
32
In principle it indivisibly combines usus (possessory rights), usus fructus (own the 
natural fruits a good) and abusus (destroy, transfer or transform the good).
33
 
 
However, the law imposes restrictions on ownership rights.
34
Depending on the ultimate policy 
objectives of a Government, such restrictions may create different types of ownership rights. 
Private ownership rights, communal ownership rights and collective ownership rights are the 
prominent types of ownership rights.
35
 Private ownership rights means the owner of the good and 
no one else has the authority to decide how the good should be used. Private ownership rights 
,are the widest type of ownership right. It combines usus, usus fructus and abusus. One person or 
several persons jointly may have private ownership rights on a good.
36
 
 
Communal ownership rights are when many persons have the right to use a thing for the same 
purpose. Communal ownership right is usually associated with land or forest ownership rights. It 
includes rights to way, cutting wood, grazing animals, and irrigation on the communal land. 
“Other important examples of communal rights might include the right to use a watercourse for 
the disposal of waste products or the right to fish on a particular stretch of water or at sea or the 
right to allow smoke or other waste gases to escape into the air.”37Communal ownership rights 
give lesser rights to owners when compared to private ownership. The ownership rights can 
never be given to an individual, it is given to a community. The individual has no rights of 
administration and disposal, and his right is limited to the use of the goods without unnecessarily 
affecting similar rights of other members and he cannot transfer such use rights. It is the 
community that has the power to administer the goods including allowing new comers to use 
them.
38
However, even the community cannot transfer the ownership of the goods to others and 
the community cannot order the partition of the goods among members.
39
 
                                                             
32 Ibid Art 1204(1) 
33 Ibid Art 1204(2), 1205, 1206 
34 Ibid 
35 Ricketts (n 30) 88-92. Also see Civil Code Title VII-IX 
36 See Civil Code Art 1257 
37 Ricketts (n 30) 89 
38 Goods are either movable or immovable. Immovable is either land or building. See Civil Code Art 1126 & 1130 
39The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation 
No.456/2005 define communal land holding as follows: “Communal land holding means rural land which is given 
by the government to local residents for common grazing, forestry, and other social services.” Notice that Art 40(3) 
of the FDRE constitution reserves ownership right on land exclusively to the state. 
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Collective ownership is a form of ownership that gives the least legal entitlement to the owners. 
Unlike private ownership but like communal ownership, collective ownership always 
presupposes plurality of owners. Moreover, transfer of ownership or division of the property 
among the members is not possible. An individual member with a collective ownership right can 
never decide how or when to exercise his use right. With collective ownership rights, the right is 
a shared right.
40
 The decision about the use of the resource is taken as a group.
41
Private 
ownership is the characteristics of capitalist/market economy. Communal ownership is the 
characteristics of subsistence agriculture or pastoral life. Collective ownership is often the 
manifestation of command or cooperative economy. 
 
Collective ownership rights have the characteristics of ownership rights in true cooperatives. A 
cooperative intends to become the building block of society. This means they are established for 
an undetermined period of time. There is no presumption of future division of the property 
between cooperative members. The members, and would be members, are presumed to have 
equal claim on the property of the cooperative. That is why true cooperatives adhere to the 
principle of open membership without making any change to the par value of shares. 
 
Although, it provides for the indivisibility of assets and funds of the cooperatives, Ethiopian 
cooperative law cannot guarantee the continuous existence of collective property rights in a 
cooperative. A fund of a cooperative can be divided up to its members only if the fund is the 
annual net profit of the cooperative.
42
Assets of a cooperative could be divided to members only 
if the cooperative is liquidated after dissolution.
43
 Moreover, a fund which is not an annual net 
profit and/or any assets of the cooperative can not also be transferred to third party. This 
indivisibility is an indication of collective ownership rights. However, this collective ownership 
right may be eroded if a cooperative is owned by profit seekers. There are legal provisions that 
can be utilized to this purpose. To start with, the founders’ meeting is empowered to fix the 
capital of a cooperative. The founders’ meeting may keep this capital to the bare minimum so 
that the cooperative could have almost no worth. Worth is not a necessary condition to make 
                                                             
40 Ricketts (n 30) 89  
41 Ibid 
42 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 32 
43 Ibid  
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large profits.
44
 The source of the fund of a society is its annual profit,
45
 but only 30% of this 
annual profit goes to the collective ownership.
46
The remaining 70% is distributed to members as 
a dividend.
47
This 30% continues to be accumulated until it reaches 30% of the capital.
48
Since the 
capital may be very minimal, the cooperatives may reach this 30% in one financial year or a 
shorted period of time. The general meeting may also decide to dissolve a cooperative if the 
members are willing to divide the property of the cooperative.
49
 
 
Legal reserve as Creditors’ Guarantee 
Under the Commercial Code, a reserve fund is intended to increase the security of creditors of a 
firm. Only firms with limited liability (companies) are required to maintain a legal reserve 
fund.
50
There is no legal reserve fund requirement for a partnership since there is no fixed capital 
and liability is unlimited.
51
In company limited by shares, the legal reserve fund is at least five 
percent of the annual net profit until it reaches 20% of the capital.
52
 In a private limited 
company, this five percent continues until it reaches ten percent of the capital.
53
 Banking and 
insurance companies are expected to keep an additional reserve fund in the National Bank of 
Ethiopia.  
 
Similarly under Ethiopian cooperative law, the legal reserve is intended for the security of the 
cooperative’s creditors. A cooperative’s liability is limited. Before it was amended in 2004, 
Ethiopian cooperative law expected a cooperative to carry out expansion work and social 
services.
54
Now there is no such expectation. Then the purpose of a legal reserve fund is only for 
the security of creditors. 
 
                                                             
44See Chapter Two. 
45The fact that the law does not define profit of a cooperative any income obtained from whatever source including 
government assistance and charitable donations may be taken as profit of a coop. Moreover; there is a possibility 
that the cooperative may consider income from depreciation of business asset as annual profit. 
46Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998  Art 33(1) as amended 
47 Ibid   
48 Ibid 
4949 Ibid Art 40(1) 
50 Commercial Code Art 454, 539 
51 Ibid Art 255,289, 296 
52 Ibid Art 454  
53Ibid Art 539 
54
 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 33(b) and 33(c) 
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Egoistic Profit sharing principle 
Ethiopian cooperative law imposes the model of economic egoism on a cooperative. Profit 
seekers prefer a firm that enables them to maximize the net return from their investment. They 
do not want to forgo any benefit for the benefit of others. Ethiopian cooperatives law squarely 
fits this egoistic rationality. First, the law expressly stipulates profit sharing in accordance with 
investment as a guiding principle of cooperatives.
55
When we continue our analysis, we find a 
provision that totally leaves the criteria of distributing profit to the general meeting.
56
This means 
taking egoistic rationality as its principle the general meeting may decide on distribution in 
accordance with capital investment in a cooperative. True cooperatives do not adhere to the 
principle of egoistic rationality. They have purposes to attain other than enabling members to 
accumulate wealth. The principle of profit sharing under Ethiopian cooperative law is even more 
difficult for true cooperatives since it follows egoistic principles of market economy. 
 
Wider Shareholder rights 
It is self-evident that shareholders prefer a type of firm in which they can have a wider property 
right on their shareholding. Let us now compare the rights of members in a cooperative under 
Ethiopian cooperatives law and shareholders’ rights under the Commercial Code. 
Members’/shareholders’ rights include a power to transfer of shares, voting rights, a defence 
against non-expulsion and access to a grievance procedure. 
 
Transfer of shares 
By transfer of shares it is intended to mean the ending of one’s ownership right in a firm either 
by transferring the ownership right to a third party or by withdrawing after receiving proportional 
payment. It is obvious that the right to transfer ownership right to a third party is broader than  
the right to withdraw upon receiving proportional payment. This is because the right to transfer 
to a third party gives the owner the opportunity to choose wider options of transferring rights. 
However, although it benefits the withdrawing partner it may adversely affect the remaining 
partners, left with a new partner.  
 
                                                             
55See further discussion in Chapter Four 
56 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 33(2) as amended by Proclamation No.402/2004 
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Under the Commercial Code there are four types of partnership and two types of company. The 
four types of partnerships are ordinary partnerships, joint ventures, general partnerships and 
limited partnerships. Ordinary partnerships carry out non-commercial economic activities such 
as agriculture, forestry, fishing and cottage industry.
57
 Other partnerships could choose to carry 
out either commercial or non-commercial economic activities.
58
 
 
In an ordinary partnership, it is not possible to assign all the rights; the owner member can only 
assign the usufructury rights.
59
A partner can however, withdraw from the partnership by selling 
his share to the partnership “in cash, on the basis of the value of his right on the day when he 
leaves the partnership.”60In a general partnership, assignment of ownership is allowed if all 
members agree, although the memorandum of association may provide for the sufficiency of a 
majority.
61
A member of a limited partnership has an alternative to leave the partnership either by 
selling his share to the partnership or to a third party.
62
 But transfer to a third party is conditional 
upon the consent of managers and majority members.
63
Unless otherwise agreed to continue the 
partnership, all types of partnership would be dissolved upon incapacity, death, bankruptcy or 
attachment of a share of any partner.
64
 
 
Companies are of two types; share companies and private limited companies.
65
They are always 
commercial regardless of the nature of their economic activity.
66
In a share company, a 
shareholder could freely transfer his shares to third parties, although the company can include the 
right to preemption in the memorandum of association.
67
However, in a private limited company, 
free transfer of share is possible only between members.
68
 Any transfer of shares to non-member 
                                                             
57 See Commercial Code Art 5-9, 10(1), 213(1) 
58 Ibid Art 213 10(1) 
59 Ibid Art 250 
60 Ibid Art 262(1) emphasis added 
61Ibid Art 282 The law is silent whether or not the partner has the right to withdraw by selling his share to the 
partnership. 
62 Ibid Art 303 & 302 
63 Ibid Art 302 The law is silent on joint venture. 
64 Ibid Art 260, 295 & 303 
65 Ibid Art 10(2), 212(1)(e), 212(1)(f) 
66 Ibid Art 10(2) 
67 Ibid Art 333 
68 Ibid Art 523(1) 
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requires the approval of at least the majority of members holding 75% of the share capital.
69
Both 
in a share company and a private limited company, the law never entitles the shareholder to force 
the company to buy his share.
70
In a case of the death of a shareholder, their shares are transferred 
to their heir in accordance of the inheritance law.
71
 
 
In general, the right to transfer their share in cooperatives is wider than it would be under a 
partnership and a private limited company, but a little narrower than under a share company (to a 
public company). A member who wants to end his ownership rights in a cooperative has two 
alternatives. The first alternative is to demand the cooperative to pay him his proportionate share 
in the property of the cooperative.
72
The second alternative is to transfer his share to a third party 
(member or non-member) on condition that the management committee approves the transfer.
73
 
Upon the death of a member their share is paid to their heirs in accordance with inheritance law, 
but non-member heirs have to get the permission of the management committee if they want to 
become a member.
74
  
 Voting rights 
Voting rights of an owner in a cooperative are less favorable when compared to a partnership and 
a company under the Commercial Code. The first disadvantage to an owner in a cooperative is 
that the shareholder has only one vote regardless of the amount of his shareholding, and it may 
not be possible to change this by using by-laws.
75
 But under the Commercial Code, both in 
partnerships and companies, voting in principle depends on the number of shares the person has 
in the firm.
76
 The second is that when a cooperative makes a decision, it is always passed by a 
majority vote whatever its nature may be.
77
 However, in a partnership, any amendment to the 
                                                             
69 Ibid Art 523(2) 
70However; shareholders in a share company which changes nature or object of the company or transfers head office 
abroad may withdraw from the company and have their shares redeemed. See Ibid Art 463 
71 Ibid Art 524 
72 Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 Art 14(1(d)   
73 Ibid Art 19(1) 
74 Ibid Art 19(2) & 19(3) 
75 Ibid Art 18(1) & 5(2) Although one may argue that cooperatives could provide for vote according to use or capital 
contribution it would not be as such easy to convince the organ that registers cooperatives due to the nature of true 
cooperatives and also the law expressly provides democratic control in the definition of cooperatives as well as in 
the guiding principle of cooperatives. See Art 2(2) and 5(2) 
76 See Commercial Code Art 234, 295,, 303, 407, 534(2)  
77 Although Art 11(3) the Ethiopian Cooperatives Law provides that the by-laws can be amended by special 
resolution, it does not give any veto power to individual shareholder. Special resolution means resolution passed by 
a two third majority of the members. See Ibid Art 2(5) 
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memorandum of association or appointment of an attorney requires the unanimous consent of all 
members.
78
In companies, the nationality of the company can be changed only if there is 
unanimous vote to that effect.
79
 More importantly no member may be required to increase his 
contribution without his consent.
80
 However, although the law is disadvantageous for the 
minority, it could make space for the majority to pursue a profit-seeking motive even if it is at 
the cost of minority members. This dictatorship of the majority without any minority rights may 
encourage profit-seekers to further subvert the public objectives of a cooperative in favour of 
profit seeking objectives.  
 
The right of non-expulsion 
Another area where Ethiopian cooperative law opens the door to profit seekers is the right of 
non-expulsion. In general partnerships, limited partnerships and companies there is an absolute 
immunity from expulsion either by the decision of shareholders or a court. A shareholder can 
withdraw from a firm only upon his own decision. Under ordinary partnerships a member may 
be expelled from the partnership by a court order.
81
 However, under a cooperative a member 
may be expelled from membership by a decision of a general meeting.
82
 Again although the law 
is disadvantageous for the minority, it could make space for the majority to pursue a profit-
seeking motive even if it is at the cost of minority members. This dictatorship of the majority 
without any minority rights may encourage profit-seekers to further subvert the public objectives 
of a cooperative in favour of profit seeking objectives. They would threaten to dismiss any 
member who may stand against their profit maximizing motives.  
 
Access to grievance hearing organs 
The Commercial Code leaves to the freedom of the members of a firm to decide on an 
appropriate dispute settlement mechanism. Thus, whenever he/she feels aggrieved, a member 
may choose either public or private dispute resolution mechanisms. Even among the private 
dispute resolution mechanisms (negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration) members 
may choose the one suitable for their case. However, this freedom is limited in a cooperative. 
                                                             
78 See Commercial Code Art 233(1), 235, 295 and 303 
79 Ibid Art 425(2) and 536(1) 
80 Ibid Art 425(2) and 536(2) 
81 Ibid Art 261 
82Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 15(2) 
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Under Ethiopian cooperatives law, a member who has a grievance is not entitled to choose public 
dispute mechanism.
83
 He can go to court only by appeal.
84
 Even in private dispute resolutions, it 
seems that he is limited to conciliation and then arbitration.
85
  This is the only point where the 
cooperative law appears to be unfavorable to profit-seekers. 
 
Restriction on borrowing 
Ethiopian cooperative law requires the by-laws of a cooperative to provide the amount (at least 
the maximum) and conditions of borrowing money both from members and third parties.
86
This 
restriction (although nominal since the general meeting could modify the by-laws by two-third 
majority) seems to have intended to protect the creditors of the cooperative since the cooperative 
is of a limited liability (and even the cooperative itself from rent-seeking members). This is 
because there is no such similar restriction under a partnership, which has unlimited liability, and 
private limited company whose general manager is answerable to the creditors for any breaches 
of their duties.
87
 In a share company, there is no restriction on borrowing from a shareholder but 
borrowing by a member of board director has to be supervised.
88
 
 
Restriction on lending 
Art 35 of the Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 prohibits cooperatives from 
lending money to non-member individuals or non-cooperative associations. This article is some 
what ambiguous. If it is referring to saving & credit cooperatives, it can be interpreted as simply 
stating the concept of user ownership. However, this alternative is unconvincing since the law 
cannot restrict user ownership to only saving and credit cooperatives without saying anything 
about other types of cooperatives. It should be referring to any type of cooperative in order to 
curb them from over-utilization of banking transactions under the guise of attaining their 
cooperatives objectives. Under Ethiopian law, it is a criminal act to give a loan without getting a 
license from a national bank. However, cooperatives are entitled to extend loans to members 
                                                             
83 Ibid Art  46-49 
84 Ibid Art 52 
85 Ibid Art 46 & 47(1) 
86 Ibid Art 34 as amended by proclamation No.402/2004 
87 Commercial Code Art 530 
88 Ibid 356 
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without such licenses. This could even be taken as a positive advantage of cooperatives over 
investor-owned firms. 
 
5.2 The Management of Cooperatives under Ethiopian Cooperative Law 
 
In chapter two, we saw that when ownership is separated from the management, the management 
bodies may use their position to satisfy their personal interests or to satisfy the interest of the 
public. The corollary to this is that when management is in the hands of owners they may use 
their power for profit maximization a more common outcome as “there is a growing amount of 
scholarship which indicates that there has been no separation of control from ownership.”89 
 
The legal power and accountability of a management organ greatly influences the ultimate 
motive of an economic organization. Accordingly, it influences profit-seekers’ choice of types of 
economic organization. Profit-seekers normally prefer a form of economic organization that 
greatly minimizes separation of management from ownership. In this subtopic our ultimate 
purpose is to determine whether the provisions of Cooperative Society Proclamation 
No.147/1998 minimize separation of control from ownership. Put in a question form; can the 
owners use the management of cooperative to advance their profit-maximizing motive? 
 
A. The management organs of Ethiopian cooperatives 
The management structure of Ethiopian cooperatives is similar to profit making 
businesses.
90
Under Ethiopian cooperatives law, there are three management organs of a 
cooperative; general meetings, the management committee and the control committee.
91
General 
assembly is a meeting of members of a cooperative.
92
The management committee means a body 
elected by the general assembly with the responsibility to manage the activities of the 
society.
93
The members of the management committee are normally members of the cooperative. 
                                                             
89 Lorraine Talbot, Critical Company Law(Routledge-Cavendish, 2008) 139 
90 The management structure of charities & Societies in Ethiopia is of two level; the general meeting of members 
and a board of directors. The board of directors has both the policy making and agency power. There is no concept 
of general manager and auditor. See Civil Code Art 426-450 
91 Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art 20, 23,  &25 
92 Ibid Art 2(4) 
93 Ibid Art 2(6) 
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The control committee is a committee established by the general assembly to audit the activities 
of the management committee.
94
These organs may have subcommittees.
95
 
 
Contrary to investor-owned firms, under the Commercial Code and the Public Enterprise 
Proclamation, Ethiopian cooperative law does not expressly recognize the office of the general 
manager. In addition to shareholder meetings, (equivalent to general meeting), board meetings 
(equivalent to management committee), and auditors (equivalent to control committee), share 
companies have the office of a general manager.
96
 Although other forms of investor-owned firms 
(partnerships & private limited company) are not required to have board and auditors, (if they 
like, owners may establish an office of the board of directors and auditors), they have general 
meetings and a manager.
97
 The management structure of a public enterprise is equivalent to share 
company; it has supervising authority (which is equivalent to share holders’ meeting), a board, a 
general manager and auditors.
98
 
 
Now one may ask whether or not the owners of a cooperative can establish an office for a 
general manager.
99
The reading of Art 24 of the Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 
implies that owners of a cooperative are entitled to appoint a manager since the provision limits 
the power of the management committee to policy making.
100
This is because there is very little 
written in this article on the power of agency.
101
A manager is an agent that enters into a contract 
on behalf and by the name of a firm.
102
 More strongly, since the by-laws expressly allow the 
                                                             
94 Ibid Art 26 
95 Ibid Art 27 
96 Commercial Code Art 347, 348, 368, 388 
97 See Ibid Art 233-236, 275, 287, 295 and 303. Notice however; that unlike in the case of share company, the law 
has not governed the general meeting and manager in detail. 
98 Public Enterprise Proclamation No. 25/1992 Art 10 
99 Such question may lack practical importance since even if we conclude that the cooperatives cannot appoint a 
manager, such does have very little practical effect since the management committee may play policy making and 
agency role. 
100 Compare Art 24 of Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998  with Art  362 and 363 of the Commercial 
Code and Art 14 Public Enterprise Proclamation No. 25/1992 Art 10 
101 Only 24(5) of this provision very slightly implicate the duty of a manager. However; it is insufficient since it 
does not necessary indicate agency. Also Compare Art 24 of Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 with 
Art 16 of Public Enterprise Proclamation No. 25/1992  
102 Commercial Code Art 33(1) cum Civil Code Art  2203&2204 
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general meeting to establish subcommittees,
103
 it can establish a subcommittee of management 
committee that can play the role of a manager.
104
 
 
B. Powers and duties of different management organs in Ethiopian cooperatives 
As stated above, Ethiopian cooperatives have three management organs. Let us now examine the 
powers and duties of each organ. 
 
General meeting  
The general meeting is the supreme organ. It decides on all matters which are not delegated to 
other organs by the law, by the by-laws or by its own decisions. Particularly, it makes and 
amends the by-laws of the cooperative, appoints and controls the management committee and 
auditors, decides on capital and profit distribution, and dismisses members for disciplinary 
reasons. It passes these decisions either in an ordinary resolution or in a special resolution. 
Special resolution is when a decision requires a minimum of two-third majority vote of all 
members. Other resolutions that require simple majority are ordinary resolutions. Special 
resolutions are always necessary to amend the by-laws and to amalgamate, divide and convert a 
cooperative. The by-laws may list additional issues that require special resolution.
105
The general 
meeting shall be held at least once a year. Emergency general meeting may be held at any time if 
such is requested by the management committee or one-third of the members or the cooperative 
agency. 
Management committee  
The management committee is the think-tank, the record keeper, planner and agent of a 
cooperative. This is a combination of the powers of the board and general manager in a share 
company. As discussed in the preceding subtopic, the general meeting may divide these powers 
and duties and then establish a sub-committee of general managers which can have executive and 
agency powers and duties. By doing so, the general meeting may in effect establish a board of 
directors, which may have similarity with a board of directors of share  company, which appoints 
controls and dismisses a general manager. The criteria and procedure of election of members of 
                                                             
103Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 Art 27 
104 There is a possibility to have plurality of agents/managers. See Commercial Code Art 237, 288, 525(1) and Civil 
Code Art 2218. 
105 The listing of contents of the by-laws under Art 11(2) of the Ethiopian Cooperatives Law is by no means an 
exhaustive list. 
123 
 
the management committee is determined by the by-laws of a cooperative. The term office of a 
management committee is three years and a person can be elected for membership only for a 
maximum of two consecutive terms- a person may be elected for more than two terms, provided 
there is an interval. 
 
Control Committee  
The control committee is equivalent to auditors of companies or public enterprises. Its powers 
and duties are to audit the performance of the management committee and the books and 
accounts of the cooperative.
106
The terms of office of the control committee is three years and a 
member can be elected consecutively only for two terms, and a person may be elected for more 
than two terms provided there is interval. 
 
C. Accountability of the management organs  
The management organs of the Ethiopian cooperatives are accountable to nobody else but to the 
members. The law puts very little limitations on the freedom of decision of the general meeting 
which is the supreme organ of a cooperative. This implies that there is high possibility that 
cooperatives are utilized to maximize profit if the owners are actively participating in the 
management or otherwise to the personal benefit of the management. 
 
Accountability of the general meeting 
Ethiopian cooperatives law leaves much more freedom to the general meeting than company law 
leaves to shareholder meetings. For example, the Commercial Code governs shareholder 
meetings in a more detailed fashion when compared to the Ethiopian cooperative law.
107
All these 
procedural gaps in the Ethiopian cooperatives law have to be filled either by by-laws or decisions 
of the general meeting. The Commercial Code fixes the minimum and maximum number of 
members of board of directors and gives guidelines on the remuneration of the directors.
108
But 
the general meeting of a cooperative is free to determine the number of directors and their 
remunerations as it thinks fit. Once again, unlike Ethiopian cooperatives law, the Commercial 
                                                             
106 Compare Art 26 of the Ethiopian Cooperatives Law with Art 374 of the Commercial Code. 
107 Compare Arts 388-421 of the Commercial Code with Art  22 of the Ethiopian Cooperative Law 
108 Commercial Code Art 347 and 353 
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Code also expressly lists persons who could not be auditors.
109
These freedoms may therefore be 
utilized either to maximize profit or to increase personal benefit of the management committee.  
 
The Management Committee  
The management committee is accountable to the general meeting. It is appointed and removed 
by the general meeting. It must submit its work plan and activity report to the general meeting 
for approval. Thus, the management committee, which may include the general manager, may 
work towards profit maximization when the general meeting is strong enough to control them 
and at other times work to satisfy their personal interest. 
 
The Control Committee 
The control committee is appointed and removed by the general meeting and accountable to it. 
The purpose of the control committee is to help the general meeting to control the management 
committee. However, if the members of the committee are under the influence of the 
management committee,
110
 the cooperative may be driven to the satisfaction of the interest of the 
management committee. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
In short the Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 directly and/or indirectly encourages 
profit-seekers to use cooperative form of economic organization as a competition and profit-
maximizing model. This is because the ownership rights in the cooperatives include the rights 
that are the characteristics of the profit-seeking ownership. Some of the characteristics of the 
profit-seeking ownership are lender-borrower relationship between owners and the firm, closed 
membership, investment amount dependent on individual capacity, reinvestment of profit in 
another profit-seeking firm, trading with non-owners. Moreover; wider ownership rights and 
accountability of the management organ to the owners are other important characteristics of 
profit-seeking ownership.  
 
                                                             
109 Ibid Art 370 
110 Members of the control committee may be amateur or relatives of the members of the management committee 
which make them prone to influence. 
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These characteristics can possibly exist under the Cooperative Society Proclamation 
No.147/1998.  The lender-borrower relation between owners and the cooperative is possible 
under the law. This is because the law does not expressly define the type of relationship that 
should exist between owners and the cooperatives. More importantly; in addition to doing away 
with principle of open membership and principle of mutuality the law authorizes the sale of 
shares to investors.  The law provides almost for closed membership. This is because, firstly, it 
gives less attention to the principle of open membership. Secondly, it empowers the founders’ 
general meeting to determine the total number of shares to be sold. Thirdly, it also assumes that 
there is fixed capital. If the general meeting wants more capital, it would open a door for new 
membership. Such authority derives the founders to offer membership to persons identified in 
advance. Fourthly, it mandatorily requires every member to contribute initial capital. Capital 
contribution may also serve as a means to block the poor from joining the cooperative. 
Limitation on individual investment capacity is also nominal because such a limitation may be 
waived if a member is reinvesting the dividend he received from the cooperative and there is no 
legal mechanism to control nominal members. Trading with non-members and reinvesting in 
investor owned firm surplus are not prohibited by the law. 
 
 Ownership rights are as wide as it is in investor owned firms. The general meeting has the 
chance to neutralize indivisibility of assets of the cooperative and can keep the legal reserve fund 
to the bar minimum. Profit sharing is also on the basis of investment. The right to transfer shares 
is also wide enough. Although the only limitation on ownership rights in cooperatives is voting 
right such limitation could either be neutralized through lobbying or may even be utilized to the 
advantage of the majority owners. The power of the general meeting to expel members may also 
be utilized to widen the ownership rights of the majority. More importantly, and as an extension 
of wider ownership right, owners are given unrestricted authority to manage the cooperative and 
to make the management organs accountable to them.   
 
The examination of the law ends here with the conclusion that Ethiopian Cooperative Law 
merges cooperatives with investor owned firms. The next chapter examines the government 
policy concerning cooperatives with the same purpose of searching for the criteria that can 
distinguish cooperative from investor owned firms. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ETHIOPIAN COOPERATIVE POLICY OBJECTIVES 
 
6.0 Introduction 
By Ethiopian cooperative policy objectives,
1
 what is intended here is the ultimate public benefit 
that the government expects from the cooperatives.  Historically cooperatives have been used to 
attain different objectives such as to reduce the ill effect of capitalism on the working class and 
small scale producers, to assist the colonial agenda, to facilitate the agenda of ‘land to the tiller’, 
to transform the rural community into communism, and to reduce poverty.
2
 The United Nations 
encourages cooperatives in sub-Saharan countries as an instrument of poverty reduction and 
grass root democratizations. As we will see in the following subtopics and chapters of this 
research, cooperatives may be utilized as instrument for other purposes such as channeling basic 
goods and creating social solidarity.  
As we have seen in Chapter Three, Four and Five although under Cooperative Society 
Proclamation No.147/1998 cooperatives are very similar to investor-owned firms, they have 
some special privileges. This Chapter attempts to analyze if the Ethiopian government has any 
public interest objectives that can justify such special privileges. More importantly; if there is 
such policy objective it would help us to distinguish cooperative from investor owned. 
 However; the Ethiopian Government does not have any ultimate objectives that it wants to attain 
through use of cooperatives. This is inferred firstly from the fact that the Ethiopian Government 
claims to be a developmental state. Since developmental is authoritarian any objective that may 
be attained through cooperatives would possibly be attained through the instrumentality of other 
alternatives such as public enterprises or IOFs. Secondly, although the Ethiopian Government 
has established a cooperative agency that promotes and supports cooperatives, there is no clear 
direction set by the Government that guides the cooperative agency and other Government 
                                                             
1 The “objective” may mean three different but interrelated things: mission, goal and vision. However; in this sub-
topic it is intended to mean vision. For further discussion see chapter three 
2 See Chapter One 
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organs. As a result there have been misunderstandings between the cooperative agency and other 
government agencies as to the goal of cooperatives. The fact that the objectives that cooperatives 
are intended to attain can also be attained by public enterprises and investor-owned firms has 
exacerbated the disagreement around the goals of cooperatives. 
These conclusions are drawn from a number of sources. These include a review of the 
agricultural policies of Ethiopia which claim to contain the ultimate objectives of agricultural 
cooperatives and   interviews. The analysis begins by trying to pinpoint the place of cooperatives 
in democratic developmental state political economy.  
6.1 Cooperatives in the theory of developmental state 
In developmental state ideology, the place of a true cooperative is invisible due to the soft nature 
of freedom of association and the legitimacy and power of the state in its use of a carrot-and-
stick approach to enhance the private sector that could lead to economic development. Such a 
state has unlimited power to interfere in the economy and limit property rights and the freedom 
of contract. Thus, it can attain any of its economic objectives through public enterprise/investor 
investor-owned firms. The Ethiopian state claims to be developmental. 
The state is said to a developmental state if it fulfills at least two criteria. The first criterion is 
that the Government believes that its ultimate responsibility is bringing economic development.
3
 
This means national economic development is part of its ideology.
4
 A state embraces this 
approach in part when considering the power which other states wield internationally as result of 
their economic strength. So, in order to win international influence and importance, 
developmental states decide to boost their economy at the expense of other objectives. It is ready 
to make any sacrifices if that would lead to economic development. The most obvious things that 
                                                             
3 See Meles Zenawi, ‘State and Market: the Neoliberal limitations and the Case for a Developmental State’ in Akbar 
Norman, Kwesi Botchwey, Howard Stein, and Joseph Stiglitz, Global Growth and Governance in Africa: rethinking 
development strategies (Oxford University Press, 2012) 167. Meles Zenawi, up until he died in August 2012 was the 
leader of the ruling party and the prime minister of Ethiopia. He is often accredited as being the mastermind behind 
the modern developmental state movement in Ethiopia.   
4 Social issues such as poverty reduction, fair wealth distribution, and, welfarism are only secondary agendas at best. 
The underlying objective of developmental state is to increase the share and the benefits earned (gained) from the 
global economic integration with an ultimate goal of becoming an industrialized country. 
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a developmental state is ready to sacrifice are democracy and individual rights.
5
 The government 
gets popular support by appealing mainly to nationalism and national patriotism
6
 instead of 
individual rights and democracy. 
7
 
When we see the place of cooperatives in a liberal political economy, they are enabled by an 
individual’s freedom of association. In communitarian ideology, cooperatives may be used as a 
springboard to create an egalitarian society. Developmental state ideology does not necessarily 
guarantee freedom of association. Moreover, it has no ultimate objective for creating an 
egalitarian society. So it is difficult to place true cooperatives in developmental state ideology. 
The only point where true cooperatives would be envisaged in a developmental state ideology is 
as a means of creating the social capital necessary for economic development.
8
Or, as we will see 
in the following paragraphs cooperatives may be solely the result of economic choice which 
make them the same with investor-owned firms or public enterprises. That may be the case why 
Japanese cooperatives are concentrated in agriculture, saving and credits and retail distribution of 
food which is unparalleled by the United States or other industrialized Western countries.
9
 
The second criteria that show us that the state is a developmental state is the extent of autonomy 
the government has to decide and implement its ideology.
10
 Developmental state government is 
politically unlimited government. It has legitimate power to limit individual rights and to 
interfere in the economy. But unlike communitarian states, the developmental state does not 
necessary involve itself in the production and distribution of goods and services. Rather it may 
                                                             
5 Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed), Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development 
(Cornell University Press, 1999) 17-20   
6An appeal to the necessity of economy for the protection of other individual and democratic rights may also be 
made. This means developmental state may also partially borrow the argument of communitarians who says that 
without economic equality there would not be political equality. This seems to be one of the justification the 
Ethiopian government is appealing to  since it is not easy for this government to appeal to nationalism and national 
patriotism since it was a secessionist rebel group twenty five years before and it still adheres to ethnic federalism. 
7 Woo-Cumings (n 5) 8 
8 The French and Belgian Model of Cooperatives in Colonial Africa could be an indicative of the possibility of using 
cooperatives to create social capital. See Frederick Wanyama, ‘Reinventing the wheel? African cooperatives in 
liberalized economic environment ’(2009): Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics  80(3) 361. Proponents of 
developmental state ideology believe that social capital is a critical factor in economic growth and development. See 
Zenawi (n 3) 148 
9 See Mark Klinedinst and Hitomi Sato, ‘Japanese Cooperative Sector’ (1994) 28(2) Journal of Economic Issues 509 
Japan has been a developmental state where as United State  has been a liberal state and Western Europe has been 
mainly partly liberal and partly communitarian. 
10Zenawi (n 3) 167 
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limit itself to directing private investors towards an economic activity that contributes to national 
economic development such as import-substitution industries, export trade, innovation and 
agricultural activities. It uses a carrot-and-stick approach to guide investors to economic 
activities. The developmental state is also autonomous from public opinion. It has also efficient 
bureaucracy composed of very qualified professionals, competent and obedient military and 
police force. In short it has the legitimacy and power to implement its economic ideology.  
Thus, the fact that the state can direct investor-owned firms to whatever objectives it desires that 
ultimately leads to economic growth, cooperatives in their proper sense become of no use. 
Although the state may allow investors to organize their business in a cooperative form, as far as 
the state believes that such organization can lead to economic development, since the central aim 
of the developmental state is that of nurturing and enhancing private sector enterprises on the 
basis of profit maximizing agenda that represents the country in the international market it need 
not bother about true cooperatives. Even more, its objective in creating competent profit-
maximizing investor-owned firms squarely contradicts the goal of true cooperatives. Finally, the 
nature of true cooperatives is autonomy but the interventionist nature of developmental state 
leaves very less room for such autonomy. 
 
6.2 Ethiopian cooperative policy objectives 
This subtopic intends to show that the Ethiopian Government does not have cooperative policy 
that justifies special cooperative privileges recognized by the Cooperative Society Proclamation 
No 147/1998. There is no express cooperative policy objective. But that may not necessarily lead 
us to conclude that there are no cooperative policy objectives. The policy objectives might have 
been impliedly incorporated in various documents such as Agricultural Cooperatives Sector 
Development Strategy 2012-2016 and the Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010. On the basis 
of these documents some cooperative policy objectives such as providing alternative 
product/input market to smallholder farmers and pastoralists, channeling basic goods, saving and 
credit alternatives and poverty reduction could be conjectured. However, such objectives are 
apparent (not serious commitments).This is because; first, the government can use or has been 
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using other alternatives for the same purpose. Secondly, there has been confusion on what is 
claimed to be a cooperative policy.   
A. Systemic intervention in the agricultural sector of the economy. 
Agriculture is an engine for economic development in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Government has 
planned to achieve lower middle income status by 2025.
11
The Ethiopian Government takes 
agriculture as an engine of economic growth and transformation. That is the agricultural sector 
continues to be the major source of economic growth. The economy has to growth primarily in 
the agricultural sector and such growth should propel the industrial sector to grow.
12
 The 
agricultural sector is given this priority importance since it is believed that its growth ensures 
relatively cheap labour by keeping food items similarly cheap. It also means that there would be 
relatively cheap and quality raw material for the industries. Normally industrialization is 
expected to begin from small agro-processing industries such as food, leather, and textile 
factories and then transform to medium level and finally to large scale manufacturing. Since 
about 85% of the Ethiopian population lives on agriculture, the increase in the income of 
peasantry/pastoralists increases market opportunity for industrial output, and even investment 
capital. More importantly since developmental state theory prioritizes export and since the export 
commodities of Ethiopia are agriculture products such as coffee, sesame, nut, ‘chat’13, flowers, 
cotton, flowers, hides and skins, agriculture helps the industry to grow by enabling the country to 
earn sufficient foreign exchange. These agricultural products except flower and cotton are 
produced by small holder farmers/pastoralists. The agricultural development-led industrialization 
strategy focuses on small holder farmers/pastoralists’ need to increase production and 
productivity.
14
 
                                                             
11 Ministry of Agriculture, ‘Agricultural Cooperatives Sector Development Strategy 2012-2016’ 
(2012<http://api.ning.com/files/464c0NtXZtDs3-
DGp0RziNVQaTPSSRO*4np2q7x0UaI4G1PRQeVzXmIf6zNOXGAR8-xiqLonmnmlpW-
RwUedIEmMdP5qED0b/AgriculturalCooperativeSectorDevelopmentStrategy201220163.pdf> accessed 30 January 
2015, 4  
12 This is on the assumption that underdeveloped countries do not have any better alternative than gradually 
transforming their economy from agriculture to industry.  
13 ‘Chat’ is a green mind stimulant plant.   
14
 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, ‘Growth and Transformation Plan of 2010’ (2010) 
<http://www.mofed.gov.et/English/Resources/Documents/GTP%20English2.pdf> accessed 30 January 2015, 21. 
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 Consumers/agro-processors may also be forced to buy at very high price. Besides creating 
market injustice, the low price to farmers/pastoralists would discourage them from producing 
sufficient quantity and quality products.
15
 The soaring price of food may also increase the price 
of labour and the agro-processing industries may be unable to get sufficient quantity and quality 
product at competitive prices. In addition, this market failure also invites unnecessary trade 
chains and costs since the traders may be less interested in economizing transactions. The 
individual farmer/pastoralist may be unable to search for alternative markets due to economy of 
scale and lack of information. That is probably why the growth and transformation plan is 
intended to strengthen the agricultural marketing system.
16
 
 
In addition to the abuse of market dominance by traders some farmers/pastoralists are also prone 
to manipulation. The intermediaries or even the trader may exploit the manifest business 
inexperience of farmers/pastoralists. The Ethiopian farmers/pastoralists have very less access to 
market information and also do not have the requisite marketing skills. The traders have 
experience in cheating farmers and pastoralists especially coffee producers by such means as 
issuing cheques without sufficient cover. This cheating has been committed both with and 
without collaboration of banks. The banks may collaborate with the cheaters by refusing to give 
evidence that shows that the cheque has been presented in due time but has not been paid.
17
 
 
In addition to economic issues, enabling farmers/pastoralists to obtain an equitable share of the 
national wealth commensurate with their contribution is a constitutional duty of the 
Government.
18
 The Ethiopian farmers/pastoralists have the right to receive fair prices for their 
products so that their life would be improved proportionate to the overall economic development 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development released in September 2010 the five years economic development 
plan that runs from 2010/11-2014/2015. This Plan is abbreviated to ‘GTP.’ 
15 Although low domestic market price of exportable agricultural products may temporarily encourage exports since 
such low prices would make the exporter more competitive in the international market, the export becomes 
sustainable if the farmers/pastoralists are encouraged to continue produce further. 
16 Ibid 
17 Commercial Code 1960 <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et014en.pdf> accessed 30 January 2015, 
Art 868 
18
 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1994 
<http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=193667> accessed 30 January 2015, Art 41(8) 
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of the country.
19
These objectives are guiding principles of economic and social policies.
20
 That 
means the Government must make sure that the benefits of economic and social developments of 
the country never unfairly go to the urbanites. As a constitutional duty, the Government has to 
identify challenges to the agricultural sector and provide necessary support if the sector is to 
produce the expected results. One of the major problems of smallholder farmers/pastoralists in 
Ethiopia is the lack of alternative markets. This may be due the existence of the few traders who 
buy agricultural products. The fact that there are few buyers of agricultural product further 
means that there are few suppliers of these products to the final consumers or agro-processors. 
Thus these few traders buy and resale agricultural products at a price they think right. As a result 
the farmers/pastoralists receive a very low price. 
 
Therefore, the Government has planned to interfere into the agricultural sector of the economy 
by using agricultural cooperatives.
21
 “Agricultural cooperatives are agricultural-producer-owned 
cooperatives whose primary purpose is increasing member producers’ production and income by 
helping better link with finance, agricultural inputs, information, and output markets.”22 They are 
seen as critical in achieving the Government’s development targets in GTP.23It is believed that a 
“well-functioning agricultural cooperative sector helps many smallholder farmers increase their 
yields and incomes.”24 These agricultural cooperatives would be agricultural output marketing 
cooperatives and agricultural input supplying cooperatives.  
 
The Government would therefore use agricultural cooperatives to solve agricultural output 
market problem and to disseminate agricultural technologies to smallholder farmers and 
pastoralists. Let us see these two options in some detail and we also consider if the Government 
has other alternatives. 
 
 
 
                                                             
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
21 Ministry of Agriculture (n 11) 7 
22 Ibid 7  
23
 Ibid 
24 Ibid 4 
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Alternative market to smallholder farmers and pastoralists 
In order to solve the output marketing problems of agricultural outputs farmers and pastoralists 
may be encouraged by the Government to form marketing cooperatives. The cooperatives would 
purchase the products of their member at a fixed price and then resell them to consumers and 
agro-processors in the domestic and international market. The cooperatives, therefore, act as a 
commission agent for each member.  The Growth and Transformation Plan of 2010 provides as 
follows: 
“Since it is essential to make the agriculture marketing system 
remain in tune to the agricultural production and productivity 
growth, and since this system is essential for accelerated 
agriculture growth, focus will be made to lay down an agricultural 
marketing system starting at kebele all the way up to country level. 
Transparent, efficient and effective agricultural marketing system 
that involves farmers’ cooperatives…will be established and 
strengthened.” 25 
Of course, the problem of agricultural marketing could be resolved through other alternatives 
such as agricultural products standard and quotes (fixing the standard quality with corresponding 
prices), public enterprises (wholly state owned business enterprises that buy agricultural products 
from peasants/pastoralists and supplies agricultural inputs) and commodity exchange markets (a 
public enterprise that serve as intermediary between the peasant/pastoralists and traders). The 
Growth and Transformation Plan does not see cooperatives as the only alternatives to solve 
agricultural problems.
26
 The Growth and Transformation Plan also expects that modern output 
market centers and the private sector will be established and strengthened.
27
Generally, it is 
difficult to see the special role of cooperatives in agricultural marketing in the context of a 
political economic system where the state can interfere in a market without limit to ensure that 
the market functions efficiently. Historically agricultural marketing cooperatives emerged in a 
political economy where the state was unable or unwilling to directly interfere in the economy.
28
 
                                                             
25 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (n 14) 23 (emphasis added) 
26 Ibid 
27
 Ibid 
28 See the emergence of Producers’ Cooperatives in Nineteenth Century North America in Chapter One. 
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As stated above, the Ethiopian Government may correct the agricultural product market failure in 
at least three alternative ways. The first alternative is to establish wholly state owned agricultural 
commodity exchange market institutions.
29
 In this regard the Growth and Transformation Plan 
provides as follows: 
“The shift to a higher growth path of agricultural diversification 
and commercialization of subsistence agriculture also requires an 
effective marketing system. Modern agricultural marketing system 
like the marketing practiced through ECX will be made to continue 
with strength.”30 
The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (the Exchange) was established in 2007 by the Government 
to solve the market problems that affects agricultural produces. Through this it was hoped that 
the establishment of orderly and unified marketing system for agricultural commodities would 
increase the participation of small agricultural producers by providing up-to-date market 
information and enabling them to negotiate better prices for their products.
31
Furthermore, the 
farmers and pastoralists would be guaranteed payment of the sale price by the market 
institution.
32
 Since the Exchange would serve as an intermediary the cost of transaction would 
also be reduced.  
However, the Exchange may be inaccessible for individual small holder farmers and pastoralists. 
The first reason is that the right to trade on the Exchange belongs to members only.
33
It would be 
inconvenient for ordinary and illiterate
34
Ethiopian farmers and pastoralist to fulfill membership 
criteria and then purchase membership seats.
35
 Secondly the Exchange is open only for few cash 
crops such as coffee and sesame. Thirdly, the Exchange is available only in a few places. Thus, 
cooperatives would still remain important for marketing agricultural produces. But still there is a 
second alternative that may make cooperatives unnecessary. 
                                                             
29 Ethiopian Commodity Exchange Proclamation No.550/2007  
<http://www.ecx.com.et/downloads/Rules/ecexproclamation.pdf> accessed 30 January 2015, Art 3(1) 
30 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (n 14) 29 
31 Government of Ethiopia (n 29) Preamble and Art 6 
32 Ibid Art 6(6) and 9(2)(e) 
33 Ibid Art 20(1) 
34
 More than half of the population of Ethiopia is unable to read and write. 
35 Government of Ethiopia (n 29) Art 8 
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The second alternative would be standard and quotes,
36
 complemented by licensing and 
concession agreements. The Government may determine the quality and quantity standard of 
agricultural products.
37
 Then based on the standard it is possible to quote price for each 
agricultural products. The Government may further regulate the market by issuing special trade 
licenses to those grain dealers who fulfill certain criteria
38
 necessary for fair and efficient 
agricultural marking including ethical criteria. These traders may also be made subject to 
government inspection and supervision. When the government wants to give some subsidies to 
small holder farmers/pastoralists it may enter into a concession agreement with traders. The 
concession agreement may then entitle the smallholders to a higher price from the trader and the 
trader being compensated by the Government.
39
 The purchase price quote would possibly force 
the traders to increase efficiency and avoid unnecessary middlepersons. The standardization 
measures may also have side benefits of pushing the farmers/pastoralists to produce products that 
meet the quality demand of international market and hence complement the export trade of the 
country. However, this alternative may be impracticable since standardization
40
would be costly 
and time taking and cooperatives may still remain important. 
The third alternative is establishing an autonomous public enterprise
41
 that purchases agricultural 
producers of smallholder farmers/pastoralists.
42
The developmental state by definition is a state 
whose government would take all possible measures that would contribute to the economic 
development. Besides, the Privatization and Public Enterprise Supervising Authority has the 
                                                             
36 B.H. Hibbard, ‘Effect of Government Control on Marketing Methods and Costs’ (1919) 9(1) The American 
Economic Review 50 
37 Quality and Standards Authority of Ethiopia Establishment Proclamation No. 102/1998 
<http://chilot.me/2011/08/07/proclamation-no-1021998-a-proclamation-to-establish-quality-and-standards-
authority-of-ethiopia/> accessed 30 January 2015  
38 The license criteria may include cooperative form of ownership if necessary. 
39 Civil Code 1960 <http://onebookonevote.com/ethiopian/ethiopian-civil-code-1960-pdf.html> accessed 30 January 
2015, Art 3207-3243. 
40 Standardization means an activity which consists of processes of formulating, issuing and implementing 
standards. Ibid Art 2(3) 
41 Notice that Ethiopian Commodity Exchange is also a public enterprise. However; its role is the role of a brokerage 
or intermediary. It does not buy or sell agricultural produces. 
42 Ministry of Agriculture (n 11) 48 In Ethiopia, during the Derg regime, there was a Government agency that 
purchased agricultural products and resold them to the urban dwellers. However, the purpose was controlling the 
price of agricultural produces in favour of the urbanites rather than protecting the peasantry. Currently also there is 
the Ethiopian Cereal Grain Enterprises that purchases cereals in order to ensure that the county would have 
sufficient reserve cereals for a time of any emergency. 
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power to “cause the establishment of new enterprises in sectors where private investors could not 
participate for various reasons and which would be bottleneck for the overall economic 
development.”43Thus, the Ethiopian government may establish a public enterprise whenever 
required. The enterprise purchases agricultural produces at a price determined by the 
management from time to time depending on the type and quality of the product. Public 
enterprise would obviate the need of standardization. Since its ultimate objective is to help the 
farmers and pastoralists it would not deprive them of their produce. The purpose of 
standardization is to make sure that the traders are paying fair price to the agricultural producers.  
Medium of agricultural technology dissemination  
Agriculture is essential to the Ethiopian economy. But the challenge it faces is not only 
marketing of output but also marketing of inputs. “It is proved that it is possible to increase the 
productivity of smallholder farmers within short period of time by utilizing…technologies.”44 
The Government plans to make the increase in productivity of smallholder farmers the basic 
sources of agricultural growth.
45
 Thus, to increase agricultural productivity farmers/pastoralists 
will be given in new technology adoption.
46
 However, the market may not ensure the supply of 
the required technology at required time and price.In order to sustain technology use, 
government may be expected to take measures to make farmers have enough inputs.
47
 Thus, the 
Government may engage in tasks to distribute technology efficiently by using farmer 
cooperatives.”48 
But there are no sufficient reasons behind the preference of cooperatives over other forms of 
economic organization. Probably cooperatives may make concerned farmers and pastoralists 
active participant in the supply of the technology. In fact, if the cooperatives are true 
cooperatives both in the sense that they do not have profit maximizing motives and in the sense 
that each member joins the cooperatives without direct or indirect influence either apparent or 
                                                             
43 Privatization and Public Enterprise Supervising Authority Establishment Proclamation No.412/2004 
<http://69.94.35.190/bid/2005/dec05/dec_10_privatization_and_public_enterprise_supervision_agency.htm> 
accessed 30 January 2015, Art 5(3) 
44 Ministry of Agriculture (n 11) 44 (emphasis added) 
45 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (n 14) 22 
46 Ibid 
47
 Ibid 23 
48 Ibid (emphasis added) 
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real
49
 from the Government, they would reduce the burden of the Government. But when 
cooperatives are established by the initiation of the Government there would be passivity on the 
part of members. This means the Government still remains burdened in organizing, supporting, 
inspecting and privileging the cooperatives. After all these efforts, they may not produce the 
expected result. Furthermore, the ongoing inefficiency may lead the Government to interfere in 
the autonomy of the cooperatives.
50
 Compared to cooperatives public enterprises would be 
efficient. The Government may also define agricultural inputs and technologies as basic goods 
and accordingly regulate the distribution of such basic goods by investor-owned firms.
51
 
B. Consumer Protection, Saving and Poverty 
The government may also interfere in non-agricultural sectors of the economy. This may be to 
protect consumers or encourage saving or reduce poverty. Let us examine these points in some 
details as follows: 
  Medium of Channeling Basic Goods/Services to the Consumers 
“The term ‘Basic Goods or Services’ mean goods or services related to the daily need of 
consumers, the shortage of which in the market may lead to unfair trade practice.”52Sugar, bread, 
edible oil, wheat, teff
53
, and soap are examples of basic goods.
54
 
                                                             
49 The apparent influence is the propaganda of local cadres that creates psychological influence on 
farmers/pastoralist. The cadres may make the farmers/pastoralists believe that if they do not join cooperatives they 
would be taken as disobedient to the Government which may have a negative repercussion that they could not know 
what. The real influence is when the farmers/pastoralists are intentionally denied by the Government to access to 
technology through their own ways. 
50 We will see in the next Chapter that cooperatives have been proved inefficient in enabling the Government to 
attain the expected result. 
51 Compare this with Trade Practice and Consumers’ Protection Proclamation  No. 685/2010 
<http://chilot.me/2011/01/19/trade-practice-and-consumer-protection-proclamation-no-6852010/> accessed 30 
January 2015, Art 2(1) and 47 
52 Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Proclamation No. 685/2010 
<http://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/685-ae.pdf> accessed 30 January 2015,  Art 2(1)  
53 A tiny cereal used to prepare traditional bread called injera. 
54 Since the law does not contain lists of basic goods it is either up to the Ministry of Trade or Council of Ministers 
to determine the list. Health, electric, water and telecommunication may be outside of the definition of basic 
goods/services since such services are currently provided by the government and hence they are less likely to lead to 
unfair trade practices. See Proclamation No. 685/2010 (n 72) Art 2(1), 46 and 55“The term ‘Consumer’ means a 
natural person who buys goods and services for his personal or family consumption, where the price is being paid by 
him or another person and not for manufacture or resale” Art 2(4) 
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Besides its unjustness, unfair trade practice
55
 would affect the development agenda at least in 
two ways. Firstly, it may lead to price soaring, thereby making basic goods/services out of the 
reach of those in need.
56
In addition to affecting the political stability which is essential for 
development, price soaring would affect the industrializations by increasing labour price. It may 
also lead to inflation which could have destructive consequence over the economy.
57
 The Growth 
and Transformation Plan considers high inflationary pressure a serious challenge to the 
macroeconomic stability and intends to keep it within a single digit.
58
Secondly, unfair trade 
practice leads to socially wasteful rent-seeking.
59
 Capital would flow to areas where large profit 
would be reaped without however; adding any value to the economy. Value adding areas of 
investment such as manufacturing would be relegated as unprofitable. In short, the Government 
has a keen interest to fight unfair trade practices. 
Promoting producer and consumer cooperatives and assisting them would be one alternative of 
fighting unfair trade practices.
60
 The Government may assist smallholder farmers/pastoralists to 
be organized into marketing cooperatives to supply their produces directly to the consumer. This 
would be made complete by assisting consumers of agricultural producers to be organized into 
purchasing consumer cooperatives. This coordination of the rural with the urban would reduce 
cost of transactions by abolishing intermediaries and by benefiting from economies of scale. This 
strategy would also connect consumers (in this case rural or urban consumers) to manufacturers. 
The Government could also use consumer cooperatives to distribute imported basic goods. There 
is a public enterprise, the Wholesale and Import Enterprise, which has the duty to import basic 
goods and make them available to retailers. During the socialist government, the Wholesale and 
Import Enterprise and Ethiopian Grain Enterprise were using the lowest administrative organ 
(kebele) to distribute basic goods to consumers. However, the introduction of the market 
economy outdated the importance of kebele as an alternative means of channeling basic goods. 
Consumer cooperatives could perform the role once perform by the kebele.  
                                                             
55 The law defines unfair trade practice to mean ‘any act in violation of provisions of trade related laws’ see Ibid Art 
2(12). However, the researcher uses it here to mean any benefit that the trader derives due to absence of competitive 
market. 
56 Tony Cleaver, Economics: the basics (2nd edition, Routledge, 2011) 103 
57 Jim Stanford, Economic for Everyone: A Short Guide to the Economics of Capitalism (Pluto Press, 2008) 202 
58 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (n 14) 3 and 16 
59
Zenawi (n 3) 48 
60 See Proclamation No. 685/2010 (n 72) Art 47 
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However, there are other options to control unfair trade practices. One of these options would be 
to control situations that would lead to market abuse such as cartelisation.
61
 Price cap could also 
be applied to complement the antitrust law. The Ministry of Trade and regional bureaus are 
empowered by the law to prepare the list of basic goods/services with price caps and make it 
known to the public.
62
 The Ministry/bureau would also follow up the implementations of its 
notices by a trader.
63
 Establishing public enterprise that carryout retail trade of basic 
goods/services would also be another option. 
   Saving and credit alternatives 
One of the major challenges to the Ethiopian economy is the low level of domestic savings to 
support the huge demand on the country’s investment for accelerating growth and development. 
64
It is feared that such a low level of domestic savings would hinder the success of the Growth 
and Transformation Plan.
65
  To avert such problems “everything possible will be done during the 
GTP period to fully utilize domestic opportunities through community/social mobilization; and 
to coordinate efforts with non-state actors in general in order to tap the dynamic potential of 
Ethiopian society.”66 
Saving and Credit Cooperatives would be one alternative ways of engaging the community and 
achieving the social mobilization through non-state actors. Banks are usually inaccessible to 
rural communities and even to low income urban residents. Thus local saving and credits 
cooperatives could be promoted by the Government to fill this gap. In addition, to serving 
inaccessible places, they could actively promote saving. 
 
However, saving and credit cooperatives would not be the best way for the Government to 
promote and access savings.
67
 This is because the savings deposited in saving and credit 
cooperatives are mainly out of the reach of the Government. It is difficult for the Government to 
                                                             
61 Ibid Art 5-22, 49 
62 Ibid Art 46 
63 Ibid Art 47 
64 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (n 14) 3 
65 Ibid 96 
66 Ibid 98 (emphasis added) 
67 Although the Government has developed a strategic plan to use agricultural cooperatives to increase smallholder 
farmer yields and income, and although rural saving and credit cooperatives are owned by farmers and can help 
increase yield and income, the strategic plan does not include them. See Ministry of Agriculture (n 11) 7 
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supervise the money that flows in the economy through the medium of the saving and credit 
cooperatives. Moreover, the Government would find it difficult to direct the use of such money 
to projects given priority by the Growth and Transformation Plan.
68
 Saving and credit 
cooperatives extend loans to members with very less regard to the type of project for which the 
money is intended to be used. Thus, the Government has preferred to make Government-owned 
banks especially the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and small and micro financial institutions 
accessible to the people. In addition, the Government is using government bonds and housing 
savings as an alternative way to promote savings. Although saving and credit cooperatives would 
be feasible alternative ways of gaining loans for household/smallholders
69
 since they do not 
normally require collateral as banks do, the Growth and Transformation, does not indicate any 
plan of the government to solve the problem of smallholders’ access to loan. 
    Poverty reduction strategy  
It has been the Millennium Development Goal of the UN to reduce poverty by half in 2015. 
Ethiopia as a member of the UN and also as a country aspiring to reach middle level income in 
2025 has planned to reduce poverty. Poverty may be reduced in three alternative ways. The first 
alternative is to enable an individual to participate in an economic activity that earns them 
enough money. They may be assisted either to get employment or to start to improve their own 
enterprise. In addition, to reducing poverty, this alternative also contributes to the general 
economic development of the country. The second alternative is providing financial aid and other 
benefits to an individual in poverty. Although this alternative reduces poverty, it adds nothing to 
the economy and may even lead to dependency and waste labour resources. A combination of 
both alternatives may be used as a third alternative. 
                                                             
68About the government’s plan to prioritize projects see Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (n 14) 17-
18 
69 Banks are usually unwilling to extend loan to smallholders either because of expensive cost of administering 
spatially dispersed small loans or smallholders especially peasants could not develop acceptable project proposal or 
they could not have collateral to guarantee the repayment of the loan. The problem of collateral is more severe for 
Ethiopian smallholder farmers since land is a public property and a peasant holder has no right to present it as 
collateral. See Constitution of the FDRE (n 15) Art 40(3)-(5); Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rural Land 
Administration and Land Use Proclamation No.456/2005 <http://theredddesk.org/printpdf/countries/laws/federal-
democratic-republic-ethiopia-rural-land-administration-and-land-use> accessed 30 January 2015, Art 8 
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Cooperatives could be used to combine both poverty reduction strategies. The United Nation also 
recommends cooperatives to be used to reduce poverty.
70
There is precedent for this as 
historically, cooperatives emerged in nineteenth century Britain to reduce the poverty of people 
affected by capitalist economy. Philanthropists have employed cooperative form of economic 
organizations to fight poverty especially in Southeast Asia.
71
 Thus, the Government may 
organize poverty-stricken individuals into producer/worker cooperatives, provide them with 
necessary training, and give them working capital including working premises and moral 
support. The Government may also provide the members of the cooperatives with subsidized 
basic goods/services. The cooperatives could be organized to gradually grow out of their 
dependence on state subsidy provided their members have come out of poverty. 
However, the Ethiopian Government prefers to use micro and small enterprises rather than 
cooperatives to reduce poverty. An enterprise is classified into micro and small enterprise solely 
on the basis of capital and does not make any distinction between cooperatives and other forms 
of micro and small enterprises (sole trader, or business organization proper).
72
The government 
subsidizes micro and small enterprises providing comprehensive and accessible development 
support such as training, access to loan, working premises and market opportunity.
73
 Hence, the 
Government has seen nothing special in cooperatives in struggle against poverty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
70 Johnston Birchall, Rediscovering the cooperative advantage: poverty reduction through self-help (Cooperative 
Branch of International Labour Office, 2003)  
71 See Chapter One 
72
 Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (n 14) 31   
73 Ibid 
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6.3 The Confusion about cooperative policy objectives 
Although the Federal Cooperative Agency was established in 2002 to register and support 
cooperatives
74
 and although the Agricultural Transformation Agency has developed Agricultural 
Cooperatives Sector Development Strategy from 2012-2016 it is still unclear what the 
Government expects from cooperatives. There is even a suspicion that the Government has no 
policy objectives to attain through its use of cooperatives and it is up to the middle level 
management to redirect the cooperatives to solve any contemporary problem. The following 
points indicate where this confusion lies.  
A. No policy objectives but strategy  
There is confusion of between policy and strategy. As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the 
cooperatives policy objective is the ultimate public benefit that the Government expects from 
cooperatives. On the other hand, the strategy is intended to mean the practical guidelines that 
have to be followed and actions that have to be taken in order to attain the policy objectives.
75
 
Accordingly, to develop a strategy there should first be policy objectives. The Ethiopian 
Agricultural Transformation Agency has developed Agricultural Cooperative Sector 
Development Strategy that is expected to enhance the Government’s support of agricultural 
cooperatives.
76
The agency identified seven bottlenecks that affect the well-functioning of the 
agricultural cooperatives and laid down actions that the Government is expected to take to 
resolve the bottlenecks.
77
 One of the seven bottlenecks identified by the agency is the lack of 
policy objectives.
78
 However, paradoxically, the Agency states that the policy objective of the 
agricultural cooperatives is to increase smallholder farmers’ productivity and income.79 
Probably the agency entered into such an erroneous assertion because it is impossible to develop 
a strategy without identifying policy directions. However, rather than conclusively stating the 
                                                             
74 There are regional cooperative agencies responsible to register and support cooperatives established in their 
respective regions. The Federal Cooperative Agency registers cooperatives whose members are from more than one 
region. However, the jurisdiction of support does not seem to be limited to the cooperatives registered in the federal 
level as far as the agency has the capacity to do so although it seems reasonable to expect that the federal 
cooperatives should be given priority. See Cooperative Commission Establishment Proclamation No.274/2002 
<http://www.fsc.gov.et/resources/Negarit%20Gazeta/Gazeta-1994/Proc%20No.%20274-
2002%20Cooperatives%27%20Commission%20Establishment.pdf> accessed 30 January 2015, Art 5 
75Ministry of Agriculture (n 11) 13 
76 Ibid 5 
77 Ibid  
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid 4 
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policy objective that does not exist, the agency should have at most expressly stated that it has 
been making assumption of policy objective. In fact, the wisest alternative open to the agency 
was to keep aside its plan of developing strategy for the time being and concentrate on 
ascertaining the policy objectives. Thus the agency has been confused.
80
  
B. Lack of consensus on cooperative policy objectives 
The confusion over what are the policy objectives of cooperatives is further evidenced by their 
different treatment by different state organs. . For example, the Ministry of Trade has refused to 
allow cooperatives to function without business licenses.
81
 Similarly the Ministry of Revenue 
and Custom Authority has been forcing the cooperatives to pay income tax as if they are 
investor-owned firms.
82
 Paradoxically, the Ministry has refused to recognize cooperatives as 
investors.
83
 The Ministry of Transport has recently classified cooperatives into category of 
Charities and Societies (Non-profit making associations) while registering vehicles.
84
 The Addis 
Ababa City Administration Trade and Industry Bureau does not make any distinction between 
cooperatives and investor-owned firms in the incentives it extend as far as both are within the 
maximum capital ceiling of  micro and small scale enterprises.
85
 Moreover, the City 
Administration has been encouraging peoples to form a “consumer” cooperative society which 
purchases subsidized basic goods from the City Administration and resells them to consumers at 
                                                             
80 It may even be claimed that the cooperative policy objective indicated in the Agricultural Cooperative Sector 
Development Strategy is a mere assumption that the Agricultural Transformation Agency has made without any 
express support from the government. The first point that supports this claim is the fact that the Strategy was written 
mostly on the basis of literatures and domestic and foreign experiences. Government sources are referred only on 
overall performance of Ethiopian economy and Ethiopian cooperatives. See endnotes of the Strategy. Although it is 
true that the government has strong commitment to support and promote cooperatives, the Growth and 
Transformation Plan, nowhere indicates that they are key pathway by which the agriculture sector and the economy 
as a whole will develop over the next five years and beyond (Compare end note no.12 of the Strategy). Secondly, 
although the Federal Cooperative Commission has developed a project by buying consultancy service from UKCC 
to open Cooperative College it is not clear whether the government would agree and assign necessary budget. See 
Ato Michael Ayele, ‘Interview with Senior Legal Expert of the FCA’ (2014) unpublished 
81 Ibid  
82አ ዲስ ዘ መን ጋ ዜጣ 73ኛ ዓ መትቁጥር  24 አ ር ብ  መስ ከ ረ ም 24 ቀን  2006 ዓ /ምገ ጽ  9 
83Ayele (n 58)   
84 Ibid 
85 In 2011, this researcher in collaboration with other four persons intended to start a fish breeding business and 
there arose differences on form of ownership; some say that they should form cooperatives so that they get support 
from government including income tax exemptions, others insisted for usual investor-owned firms. In order to get 
the dispute resolved they talked to Officer of Cooperative and Marketing, Hawassa City Administration Trade 
Sector, Southern Nations, Nationalities and People who alleged that the form of ownership depends fully on the 
decision of owners regardless of the mission, goal and principles contained in the establishing document. 
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a price fixed by the Government.
86
 The fact that the consumer cooperative society does function 
contrary to cooperative principle has not bothered the City Administration. Furthermore, the 
City Administration has been handing over local recreation centers which have been under the 
control of lowest political administrative organ to groups who organize themselves under the 
name of “consumer” cooperative society. The Federal Cooperative Commission has made 
repeated discussion with these government organs so that they accept its advice as to how to 
deal with cooperatives but still there has not been any significant improvement.
87
 This implies 
that there are no government cooperative policy objectives at the Council of Ministers’ level. 
C.  Relegation of non-agricultural cooperatives 
Even if one believes that there is cooperative policy objective it is only for agricultural 
cooperatives. The Agricultural Transformation Agency is authorized to develop and has 
developed a strategy (if we say strategy is equivalent to policy object although this is 
contestable) only on agricultural cooperatives. “This strategy focuses solely on agricultural 
cooperatives.”88 Even rural saving and credit cooperatives are excluded from agricultural 
cooperative sector development strategies.
89
 There is no other organ specifically authorized to 
develop a strategy for non-agricultural cooperatives such as retail cooperatives, saving and 
credit cooperatives and workers’ cooperatives. The Federal Cooperative Agency has not been 
empowered to develop a policy on cooperatives.
90
 
Furthermore, even if the Federal Cooperative Agency had been authorized to develop practical 
guidelines that have to be followed and actions that have to be taken in order to attain the policy 
objectives,
91
 it has not yet developed any such clear guidelines. This is probably because the 
agency can never mandate other state organs to follow the guidelines
92
 or it is difficult to 
develop the guidelines in the absence of clear policy objectives, or the agency has been 
preoccupied with agricultural cooperatives.  
                                                             
86 See further discussion in Chapter Seven 
87 Ayele (n 58)   
88 Ministry of Agriculture (n 11) 7 
89 Ibid 
90 See Proclamation No.274/2002 (n 52) Art 5 
91 Ibid 
92 See Ministry of Agriculture (n 11) 5. The reluctance of public officers to support cooperatives is identified as one 
of the seven bottlenecks. 
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Non-agricultural cooperatives are relegated not only in terms of lack of policy objectives and 
strategy but also in terms of practical support and promotion. Most cooperatives that are actually 
receiving the support of Federal Cooperative Agency are agricultural cooperatives. As a result 
these cooperatives are more successful and take the largest share in cooperative marketing. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
To repeat, this thesis argues that cooperatives in Ethiopia have been uncategorized especially 
from investor owned firms. Each Chapters of the thesis are designed to show why such 
happened. Chapter One and Chapter Two provides evolution of cooperative ideas and 
entrepreneurs’ rational calculation as justifications. Chapter Three, Four and Five charge the 
Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998.  
This Chapter Six searches if there is any government policy that distinguishes cooperatives from 
investor owned. However; the finding of the search is that there is no government policy that 
could enable us to understand cooperative as distinct from investor owned firms.  
First of all, in a country that advances developmental state ideology it is implausible to imagine 
government policy that distinguishes cooperatives from investor owned firms. This is because 
the major concern of the state is economic development, which could better be achieved through 
investor owned firms than through true cooperatives. The ultimate objectives of true 
cooperatives are fairness and equality but not wealth accumulation. Moreover; the authoritarian 
nature of government in developmental state makes the differing form of economic organization 
of no practical relevance since the government can direct any form of ownership to whatever 
purpose it wants.  
Secondly, although some policy objectives may be conjectured the fact that the government can 
use or has been using other alternatives for the same purpose makes such conjecture apparent. 
On the basis of Growth and Transformation Plan of 2010 and Agricultural Cooperatives Sector 
Development Strategy 2012-2016 it may be conjectured that the Policy Objective of Government 
is to use cooperatives as alternative product/input market for small hold peasants/pastoralists. 
However; the problem of agricultural marketing could be resolved through other alternatives 
such as commodity exchange markets (a public enterprise that serve as intermediary between the 
peasant/pastoralists and traders), public enterprises (wholly state owned business enterprises that 
buy agricultural products from peasants/pastoralists and supplies agricultural inputs) and 
agricultural products standard and quotes (fixing the standard quality with corresponding prices).  
Circumstantial evidences may also implicate that the Government has aimed to use cooperatives 
as a medium of channeling basic goods/services to the Consumers, encouraging saving and 
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fighting poverty. But since the Competition and Consumer Protection Law of Ethiopia empowers 
the Government to define basic consumer goods, fix their price and control the distribution, 
cooperatives are of no better use than investor owned firms. Saving and credit cooperatives 
would not be the best way for the Government to promote and access savings
 
since it is difficult 
to direct the use of such money to projects given priority by the Growth and Transformation 
Plan. Still more, the Ethiopian Government has been using all possible forms of economic 
organization to fight poverty by classifying them as micro and small enterprises on the basis of 
their working capital. 
 
Thirdly; .the fact that there has also been confusion on what is claimed to be a cooperative policy 
make such objectives apparent (not serious commitments). The Ethiopian Agricultural 
Transformation Agency on the one hand asserts the absence of cooperative policy as major 
bottleneck to cooperative development and on the other hand it states that the policy objective of 
the agricultural cooperatives is to increase smallholder farmers’ productivity and income. There 
is also no consensus among Government agencies on the policy objectives of cooperatives. Still 
more; the claimed policy objectives do not include non-agricultural cooperatives. 
The next two chapters examine the practice in Ethiopia if in case the practice has some thing to 
distinguish cooperatives from investor owned firms. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE OBJECTIVES OF COOPERATIVES IN ETHIOPIA 
7.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to show that in practice the vision of cooperatives in Ethiopia has   
been profit-maximizing. They are carrying out commercial activities as if they are investor-
owned firms. Cooperatives to whom the government has been attempting to assign some public 
duties have failed to attain such duties. This is demonstrated by showing Ethiopian cooperative’s 
profit-seeking behaviour. Furthermore; the failure of Government’s attempt to cooperatives for 
certain purpose could imply the profit seeking nature of cooperatives.  
Mission, goal and vision are all critical components of a cooperative’s objectives.1 The mission 
of a true cooperative is its collective engagement in economic activities, with the goal of 
withstanding challenges that are difficult on an individual basis. The vision cooperative is 
gaining economic and social justice.
2
In contrast the mission of investor-owned firms is gathering 
money from investors with the goal of maximizing profits. The vision is to make a lucrative 
profit out of their investments.   
The majority of the evidences used in this chapter are collected through interviews. The 
interview questions were prepared so to ensure that the questions were open-ended and invited 
interviewees open responses. The persons interviewed were employees of cooperative agencies, 
employees of cooperative unions, and cooperative management committee members. All 
interviews were made in person. Interviews were made in Amhara, Oromia, Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples and in Addis Ababa. Since the purpose of this research is to investigate 
the possibility of Cooperatives behaving as investor-owned firms, it was considered necessary 
only to establish this on a small set of participants and as such no sampling method was required. 
Due to the limitations placed upon the researcher, the regions are selected mainly due to their 
accessibility for the researcher. In addition to the interview evidences, documents and official 
reports were also used as sources of evidence. 
                                                             
1See Chapter Three 
2 Ibid 
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7.1 Cooperative rent-seeking and objectifying profit maximization
3
 
The rent seeking profit maximization objective of the cooperatives are inferred from the 
behaviour of the cooperatives and cooperators using evidence such as the appointment of general 
managers, profit sharing on the basis of capital contribution, transactions with non-members and 
investing in profit seeking firms. The principles of autonomy, education and coordination are 
also factors in the evaluation of whether the cooperative is profit maximizing.  
A. Appointment of general managers 
Producer and consumer cooperatives can be considered to focus on the level of collective 
sales/purchases while worker cooperatives considered focusing on the level of collective 
production and collective sales. Producers do not normally employ a manager that manages the 
sale of their products. Similarly consumers do not employ a manager to manage the consumption 
of goods/services. At most, they can appoint a selling/purchasing agent to manage this for them. 
Moreover, true cooperatives usually adhere to the principle of collective management.
4
 
Cooperative transactions are normally relatively simple, since on the one side of a transaction is 
the member(producer cooperatives purchase from members, consumer cooperatives sell to their 
members, and worker cooperatives are selling their own product and labour is obtained from 
members). Therefore, these transactions could easily be managed by committees and agents.  
 
A manager is normally employed by traders since a trader has the purpose of maximizing profits 
by any means. Under the Commercial Code of Ethiopia 1960, Article 33(1):  
“A manager is a person who has been authorized, expressly or tacitly, to carry out acts 
of management and to sign in the name of the trader.”5 
Ethiopian cooperatives usually appoint general managers.
6
 Some cooperatives even go to the 
extent of entitling the manager to have a share in the annual profit of the cooperative so that 
                                                             
3 See also our discussion of indicators of profit-seeking ownership Chapter Five 
4 For example, Ethiopian cooperative law does not recognize the office of the manager. Rather the law provides for 
management committees and sub-committees. See Cooperative Societies Proclamation 
No.147/1998<http://chilot.me/2011/11/22/cooperative-societies-proclamation-no-1471998/> accessed 30 January 
2015, Art 20-27 
5Commercial Code 1960<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/et/et014en.pdf> accessed 30 January 2015, 
Art 33(1) 
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managers are encouraged to increase the annual profit of the cooperative.
7
 The fact that that 
cooperatives in Ethiopia have been sticking to the office of the General Manager would imply 
nothing but their desire to make more profit and to act as a trader, using the cooperative’s name 
as a camouflage.
8
 
B. Profit sharing on the basis of capital contribution 
The other behaviour of Ethiopian cooperatives that reveal their profit maximizing motive is 
profit sharing on the basis of capital contribution. As stated in the initial discussion on the 
guiding principles of cooperatives in Ethiopia, one of the areas where Ethiopian cooperatives law 
expressly merges cooperatives with investor-owned firms is its clear stipulation of distribution of 
profit on the basis of capital investment; members receive dividend from profit according to their 
shares and contribution to the capital.
9
 In practice also cooperatives strictly adhere to this 
principle. 
C. Transactions with non-members 
Transactions with non-members open the door for cooperatives to harbor profit seekers and there 
is no legal mechanism to rout out such behaviour. Profit distribution on the basis of transactions 
may not necessarily indicate the existence of non-profit motives.
10
 Indeed, it might indicate the 
opposite. If investment in capital is very minimal then transactions with non-members are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
6Daniel Legesse, ‘Interview with the General Manager of Addis Ababa Saving and Credit Cooperative Union Ltd’ 
(3 August 2014) Unpublished; I also learnt the same from the interview with Fikre Mekuria, Tewodros Taddele, 
Mierab Kolfe, ‘Interview with Board Chairperson and General Managers of Consumers’ Cooperative Union Ltd’ (5 
August 2014) Unpublished; Gadissa Eda’a and Ayele Bedane, Girma Regassa, ‘Interview with the Finance Head, 
Certificate Officer and Legal Services Head of Oromia Coffee Farmers’ Cooperative Union’(8 March 2013) 
Unpublished. The by-laws (as of January 2008) of Oromia Coffee Farmers’ Cooperative Union Ltd Art 24(4) and 
the by-laws (as of March 2008) of Addis Ababa City Administration, Arada Sub-City, and Kebele 01/02 
Consumers’ Cooperative Ltd Art 18(6) establish the office of the General Manager.  
7 For example Oromia Coffee Farmers’ Cooperative Union Ltd provides such mechanism in its bylaws. See Art 
38(1) of the by-laws(January 2008) of the Union 
8 There are indications that show tendencies of seeing cooperatives as an alternative way of involving in economic 
activities for profit –maximization motives. For example, the Cooperative Academic Departments in Ethiopian 
Universities in the past have been usually clustered under the College of Agriculture but recently the tendency is 
clustering them under College of Business and Economics. Similarly in the past(after 1991) cooperative 
agencies/sectors have been accountable to the Ministry/Bureau of Agriculture  but that trend  have seemed to change 
and these agencies are either made directly accountable to the  highest executive or even to the Bureau of Trade and 
Industry like in the case of Addis Ababa City Administration. Some cooperative experts of the government also 
seem to believe that cooperatives are alternatives to IOFs to make business for profit. I learnt this for example from 
the interviews with Tesfaye Wami, ‘Interview with the Legal Advisor and Promoter, Inspection, Audit and Legal 
Service Work-Process Main Unit’ (4 August 2014) Unpublished; Mulugeta Mengistu, ‘Head, Promotion and 
Development Work-Process Main Unit’ (3 August 2014) Unpublished 
9See Chapter Four 
10 See Chapter Two 
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disproportionally significant. For example, in Addis Ababa it is enough to contribute 100 birr 
(about £3) as a share capital to join consumer cooperatives.
11
The total share of cooperative 
transactions with its members’, especially in consumer cooperatives,12 may be very small and 
nominal compared to its total transaction value.  In this case, the producer cooperative purchases 
large quantities from non-members and resells these goods which are clear evidence of 
transacting for profit. Similarly, if consumer cooperatives purchase goods and resell large 
quantities of the goods to non-members, leaving nominal quantities for its members, it is again 
transacting for profit. If a worker cooperative employs a large numbers of non-members
13
 and 
also sells goods/services which are not produced by its members, it has a clear motive of profit 
maximization. Under the guise of creating an alternative product/input market or creating job 
opportunity or helping the state to control inflation, cooperatives in Ethiopia make unlimited 
purchases from non-members goods or labour/sale to non-members.
14
Some cooperatives may 
keep a separate account for net profits obtained from purchase/sale to non-members,
15
 but such 
would only be possible if the members are fully committed to non-profit activities since they 
could decide to distribute it at any time they want. The legal requirement that thirty percent 
should be kept in a reserve fund exacerbates the possibility of profit seekers hiding under the 
cooperative label.
16
 
The government has already understood this rent seeking profit motive of cooperatives and has 
taken different measures to reduce it. For example, the Government of Addis Ababa City 
Administration encourages members to use their dividends to buy additional shares so that the 
annual surplus could raise the capital of the cooperatives instead of going to the pocket of the 
members.
17
 The government has also decided that cooperatives should deposit the legal reserve 
fund in independent government account so that such fund would be out of their reach.
18
When 
                                                             
11See the by-laws (as of March 2008) of Addis Ababa City Administration, Arada Sub-City, and Kebele 01/02 
Consumers’ Cooperative Ltd Art 10 
12Consumers’ consumption is normally small and inelastic unless every consumer in the locality of the cooperative 
becomes members. 
13 According to Marxist theory profit is created by extracting unpaid labour from workers. See Roger Backhouse, 
The Penguin History of Economics(Penguin UK, 2002) 159 
14 All interviewees in this research confirmed that cooperatives are encouraged to purchase from/sell to non-
members.  
15 See the by-laws (as of January 2008) of Oromia Coffee Farmers’ Cooperative Union Ltd Art 38(5). 
16See our discussion of Collective Ownership Rights in Chapter Five. 
17 Interview with Mengistu(n8)  
18 Ibid 
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cooperatives are dissolved they are expected to return to the Government the land that was freely 
assigned to them; the land given to cooperatives is registered by the name of Addis Ababa City 
Administration Trade and Industry Bureau.
19
 The Government has also gone to the extent of 
limiting the constitutional right of freedom of association stating that anyone who wants to form 
a consumer cooperative is advised to join the already existing consumer cooperative in their 
residence.
20
The worker cooperatives in Addis Ababa have been ordered to be converted into 
investor-owned firms since they have been found to be pursuing a rent seeking profit 
maximization motive which stands in contradiction to the principles of true cooperatives.
21
 Since 
2008, the Addis Ababa City Administration has refused to register further Workers 
Cooperatives.
22
 
However, all these measures are illegal since they violate the principle of autonomy, property 
rights or freedom of association. Advising cooperatives to raise their capital by using annual 
surplus would amount to interference into autonomy of cooperatives which is expressly 
recognized by Ethiopian Cooperatives Law. Since the cooperatives have a rent seeking profit 
motive they may be easily influenced by the government advice into believing that failure to hear 
the Government’s advice would deny them special privileges such as access to land and loans 
without collateral. In fact according to an interview with Mekuria, Legesse, Eda’a and Bedane 
cooperative does not exist in Ethiopia and Mengistu believes that the cooperatives are partly 
autonomous whereas Melese and Wami insist that cooperative autonomy is fully respected.
23
 
Moreover, the measures do not necessarily restrict the profit motive but may even produce 
negative effects. The cooperatives would be dissolved and then the capital distributed after it has 
sufficiently accumulated on the profit-maximizing basis.
24
  Some of such measures may also 
reduce the willingness of the public to join cooperatives since the public would be unable to see 
the actual benefits of Cooperatives.
25
 Transferring the legal reserve fund of cooperatives into a 
                                                             
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
21 Interview with Birke Melaku, ‘Interview with Cooperative Promotion and Development Coordinator’ (4 Aug 
2014) Unpublished and Abinet Melese, ‘Senior Cooperative Promoter, Cooperative Promotion and Development 
Work-Process Main Unit’ (4 August 2014) Unpublished 
22 Ibid 
23Mekuria (n 6); Legesse (n 6);Eda’a (n 6);Bedane (n 6);  Mengistu (n 8). Melese (n 8); and Wami (n8) insist that 
cooperative autonomy is fully respected. 
24Mengistu (n 8) agrees with such possibility although he claimed that cooperatives could not be dissolved without 
the knowledge of the government. 
25Melese(n 8)  
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Government account and denying cooperatives access to this fund before and after liquidation is 
contrary to the existing Ethiopian cooperatives law and amounts to an illegal expropriation.
26
 
There is no legal basis for the government to hold the lease of the title deed of land and transfer 
possession to Cooperatives either in the Urban Land Lease Proclamation No. 721/2011 or in the 
Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998. Moreover, Addis Ababa City Administration 
Regulation No. 46/2012 expressly declares the transfer of ownership of property belonging to 
public shops and other income generating institutions to consumer cooperative societies as an 
initial capital.
27
 The land holding of primary consumer cooperatives in Addis Ababa are those 
holdings transferred to them according to this regulation.
28
 It is also difficult to separate rights to 
the land from rights to the building constructed on it. Finally, it is a constitutional right of 
individuals to form Cooperatives as far as they fulfill the requirements stated under Art 9(2) of 
the Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998.
29
 
Generally transaction with non-members opens wider room for Cooperatives to harbor profit 
seekers and the current attempt of the government to block these profit seekers has no legal 
basis. 
D. Investing in profit seeking firms 
Investing in investor-owned firms is also an indicator of profit seeking motive of cooperatives.  
Ethiopian Cooperatives have been investing specifically in banking sector. The most prominent 
example has been the investment in the Oromia Cooperative Bank Share Company. According to 
an interview with Gadissa Eda’a (Finance Head), Ato Ayele Bedane (Certificate Officer) and 
Girma Regassa (Legal Service Head) , Oromia Coffee Farmers’ Cooperative Union, the major 
shareholders of this company are Coffee Farmers Cooperatives in the State of Oromia and 
Oromia Coffee Farmers’ Cooperative Union Ltd.30. Michael Ayele,31 Legal expert in Federal 
                                                             
26 See Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 Art(4) and Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia 1994 <http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=193667> accessed 30 January 2015,  Art 40(1), 
40(2) and 40(8); See our discussion on the purpose of Legal Reserve Fund (n 17)  
27 See A Regulation to Provide for the Transfer of Public Shops and Other Income Generating Institutions to 
Consumer Cooperative Societies set up in Wereda Level of  the Addis Ababa City Government Regulation 
No.46/2012 Art 4  
28Melaku (n 21)  
29 Constitution of FDRE (n 26) Art 31 
30Eda’a (n 6); Bedane (n 6); Regassa  (n 6). 
31
Michael Ayele, “Interview with a senior Legal Expert  of Federal Cooperative Agency”, (12 April 2014) 
unpublished 
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Cooperative Agency, also mentioned that Oromia International Bank Share Company is also 
another investor-owned firm in which the cooperatives have invested their money. The Addis 
Ababa City Government also helped the cooperatives in the city to establish Addis International 
Bank Share Company by proposing the idea and making feasibility study with a cost of more 
than two hundred thousand birr (about £6000).
32
 More than 67% of the total capital of this share 
company is owned by consumer cooperatives, and saving and credit cooperatives in Addis 
Ababa.
33
 These cooperatives are also establishing the Addis Insurance share company.
34
 
The cooperators (organizers of cooperatives) and the Addis Ababa City Government are arguing 
that the cooperatives are establishing banks and insurance firms in the form of a public company 
not because they are profit seeking but rather because the existing financial regulation law does 
not allow the formation of a cooperative bank and insurance firm.
35
They assert that cooperatives 
are unable to access loans from commercial banks since these banks require collateral.
36
They 
further argue that although the cooperatives have repeatedly appealed to the government to allow 
the establishment of cooperative banks and insurance firms within the ambit of cooperative law, 
the government has not shown any willingness to allow such actions.
37
Many of them believe this 
is because the Government does not want to lose control of the large amount of funds 
cooperatives have deposited in the state owned Ethiopian Commercial Bank.
38
 
However, there is also no sufficient legal reason to establish a cooperative bank from which to 
access to funding. Producer cooperatives could establish saving and credit scheme to extend 
loans to its members.
39
Saving and credit cooperatives are legitimate. Members of consumer and 
worker cooperatives do not normally need loans. If the consumer/worker cooperatives 
themselves need a loan they can borrow from saving &credit cooperatives or even from producer 
cooperatives.
40
Cooperatives are expected to be self-help, economic organization and thus they 
should not need to use the funds deposited in commercial banks; as they should collect the 
                                                             
32Mengistu(n 8)  
33 Ibid 
34 Ibid 
35 Ibid; Legesse (n 6);Mekuria (n 6)  
36 Ibid 
37Ibid 
38 Ibid 
39 Proclamation No.147/1998 (n 4) Art 35; See also the by-laws of Oromia Coffee Farmer Cooperative Union Ltd 
(January 2008) Art 24-30 
40Proclamation No.147/199 (n 4) Art 35 
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necessary funds they need from members of the cooperative. There is no law that imposes 
maximum loan selling. The existing financial regulation law does not attempt to regulate the 
funds that circulate in the economy from cooperatives, and as such should be considered to be a 
special privilege of cooperatives. So there is no legitimate reason for cooperatives to rush to 
establish bank and insurance firms in the form of a public company except to satisfy their profit 
seeking desires;
41
financial regulation law acts as nothing more than a convenient disguise for this 
behaviour. 
E. Compromising principles of open-membership, autonomy, education and coordination 
The Ethiopian cooperatives do not live up to fundamental principles of true cooperatives such as 
open membership, autonomy, education and coordination for self-interested reasons. Many 
cooperatives are unwilling to admit new member for fear that if new members are added, the 
benefit they have got from the government would have to be shared out equally.
42
Many 
Ethiopian cooperatives are not sufficiently resisting government interference since they receive 
subsidies granted on their continued service in furthering Government objectives.
43
 The 
cooperative education and promotion (teaching of the cooperative ideology to the public and to 
the youth) is carried out by the government rather than undertaken by the Cooperatives 
themselves.
44
 There is very little cooperation between cooperatives as each cooperative prefers to 
stick to its own interests and locality.
45
 
 
 
                                                             
41 There is no clear reason why the Ethiopian saving and credit cooperatives become eager to use the word bank in 
their name. If they want to be big enough they have to work hard to increase the number of their members and small 
cooperatives should be amalgamated. There is no legal restriction on the maximum number of members or capital. 
Although there seems to be territorial restriction such restriction would not be an obstacle to raise large saving fund 
because the law does not clearly define territorial limit (see Proclamation No.147/1998 (n 4) Art 6(2). 
42Melaku (n 21); Melese (n 8) 
43Mekuria (n 34)  
44Melaku (n 41); Melese(n 8) and Daniel Legesse, ‘Interview with Addis Ababa Saving and Credit Cooperative 
Union Ltd, General Manager  (4 August 2014) Unpublished  
45Mekuria(n 34) and Legesse (n 43)  
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7.2 Evidence that the Government is using cooperatives as a policy 
instrument
46
 
As was the culture in communist countries and in Africa, the Ethiopian Government since the 
1980s has continued to use cooperatives as a means to implement its own economic and political 
objectives. However, the cooperatives seem to have been resistant to this in some respects and 
they have proved to be unsuitable vehicles for promote Government policy. In this sub-topic we 
review major policy areas where the Government has tried to use cooperatives in this way. The 
main sources of information for this section are policy documents and interviews.  
A. Cooperatives as a means to implement Government policies 
The Ethiopian government has an objective of using cooperatives an instrument to attain its 
policy objectives.
47
The major areas where cooperatives have been intended to be used are in 
inflation control, agricultural marketing, to mobilize rural saving programs and in political 
indoctrination.. Let us see these areas in some details. 
Consumer cooperatives as a means of inflation control 
The Government considers high inflationary pressure a serious challenge to macroeconomic 
stability.
48
Thus, inflation control is one of the core objectives of the growth and transformation 
plan of the Government.
49
 The Government believes that the major causes of price inflation in 
Ethiopia are inefficient monopolistic domestic market, international price inflation and monetary 
policies of the Government.
50
 Reducing the transaction chain by avoiding ‘middlemen’, 
subsidizing basic goods and price fixing have been taken as solutions to these problems.
51
 The 
government has preferred consumer cooperatives as means to implement the solutions since the 
                                                             
46Under this topic, we show that the Government intends to use cooperatives as an instrument to attain its policy 
objectives. See our discussion of Ethiopian Cooperative Policy where we showed that the Ethiopian Government 
does not have policy that makes the existence of cooperatives the only or best alternative. 
47 See የ ኢዮጵያ ህ ዳሴና የ ል ማታዊዲሞክ ራሲያ ዊመን ግ ስ ታችን የ እ ድገ ትመር ህ ዎችመጋ ቢት  2004 ዓ / ምገ ጽ  122 እ ና ገ  ጽ   
146-148; Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, ‘Growth and Transformation Plan of 2010’ (2010) 
<http://www.mofed.gov.et/English/Resources/Documents/GTP%20English2.pdf> accessed 30 January 2015 
48 See የ ኢዮጵያ ህ ዳሴና የ ል ማታዊዲሞክ ራሲያ ዊመን ግ ስ ታችን የ እ ድገ ትመር ህ ዎችመጋ ቢት  2004 ዓ / ምገ ጽ  122 እ ና ገ ጽ  
12 6 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid 126-127 
51 Ibid 
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government is suspicious of the private sector.
52
According to a document prepared by the ruling 
party in 2011 the government in power believes that private sector firms are its political rivals 
and usually wasteful rent seekers or remnants of the past regime.
53
 
 According to an interview with Mengistu, Mekuria, Legesse, and Tesfaye since 2008, the 
Government has been working immensely hard to increase the number of consumer cooperatives 
so that it would be easier to control the proper implementation of price fixing and to distribute 
government subsidized goods to the public, while also trying to avoid the unnecessary benefit 
that would go to the intermediary.
54
  According to the Addis Ababa City Government Regulation 
No.46/2012 to encourage consumer cooperatives, the Addis Ababa City government went to the 
extent of dissolving the existing public shops and other income generating institutions and 
transferring their immense wealth to the consumer cooperatives established at the Wereda 
level.
55
 According to an interview with Mengistu the wealth transferred to consumers 
cooperatives worth more 159 million birr (about five million pound).
56
 Mengistu further stated 
that 70 million birr (about 2.5 million pound) loan without collateral has been given to the 
cooperatives by the government.
57
 
 
Producers’ cooperatives as a means to agricultural marketing58 
Effective and integrated input and product agricultural marketing in rural Ethiopia has been 
taken by the Government as a necessary condition for agricultural productivity.
59
Wary of the 
private sector the government
60
has preferred agricultural producer cooperatives to create 
                                                             
52Tesfaye Matewos  Kalo, ‘Interview with Cooperative Societies ’Organization and Registration Officer’ (25 June 
2014) Unpublished  
53The existing government claims that its political basis is the peasantry. The fact that it is a leftist government 
would also make it suspicious of the private sector. The Government have already declared neo-liberalism as an 
ideology that promote rent-seeking and private sectors as major beneficiaries of such ideology. Hence, to gain 
political basis in urban areas and to do away with neoliberalism and beneficiaries of this ideology the Government 
has been working to recreate and incubate developmental private sector from micro and small scale enterprises. See 
(n 47) in general and 154-160  in particular. 
54Mengistu(n 8); Mekuria(n 34); Legesse(n 6); Tesfaye Kalo (n 51)  
55 Addis Ababa City Government Regulation No.46/2012; According to an interview with Mengistu (n 8) the wealth 
transferred to consumers cooperatives worth more 159 million birr (about five million pound).  
56 Mengistu (n 8) 
57Mengistu(n 8)  
58 See our discussion on this issue under cooperative policy in Ethiopia in Chapter Six 
59 See የ ኢዮጵያ ህ ዳሴና የ ል ማታዊዲሞክ ራሲያ ዊመን ግ ስ ታችን የ እ ድገ ትመር ህ ዎችመጋ ቢት  2004 ዓ / ም 146-147 
60  In fact the agricultural input has been provided by companies owned by the ruling party. 
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effective and integrated agricultural marketing.
61
Especially, in the agricultural product market, 
agricultural product cooperatives have been expected to connect the small hold farmers to the 
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange.
62
 
To create the expected type of cooperatives the Government has been working hard. In 2012, the 
Agricultural Transformation Agency prepared the Agricultural Cooperative Sector Development 
Strategy 2012-2016.
63
The Federal Cooperative Agency in collaboration with regional agencies 
has been promoting and assisting the formation and strengthening of agricultural cooperatives.
64
 
To further strengthen the process an Agricultural Cooperative College has been considered.
65
 
The government has also planned to introduce certification and rebranding of agricultural 
cooperatives.66The certification and rebranding has been expected to provide “farmers and other 
services providers [with] a strong mechanism to differentiate well performing co-operatives from 
others who are co-operatives in name only”.67 
Saving and credit cooperatives as means of mobilizing rural saving 
The government has planned to increase national saving from 10% of the GDP to 15% of the 
GDP.
68
 It is also believed that one of the major reasons that hindered saving is the absence of 
efficient saving institutions in the rural areas.
69
 Rural saving and credit cooperatives have been 
taken by the government as an alternative solution.
70
 Accordingly, rural saving and credit 
cooperatives have been promoted,
71
 although the Growth and Transformation Plan of 2010 and 
the Agricultural Cooperative Sector Development Strategy 2012-2016 did not mention of them.
72
 
                                                             
61 See የ ኢዮጵያ ህ ዳሴና የ ል ማታዊዲሞክ ራሲያ ዊመን ግ ስ ታችን የ እ ድገ ትመር ህ ዎችመጋ ቢት  2004 ዓ / ም pp.146-147 
62 Ibid 
63 See Chapter Six, Section 6.2  
64 Ayalew (n 31)  
65 Ibid 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ministry of Agriculture, ‘Agricultural Cooperatives Sector Development Strategy 2012-2016’ (2012) 
<http://api.ning.com/files/464c0NtXZtDs3-
DGp0RziNVQaTPSSRO*4np2q7x0UaI4G1PRQeVzXmIf6zNOXGAR8-xiqLonmnmlpW-
RwUedIEmMdP5qED0b/AgriculturalCooperativeSectorDevelopmentStrategy201220163.pdf> accessed 30 January 
2015, 33 
68 See የ ኢዮጵያ ህ ዳሴና የ ል ማታዊዲሞክ ራሲያ ዊመን ግ ስ ታችን የ እ ድገ ትመር ህ ዎችመጋ ቢት  2004 ዓ / ም  pp.118-119 
69 Rural micro financial institutions that have been functioning are claimed to be inefficient. See Ibid 120 and 122 
70 Ibid 122 
71 Michael Ayalew, ‘Interview with Senior Legal Expert, Federal Cooperative Agency’ (24 February 2014) 
Unpublished 
72  See our discussion of conjecturable policy objective of saving and credit alternative in Chapter Four. 
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Cooperatives as a form of political indoctrination  
The ruling party has an ambition of creating the long lasting hegemony of developmental state 
status.
73
It aims to create a political landscape where only political parties that accept the 
development state ideology are able to win democratic elections and where liberal and other 
ideologies will be marginalized in Ethiopian politics.
74
It believes that such a long lasting 
hegemony is possible, if and only if, the idea becomes the prevailing public attitude and embeds 
itself in popular culture.
75
 It aims to meet the target through success in economic development 
and good governance.
76
This approach is not widely considered to be sufficient to be persuasive 
and so the government also relies on ideological persuasion.
77
 Indoctrination forms an 
indispensable mechanism of the ruling party in creating long lasting hegemony of the 
developmental state ideology in Ethiopia. 
The party document published in March 2012 indicates that, in addition to state owned and party 
owned Medias, the Government has planned to use academic institutions, associations (including 
the investor-owned firms’ association) and religious associations as a medium to further the 
Government’s policy objectives.78 Although cooperatives are not expressly mentioned in the 
document the fact that the party is ready to use such a range of associations suggests the policies 
of the previous Marxist Government in using cooperatives as a means of indoctrination may once 
again be resurfacing. Interviews made with Ato Mulugeta Mengistu, Main Work-Process Unit 
Head, and Ato Tesfaye Matewos, Officer, Cooperative Society Promotion and Registration 
Sector
79
 are congruent with this conclusion. For example, according to Ato Mengistu one of the 
objectives of cooperatives is “to create healthy relationship between the public and the 
government.”80 This assertion may only be limited to the indirect consequence of distribution of 
quality goods at fair price but it could also means the creation of ideological consensus between 
the Government and the public, by indoctrinating the public to the developmental state ideology 
                                                             
73 See የ ኢዮጵያ ህ ዳሴና የ ል ማታዊዲሞክ ራሲያ ዊመን ግ ስ ታችን የ እ ድገ ትመር ህ ዎችመጋ ቢት  2004 ዓ /40  
74 Ibid 86-88; Although the ruling party is currently a vanguard party, it does not seem to be happy with this status 
quo since it is difficult to appear democratic to the Western donors. As a result, it aims to create strong opposition 
parties with in the ambit of developmental state ideology. 
75 Ibid 40 
76 Ibid 198 
77 Ibid 198 
78 Ibid 78-81 and 202 
79Mengistu(n 8); Tesfaye Matewos (n 52) 
80 Mengistu(n 8); 
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through cooperative., Similarly, according to Matewos, one of the objectives of cooperatives is 
“to indoctrinate the idea of mutual development among the public.”81Although the merits of such 
a scheme would be to have a public which subscribe to the idea of mutual benefit it nonetheless 
remains a Government propaganda campaign through which it pursues developmental state 
ideology. Thus it is clear that the Government intends to use cooperatives to promote 
government policy.   
7.3 Where the Government has succeeded in meeting its objectives? 
. 
However, in a policy document prepared in March 2012 by the ruling party it has been expressly 
and vigorously admitted that agricultural marketing and rural saving and credit cooperatives have 
not been able to serve the government to attain its policy objectives.
82
Furthermore, although the 
document further indicated that unless research that would fundamentally solve the problem is 
made by taking Taiwan cooperatives as the best practice, the agricultural sector development 
would be in jeopardy;
83
 since then there has been only a plan to introduce certification and 
rebranding.
84
 
The Government’s attempt to increase membership of cooperatives has also failed. This is 
evident from the fact that the Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency, an independent agency that 
makes statistical data collection has no any data relating to cooperatives. According to an 
interview with Zelalem, the Business Statistics Directorate Director, and Ethiopian Central 
Statistics Agency, the agency collects data if it is convinced that the data could have some 
impact on the analysis of Ethiopian Economy.
85
He further stated that the Central Statistics 
Agency has no any record or data concerning cooperatives.
86
 According to Mengistu, Wami, 
Melaku and Melese in Addis Ababa, the City Government has planned to increase the number of 
members to fifty percent of the total population of Addis Ababa.
87
But the increase of number of 
                                                             
81 Matewos (n 52) 
82
See የ ኢዮጵ ያ ህ ዳሴና የ ል ማታዊዲሞክ ራሲያ ዊመን ግ ስ ታችን የ እ ድገ ትመር ህ ዎችመጋ ቢት  2004 ዓ / ም  p. 122, 146, 148 
83 Ibid 146-148 
84Ayalew (n 69)  
85Zelalem Hailegiorgis ‘Interview with the Business Statistics Directorate Director, Ethiopian Central Statistics 
Agency’ (31 July 2014) Unpublished 
86 Ibid 
87Mengistu (n 8); Wami(n 8); Melaku(n 41); Melese(n 8)  
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members of the consumer cooperatives has been stagnant. For example, in Arada Sub-City the 
annual increase of cooperative membership has been about 4.5%.
88
 
Melaku and Melese (Cooperative Team Leaders in Arada Sub-City, Addis Ababa) also testifies that the 
public has been unenthusiastic about joining cooperatives and cooperative members have been 
unwilling to appear at the annual general meeting.
89
 The reluctance of members shows the lack 
of enthusiasm to push the cooperative mission. Melaku and Melese further state that such lack 
enthusiasm has also blocked the possibility of new members joining the cooperatives because the 
admission of new members has to be approved by the general meeting.
90
Moreover, according to 
these interviewees this reluctance has also negatively influenced the public against joining 
cooperatives since the general meeting is required to decide on the distribution of surplus which 
could have served as an incentive to attract new members.
91
 This would stop votes on 
membership or surplus distribution). The interview with Wami (the Legal Advisor and Cooperative 
Promoter, Addis Ababa City Administration) and Matewos (Cooperative Promotion Officer, 
Hawassa City administration) also show that even the members of the management committee 
have been unwilling to hold regular meetings and to attend the training organized by the 
government to promote cooperatives.
92
According to Melaku and Melese although the Addis 
Ababa City Government has gone to the extent of paying an allowance and telephone fees to the 
committee, they are yet to demonstrate the desired enthusiasm for the role.
93
 
                                                             
88 In an interview with Melaku (n 41) and Melese,(n 8), I got a piece of paper that contained an attempt to show 
membership increase of consumer cooperatives in the sub-city from 2012/13 to 2013/14. According to the 
document, in 2012/13 the total member was 24,814 and such number increased to 25,918 in 2013/14. It was not 
possible to get similar information from other sub cities because they never keep statistical data (Interview with 
Mengistu (n 8)). Even the data obtain from Arada sub city may be unreliable since it is a common sense that there is 
always a tendency in Ethiopia to exaggerate statistical data to prove success of the ruling party. For example the data 
I received in the city level for number of members of consumer cooperatives in Arada Sub-city for the year 
2013/2014 is 31655 which contradicts with what I received in the sub-city level (Mengistu (n 8)).So this researcher 
believes that the number of members of the consumer cooperatives in Arada sub-city is probably much less than 
what the sub-city claimed. This would be better in the main text- slightly rewritten 
89 Melaku (n 41) and Melese,(n 8). Very few employees of Cooperative Society Promotion and Development Sector 
and offices of Addis Ababa City Government are members of consumer cooperatives. Employees of the government 
who gave me interview are not members of cooperatives and they do not see any benefit of membership. Ibid See 
also interview with Wami(n 8) and interview with Mekdes Yonas, ‘Interview with the Record Officer of the 
Cooperative Society in the Promotion and Development Sector of the Trade & Industry Bureau of the Addis Ababa 
City Government’ (30 July 2014) Unpublished 
90Ibid  
91
 Ibid 
92 Ibid; Wami(n 8); Kalo(n 51)  
93Melaku(n 41); Melese (n 8)  
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In short, the cooperative movement under the leadership of the government has failed to attain 
the mission it has aimed for. The Record Officer of Cooperative Society Promotion 
&Development Sector, Trade & Industry Bureau, and Addis Ababa City Government, described 
the failure of Consumer Cooperatives in Addis Ababa as nothing more than ‘a forum of disputes 
and misunderstandings.’94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
94
Yonas(n 90)  
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7.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter Seven has attempted to see if the practical operation of cooperatives has remedied 
the defects of the Cooperative Law and the Cooperative Policy in distinguishing cooperatives 
from investor owned firms. However; the practical operation of cooperatives shows that the legal 
and policy defects have been given real life since in practice the vision of cooperatives in 
Ethiopian has been profit-maximizing. In Chapter Five we have seen that the ownership rights in 
cooperatives which include the right to manage the firm are as wide as that of investor owned 
firm.  
This Chapter shows that such wider rights exist not only in theory but also in real operation of 
cooperative. The owners of a cooperative firm freely determine how to manage the firm and 
appoint a professional manager implying their profit-seeking motives. User cooperatives could 
be managed by the committee elected from members. Ethiopian Cooperatives also distribute 
profit on the basis of capital contribution. They also trade with non-members reinvest their 
annual surplus in the investor owned firms and unwilling to admit new member. Although the 
government has recognized such profit-seeking behaviours of cooperatives and has been taking 
measures that may neutralize such motives, the measures do not have strong legal ground. Still 
more, although there are evidences that the government has also attempted to assign certain 
objectives such as channeling basic goods to consumers, serving as alternative agricultural input 
and out put market for small hold peasant/ pastoralists, mobilizing rural saving and serving as 
forum to indoctrinate developmentalism to the public, which would detract cooperatives from 
their profit-seeking motive; such attempts of the government have not proved successful. 
This chapter has examined the practice from the vantage point of cooperative objectives. The 
next chapter examines the practice from the vantage point of regulation. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
REGULATION OF COOPERATIVES IN ETHIOPIA 
 
8.0 Introduction 
Not-for-profit cooperatives are either autonomous, philanthropist dependent or state dependent.
1
 
The defining characteristic of true cooperatives is their non-profit seeking orientation. The 
behaviors of cooperatives must correspond with their motive and there should be mechanisms in 
place that encourage cooperatives to behave accordingly. Regulation is an indispensable 
mechanism in achieving this end and in realizing the objectives behind cooperatives. 
Regulation may be either self-regulation or state-centered regulation and this may be dependent 
on what the objectives of cooperatives are. Both self-regulation and state-centered regulation 
presuppose the existence of a strong motive behind the missions and goals of cooperatives. Self- 
regulation would be effective only when members of cooperatives have a convincing reason to 
comply. State regulation would be successful when the State is incentivized to ensure 
compliance because it depends on the success of cooperative for various reasons (noted in 
chapter six and seven). Cooperation among cooperatives is important for self-regulation and 
legal mechanisms are important for state-centered regulation. 
However, in Ethiopian cooperatives there is neither self-regulation nor state-centered regulation. 
Members of cooperatives in Ethiopia do not have sufficient reason to cooperate and resultantly 
there is no cooperation between cooperatives. The excessive interventionist ideology and 
behaviour of the State has denied members of cooperatives a reason to cooperate. The Ethiopian 
government lacks a reason to stick to its cooperative strategy. Finally, the lack of legal authority 
behind the cooperative principles, indiscriminate granting of special privileges, limited power of 
cooperative agencies and the pretext of autonomy of cooperatives have further limited the State’s 
ability to regulate cooperatives.  
                                                             
1
See our discussion on Chapter One 
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This chapter is set out as two sub-topics. One,  an analysis of cooperative regulation, and two, an 
analysis of cooperative regulation specifically in Ethiopia. The first sub-topic reviews the 
purpose of regulation, types of regulation and conditions necessary for regulation. The second 
subtopic seeks to demonstrate that regulation does not really exist in the Ethiopian Cooperative 
Movement.   
The first sub-topic is argued using academic writings. The evidence used in the second sub-topic 
are interviews material with employees of cooperative agencies, employees of cooperative 
unions, and cooperatives’ management committee members. The interview questions were 
predesigned open-ended questions. The purpose of these interviews was to assess if there is 
either self-regulation or state regulation of cooperatives in Ethiopia. Documents and official 
reports were also used as sources of evidence.  
8.1 Regulation of cooperatives in general  
Regulation is a mechanism to ensure that cooperatives are moving towards their ultimate 
objectives. This can be achieved through the mechanism of self-regulation or state-centered 
regulation. Motives, coordination and legal frameworks are important for regulation to exist. Let 
us see these issues in some details. 
A. The purpose of regulation 
True cooperatives have social objectives that they aim to attain. Their constitution will set out 
principles to guide their social objectives. Regulation ensures adherence to these cooperative 
principles. Any rule if not enforced is of no value. If cooperatives are not made to adhere to 
cooperative principles, it may be preferable that they should lose their special nature and become 
investor-owned firms. Furthermore, their failure to adhere to cooperative principles may also 
negatively affect the chance of true cooperatives to emerge, since it may create negative public 
impression about cooperatives in general. Thus the purpose of regulation (and penalties for 
noncompliance) is to keep cooperative distinct from investor-owned firms. 
B. Types of regulation of cooperatives 
Cooperative principles are enforced either through self-regulation or state-centered regulation. 
Self-regulation is when the enforcement of cooperative principles are carried out by a personal 
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commitment of each member to adhere to and respect the cooperative principle, and that 
commitment is rewarded and encouraged by the cooperative. It also means when the cooperative 
principles are made a part of the cooperative’s operating practice and enforced by the 
organization itself through self-reward and/or self-punishment. State regulation is when the 
cooperative principles are made part of the cooperative law and enforced by the government 
either by means of reward or punishment or both.  
These types of regulation are largely dependent on where the sources of the cooperative 
objectives/visions derive their meaning. If the objective/vision is solely initiated by the 
cooperatives’ members the type of regulation is mainly self-regulation, but if the objective/vision 
is initiated by Government then it is likely to be a tool or mechanism to attain certain public 
objectives and would be categorized as state-centered regulation. However, self-regulation would 
be more effective if the government recognized that cooperatives are not investor-owned firms, 
charities or societies but self-help economic organizations. Such recognition would help true 
cooperatives fight back against investor-owned firms masked as cooperatives. Equally, state 
regulation would also be more effective if complemented by some form of self-regulation. 
C. Self-regulation 
At least two things have to be fulfilled for self-regulation to be effective. The first part is 
motivation. Human beings can be viewed as rational beings and hence their behaviors are mostly 
rationally shaped. Individuals act or abstain from acting if such an act or inaction would produce 
some positive effect to his satisfaction. Cooperative self-regulation can also benefit from being 
seen in the light of rational decision making. The second part is cooperation among cooperatives. 
The fact that there may be multiple cooperatives formed in the same local area necessitates the 
institutional cooperation among these cooperatives, so that uniform cooperative principles would 
be developed which would make self-regulation feasible. 
As stated earlier, self-regulation is when the enforcement of cooperative principles are carried 
out by the members of the cooperatives and the cooperatives themselves.
2
Self-regulation takes 
                                                             
2Self-regulation is the feature of a number of professions in western countries. For example, in the U.S. the 
Government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) like the New 
York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealer, securities industry organizations that are 
owned and operated by their member. Among the SROs' tasks is to design rules governing their members' practices. 
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place outside the institutions of government and, hence, in the realm of private actors rather than 
public actors.
3
Most often institutions that impose sanctions on violators have to be established so 
that individuals are made to behave in accordance of a certain rule.
4
However, such rules may 
sometimes be enforced without institutions.
5
Cooperative self-regulation may emanate either 
from the commitment of each individual member or from the cooperatives as an institution. 
Individual members of cooperatives may make sacrifices
6
 to make sure that the cooperatives 
would attain their ultimate end. Such individual behaviour would gradually become a social 
norm which imposes social sanctions on rule violators.
7
 Cooperatives, as institutions, can punish 
a member who has been found to have violated the cooperative principles.  
Cooperative principles are ordinarily enforced through self-regulation. When we look at the 
historical development of cooperatives they emerged out of the activities of ideologically 
committed philanthropists such as Robert Owen, or particular interest groups such as labourers, 
consumers and small holding farmers. The Kibbutz, Moshav and Moshav Shitufi of the Israeli 
Community before the formation of the State of Israel were also good examples of self-regulated 
social organizations
8
. Cooperatives emerged as altruistic or self-help organizations where there 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
In addition, SROs are responsible for enforcing their own rules as well as federal securities laws. They conduct 
disciplinary proceedings and impose sanctions on members for violations. Self-regulation is also a feature of other 
professions, including accounting, law, and medicine. State accounting boards and the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), voluntary membership organizations for accountants, conduct investigations 
and impose disciplinary actions on accountants who commit fraud or otherwise violate the code of conduct. In some 
states, state bar associations handle attorney disciplinary matters. State medical boards handle physician disciplinary 
matter. Peter DeMarzo, Michael Fishman and Kathleen Hagerty ‘Self-Regulation and Government Oversight’ 
(2005) 72(3) The Review of Economic Studies 687-706; Self-regulation is also the main attributes of the Japanese 
industries where trade associations create both rules of trade for a particular industry and sanctions to enforce them. 
Ulrike Schaede, ‘Cooperative Capitalism: Self-Regulation, Trade Associations, and the Antimonopoly Law in 
Japan’ (2002)28(1) Journal of Japanese Studies 203; In Ethiopia there are no self-regulated professions. This may be 
either because the professions are too infant or the state ideological inclination towards the left or both. 
3David Baron, ‘Morally Motivated Self-Regulation’(2010) 100(4) The American Economic Review1299 
4
Christoph Hauert, Arne Traulsen, Hannelore Brandt, Martin Nowak and Karl Sigmund, ‘Via Freedom to Coercion: 
The Emergence of Costly Punishment’ (2007) 316(5833) Science, New Series 1905 
5 Ibid 
6
Sacrifices include such as forgoing profit collection on the basis of capital investment or criticizing defectors 
without mercy, serving in the management of cooperatives for free, taking time to advocate cooperatives’ ideology 
or in short behaving as exemplary cooperator so that others would possibly follow his suit.  
7Baron (n 3) 
8 “The Kibbutz is a collective settlement, both in production and in consumption, in which members' contributions 
to production are more or less based on the principle of ‘from each according to his abilities’ and distribution and 
consumption follow the rule of ‘to each according to his needs.’ The Moshav is a smallholders' village with 
individual production and extensive cooperative organization for marketing, supply, public and educational services, 
and mutual liability for financial obligations. The Moshav Shitufi maintains collective production and distribution 
according to the specific needs of each member, with private consumption ”The goal of the coops was to provide 
means of existence for the Jewish in Palestine and their vision was ‘laying the foundations of a new Jewish 
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was no state support available to the poor laborer, consumer, smallholder and new settler. The 
central tenet of cooperatives is of “promoting conceptions of self-sufficiency.”9 State 
involvement in the enforcement of cooperative principles was the exceptional phenomenon of 
colonial settlement in Africa and statism of the twentieth century.
10
 
Motivation as a Source of Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation can result from a variety of motivations including self-interest and altruistic 
moral concerns.
11
 Self-regulation of cooperatives initiated philanthropists mainly results from 
altruistic moral concern.
12
 Self-interest was probably the reason for the self-regulation of the 
British Owenite, Rochdale Pioneers, consumer cooperatives and the American Producer 
Cooperatives. The Kibbutz, Moshav and Moshav Shitufi of Israel were motivated by the impact 
of strong Jewish nationalism (Zionism) and a higher sense of justice.
13
 As a result they were able 
to cultivate “altruistic qualities in its members, by educating them to subordinate their private 
desires for the sake of the community.”14 
This would lead to the conclusion that the decline of the moral or self-interest concern would 
lead to the decline of self-regulation. The cooperative movement began to decline in the 
twentieth century because governments began to involve themselves in economic activities in the 
form of government production and distribution of goods and services, or price regulation, social 
welfare, and consumer protection. The emergence and triumphs of communism and socialism 
and welfare states in the twentieth century has led to the decline of moral or self-interest 
concerns for true cooperatives.
15
 Communism and socialism, social welfarism and even 
developmental statism are competing ideologies with cooperativism, whereas cooperativism is 
complementary to classical liberalism. While the communist and socialist ideology holds that 
political institutions should help the disadvantaged section of the society, cooperativism and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
community in Palestine’ See Yehuda Don, ‘Adaptation of Cooperatives to Economic Changes: The Israeli 
Experience’ (1967) 49(1) Journal of Farm Economics119-130 121-122 
9 Ibid 123 
10 See Chapters on history of cooperatives in Africa and Socialist countries. 
11See Baron (n 3) 
12Self–interest may play some role at least in shaping the behaviors of members of the cooperatives and the 
cooperatives themselves. 
13Don (n 8) 121 
14 Ibid 
15 See our discussion in chapter one section 1.2 
171 
 
liberalism leave the responsibility on individuals to self-help. As such “organizations that 
represent rival ideologies cause ideological competition, which should increase failure, while 
organizations that represent shared ideologies cause ideological mutualism, which should 
decrease failure.”16 Similarly the Kibbutz, Moshav and Moshav Shitufi of Israel declined after 
the formation of the State of Israel in 1948 since some of the principal factors which had served 
as a motivational driving force behind cooperative activity, disappeared.
17
 
“The foundation of the independent state of Israel created an identity of interest 
between the Jewish community and the authorities. The government established 
efficient administrative machinery which took the place of the parallel voluntary 
instruments of the pre-independence community. Care for taxation, defense, 
education, and social security has passed to the government, which possesses the 
power of coercion to force its decisions upon individual citizens. Such 
development has undoubtedly meant the normalization of the political and 
economic situation. Yet it has narrowed the field for voluntary activities. Thus, 
one of the most basic motivational forces for cooperative action in the past, 
namely, the specific economic and social needs served by cooperatives, has come 
to be regarded by many as passé.”18 
In summary, without motivation, self-regulation may be impossible. Cooperatives have generally 
lost the motivation necessary for self-regulation since the beginning of 20
th
 century.
19
 
Cooperation as source self-regulation 
Although motivation is necessary for self-regulation, on its own, it is not enough. Since 
cooperatives are established by taking into account locality issues,
20
effective and successful self-
regulation requires an apex cooperative organization that will assist groups and people to come 
together and coordinate their efforts. Cooperation is the philosophical and ideological foundation 
of cooperatives. The principle of education would also be better facilitated through community 
                                                             
16 Paul Ingram and Tal Simons,‘State Formation, Ideological Competition, and the Ecology of Israeli Workers' 
Cooperatives1920-1992’ (2000) 45(1) Administrative Science Quarterly25   
17Don (n 8) 126 
18 Ibid (emphasis added) 
19See our discussion supra in Chapter One section 1.2  
20If the cooperatives have to meet their objectives members should be peoples of the same locality. See our 
discussion in Chapter Three (n 41) 
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association of cooperatives than by individual effort of each cooperative. There has been 
cooperation among British retail cooperatives and the cooperative whole sale has been the result 
of such cooperation. In the United States the National Cooperative Business Association 
(NCBA) helps to achieve this principle on national level. The International Cooperative Alliance 
is also responsible to facilitate principle of cooperation in the international level. In addition to 
these organizations, there are several home pages intended to coordinate cooperative 
movement.
21
 
D. State regulations 
If the state is willing to regulate cooperatives it could do so either directly by making them 
accountable to the government or indirectly by considering the cooperatives as a private affair 
but making special benefit conditional up on fulfillment of certain circumstance. 
Direct State Control 
Direct state regulation exists when the state considers the enforcement of cooperative law not 
only a private matter but also a public matter and will control the violation of cooperative law. 
The extent of direct control may be as wide as making cooperatives accountable to the 
government office or as narrow as licensing, supervision and inspection. The extent of a state 
intervention in cooperative management depends on the extent of the role to which the state 
wants cooperatives to play in economic, social and political life of the society. Marxists and 
African governments of pre-1991 had an intention to use cooperatives as an important means to 
attain communist indoctrination and economic growth. As a result, such systems did not provide 
cooperatives with any autonomy.  When cooperatives are taken as an independent entity from the 
government, but considered nonetheless as influential in the economy, the Government may limit 
itself to licensing, supervision and inspection. Cooperative Banks are good examples of this 
latter scenario.
22
 
 
                                                             
21See our discussion in chapter four under principle of cooperation 
22  See Rajkamal Iyer, ‘Regulation of Cooperative Banks in India’ (2005) 40(50) Economic and Political Weekly 
522-524 
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Indirect state control 
Indirect control is the result of the Government’s belief that cooperatives are an expression of an 
individual’s right to freedom of association. This means that if the government passes a law that 
realizes a freedom of association it then considers its implementation a private, rather than a 
public, issue.
23
In this case, the role of Government is to issue cooperative law that define 
cooperatives and establish and organize a state organ that registers cooperatives. Since the law 
defines cooperative form of association as distinguished from other form of association there 
would not be confusion. The definition of cooperative may emphasis the ultimate end of the 
cooperatives, i.e. cooperatives may be defined as an economic association working for non-profit 
motive. If the government wants to encourage a certain sector of cooperatives working for non-
profit motives, it may give privilege based on the actual outcome. 
8.2 Regulations of cooperatives in Ethiopia  
In the case of Ethiopian cooperatives, there is neither self-regulation nor state regulation. 
Members of cooperatives in Ethiopia do not have sufficient reason to cooperate and there is no 
cooperation between cooperatives. The Ethiopian Government lacks a definitive reason to back 
the cooperative campaign and does not allow cooperatives space to regulate themselves. The 
analysis these points are framed under the separate headings of self-regulation and state 
regulation. 
A. Absence of self-regulation of cooperatives in Ethiopia 
The excessive interventionist ideology and behaviour of the State has denied members of 
cooperatives a reason to self-regulate or to be regulated. Since the Government has acted as the 
‘cooperator,’ cooperative members do not see their role in the cooperative movement. This 
intervention by the Government combined with the infancy of the cooperative movement in 
Ethiopia has also led to the non-emergence of apex organization that would have assisted the 
development of the cooperative movement.  
                                                             
23Compare this concept with the concept of criminal law and contract law. The government is duty bound to take 
direct and immediately responsibility for the prosecution of the violator of the criminal law whereas parties to a 
contract are responsible to bring their dispute to court and prove their allegation-the role of the state is limited to 
issuing laws governing contract; adjudicating disputes on the basis these laws if brought to it and then enforce its 
decision on the dispute if the winner expressly requests its enforcement. 
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Lack of motivation 
Motivation is a crucial factor in self-regulation and it may emanate from ideological, self-interest 
or altruistic moral concern.
24
 However, none of these motivations exist in Ethiopia mainly 
because the Ethiopian Government, like many other Governments in Africa, have had 
authoritarian tendencies leaving little room for individuals to take responsibility for their own 
life and the life of their fellow citizens and have had total control over cooperative development 
allowing little room for individuals to take responsibility within the movement. With the 
exception of saving and credit cooperatives and dairy cooperatives, others in Ethiopia are 
constructions of the Government. The Government has master minded their formation and 
existence. As a result of this interventionist approach by the Government in stultifying individual 
initiative there is a lack of motivation for individuals to create or maintain true cooperatives in 
Ethiopia. This point is developed below.  
The Ethiopian Government’s interventionist ideology  
Since African leaders have a tendency to underestimate the capacity of their citizens to find 
solutions to their own problems, the state diagnoses its citizen’s problems and then seeks to 
prescribe a remedy.
25
 The theory of a developmental state has served as a theoretical and 
scientific justification for their actions.
26
 This has formed a tendency for states to deny 
cooperatives their true ideological independence.
27
 True and autonomous cooperatives are 
associations of people who are able to diagnose their own problems and solve these problems 
themselves. In a country where the legitimate body to resolve problems of individuals and 
citizens is a political organ of the Government, these cooperatives do not have this autonomy. 
The major reason why true and autonomous cooperatives emerged in Britain and spread in 
Europe, America and Asia was because the State was reluctant to solve the defects of a market 
economy which led to the misery of labourers and low income earners. If it could be understood 
by the Ethiopian Government that there could be a separate ideological basis for cooperatives 
                                                             
24
See our discussion in section 8.1 of this Chapter 
25This is probably because they consider the formal modern western education as only source of problem solving 
knowledge and skill and most ordinary Africans in general and Ethiopia in particular lacks such formal education. 
26
Thandika Mkandawire, ‘Thinking about developmental states in Africa’ (2001)Cambridge Journal of Economics 
289-313  
27Cooperatives that exist in this ideology are mainly misnomers since they are mostly instruments of a state to attain 
its own agenda. This is indicated in the next subtopic in this Chapter 
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then this would leave room for an individual to take responsibility for their success. The issue of 
self-interest exists only if individuals are taking responsibility for their own fate.  Philanthropic 
altruism also exists only if there is some in need and without any one to look after him. 
According to an informant there are no philanthropists supporting cooperatives in Ethiopia except 
Ethiopian Women Self-Help Saving and Credit Cooperative Movement.
28
  
Since the Ethiopian government claims to be developmental state and has had already intervened 
into the economy to solve the problems of the market economy according to its own designs, 
there is no reason for individuals to be members of cooperatives and adhere to their principles. 
The major reasons for propagating true cooperatives are to enable small farmers to benefit from 
new markets created by forming producers’ cooperatives, protecting consumers against high 
prices and low quality goods, helping the poor to get fair employment and providing residential 
houses for urban low and middle income earners.
29
 But in Ethiopia the Government has already 
established the commodity exchange that serves as an alternative market for smallholder 
peasants and pastoralists. It also regulates the price and distribution of consumer goods. 
Moreover, there are three public enterprises, one cereal dealer and two manufactured product 
dealers that play a great role in market control.
30
Since, Ethiopia is an agrarian country where 
about eighty-five percent of the population lives in rural areas, the issue of employment rights is 
less crucial. Moreover; the Government, in addition to being a major employer, also takes the 
initiative to create jobs and to make jobs more conducive to employees through legislative means 
such as making it mandatory to have a pension and ensuring that every employee has health care 
insurance. 
 
                                                             
28 Interview with Daniel Legesse, Interview with Addis Ababa Saving and Credit Cooperative Union Ltd, General 
Manager’ (3 August 2014) Unpublished.  In its nine month performance report of April 2013 to the House of 
Peoples Representative the Federal Cooperative failed to mention anything about the success or failure of its plan to 
anchor cooperatives with charities. This implies that the Commission did not succeed in meeting its plan. (See 
Response of the Agricultural Committee of the House to the report of the Commission). 
29Johnston Birchall, Cooperatives and the Millennium Development Goals (2004) Geneva International Labour 
Office <http://www.aciamericas.coop/IMG/pdf/2004-birchall-mdgs.pdf> accessed 30 January 2015, 3;Gerald 
Sazama,‘Lessons from the History of Affordable Housing Cooperatives in the United States: A Case Study in 
American Affordable Housing Policy’ (2000) 59(4) American Journal of Economics and Sociology573-608 
30The cereal dealer is the Ethiopian Cereal Trade Enterprise and the others are Ethiopian Import and Wholesale 
Enterprise and the Ale Bejimla Enterprise. These enterprises have branches in major towns of the country and they 
may open additional branches if they need. 
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The residential housing problems in urban areas have seen the Government start a condominium 
project in 2004.
31
The Ethiopian Government designed the 20/80 urban housing project in 2004 
and has been implementing the project since then. Since 2013, an additional two projects have 
been designed; 10/90, 40/60.The project name is based on the advance payment that is to be 
made by the person who gets the chance to buy the house from the Government at its 
construction cost. In 20/80 condo houses the advance payment is twenty percent of the 
construction cost and 40/60, forty percent and 10/90, ten percent. According to the terms of the 
project, the Government constructs condo houses and transfers the ownership of the houses to 
the person who pays a certain percentage of the construction cost in advance, and enters into a 
long term loan agreement with the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia for the remaining percentage. 
Therefore, in Ethiopia although individuals may be enthusiastic to be a member of ‘housing 
cooperatives’ they are in fact are misnomers.  
There are only two reasons why individuals could be interested in joining ‘housing cooperatives’ 
priority access to urban land and administrative convenience. In the past although lease-price-
free urban lands used to be given to individuals, ‘housing cooperatives’ used to be better treated 
as compared to individuals in terms of the amount of money deposited as a capacity indication 
and priority to access. Currently, even though individuals are totally denied the privilege to 
access lease-price-free urban land, housing cooperatives’ privilege is still maintained in law and 
in practice.
32
 The other reason why individuals prefer to join housing cooperatives is because it 
would reduce administrative inconvenience. Individuals are not expected to personally apply for 
a land grant. A few individuals work as agents for the many. But on the part of the state, the 
purpose of housing cooperatives is to reduce the possibility of dealing with too many individuals. 
Individual’s or philanthropist’s use of cooperatives has been best in areas like dairy farming and 
the saving and credit sector of the economy where the Government was not providing better 
alternatives. In Ethiopia, small scale dairy production is an important source of cash income for 
                                                             
31 Condo houses seem to be preferable to housing coops. See Michael Schill, Ioan Voicu, Jonathan Miller, ‘The 
Condominium versus Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of Housing in New York City’ (2007) 36(2) The 
Journal of Legal Studies 275-324 
32 Individuals could have access to urban land for residential house through lease auction only. Those individuals 
who are unable to afford the auction system are accommodated under the housing project of the government. Urban 
Lands Lease Holding Proclamation No. 721/2011 <http://chilot.me/2012/01/11/new-urban-lands-lease-holding-
proclamation-no-721-2011/new-land-lease-proclamation-no-721-2011/>  accessed 30 January 2015, Art 12(1)(c) 
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subsistence farmers but 
33
they face many hidden costs that make it difficult for them to gain 
access to markets and productive assets.
34
Among other things; 
“costs of searching for a partner with whom to exchange, 
screening potential trading partners to ascertain their 
trustworthiness, bargaining with potential trading partners (and 
officials) to reach an agreement, transferring the product, 
monitoring the agreement to see that its conditions are fulfilled, 
and enforcing the exchange agreement” are some of the major 
problems that small scale milk producers face.
35
 
In the absence of state intervention in support of these small scale dairy farmers, it has been 
necessary to have a ‘farmer-led cooperative that handles input purchasing, distribution and 
output marketing, usually after some form of bulking or processing.’36There are no Government 
arranged market alternatives to dairy farmers in Ethiopia.  
Similarly, loans are not easily available in Ethiopia especially to ordinary households and small 
holders. This is due to two main reasons, the nature of banks and Government regulation of bank 
loans. Banks are usually unwilling to extend loans to smallholders either because of the high 
costs associated with administering spatially dispersed small loans or smallholders; especially to 
low income earners who could not develop an acceptable project proposal, or have the necessary 
collateral to guarantee the repayment of the loan. The problem of collateral is more severe for 
Ethiopian smallholder farmers since land is a public property and a farmer has no right to present 
it as collateral. The Government has the policy of prioritizing bank loans since Ethiopian banks 
do not have sufficient liquid capital to grant all loan applications. One of the major challenges of 
Ethiopian economy is low level of domestic savings to support the huge demand of the country’s 
                                                             
33See Garth Holloway, Charles Nicholson and Chris Delgado, ‘Agro-industrialization Through Institutional 
Innovation: Transactions Costs, Cooperatives And Milk-Market Development In The Ethiopian Highlands’ 
(1999)23(3) Agricultural Economics 3-10 
34 Ibid 
35 Ibid 
36Ibid; See also Gian Francesconi and  Ruben Ruerd, ‘The Hidden Impact of Cooperative Membership on Quality 
Management: A Case Study from the Dairy Belt of Addis Ababa’ (2012)1(1) Journal of Entrepreneurial and 
Organizational Diversity 85-103  
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investment for accelerating growth and development.
37
Thus the National Bank of Ethiopia issues 
directives indicating investment projects that have been given priority by the commercial banks. 
The projects that receive priority access to loans are big projects such as manufacturing, large 
scale farming, five star hotels. This forces ordinary households and small holders to search for 
other alternative sources due to the limited availability of funds for lending on the banks part. 
Saving and Credit cooperatives would be one of these alternatives.
38
Credit cooperatives can lend 
to individuals whom banks are unable to.
39
 There is no law in Ethiopia that empowers the 
National Bank of Ethiopia to interfere or regulate cooperatives and thus the credit cooperatives 
can decide their own terms for lending. Relative to other types of cooperatives in Ethiopia, 
Ethiopian saving and credit cooperatives are closer to true cooperatives since they adhere to the 
mutuality principle of user control, user ownership, and user benefit.
40
 This would imply that 
individuals have sufficient reasons to be bound by the cooperative principles.  
Absence of Cooperative Ideology in Ethiopia 
With the exception of saving and credit cooperatives and dairy cooperatives, all other types of 
cooperatives in Ethiopia are not genuine. In true cooperatives, the members recognize their own 
economic problems and they then decide that cooperatives are their best alternative to be out of 
the problems. They have autonomy not only in its daily management but also in identifying 
longer term problems and finding solutions. True and autonomous cooperatives are alternatives 
to State public enterprises and investor-owned firms. In public enterprises, the State is both the 
entrepreneur and the investor and profit is not its primary agenda. In investor-owned firms, the 
entrepreneurs and the investors may not necessarily be the same and profit is the primary and 
ultimate objective. Like public enterprises, in true and autonomous cooperatives 
entrepreneurship and ownership overlaps and profit is not an ultimate end. 
                                                             
37Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, ‘Ethiopian Growth and Transformation Plan’(2010) 
<http://www.mofed.gov.et/English/Resources/Documents/GTP%20English2.pdf>accessed 30 January 2015, 3 
38 See Abhijit Banerjee, Timothy Besley, Timothy Guinnane, ‘The Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit 
Cooperative with Theory and a Test’ (1994) 109(2) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 491 
39Timothy Guinnane, ‘Cooperatives as Information Machines: German Rural Credit Cooperatives 1883-1914 
(2001)61(2) The Journal of Economic History 366, “Economists now appreciate that resource allocation in less 
developed economies is influenced by non-firm economic institutions such as credit cooperatives;” See Ibid. 
40 This researcher is currently a member of Hawassa College of Agriculture Saving and Credit Cooperative. He 
noticed that this credit cooperative adheres to cooperative principles. In a statement she gave to Addis Zemen (state 
owned Amharic daily newspaper) on Yekatit (February) 4(11) 2006 (2014) a representative of Addis Ababa Saving 
and & Credit Cooperative Union also concluded that saving and credit coops show allegiance to cooperative 
principles.  
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However, in cooperatives in Ethiopia, it has been the State that identifies social and economic 
problems and also proposes cooperatives as a solution to the problem.
41
 The members of these 
cooperatives neither self-identify problems nor propose solutions for the claimed problems. It is 
the Government that has taken this initiative in the cooperative movement. The reason is partly 
historical. Cooperatives were first introduced in 1960s by the imperial government to bolster the 
agricultural production of the country by organizing the unemployed labourers into them. The 
socialist government continued the State led movement in order to use the cooperative societies 
as a means to build socialism. Although the Ethiopian economy was liberalized after 1991, the 
Government has remained the leader of the cooperative movement in the belief that cooperatives 
can be utilized as a means to solve challenges to economic and social development.
42
 One of the 
major tasks of the Cooperative Agency or the Cooperative Commission is expanding the 
cooperative movement and cooperative ideas. The government may develop a project and 
organize individuals into cooperatives to implement the project. Small scale coffee producer 
cooperatives and consumer cooperatives (especially in urban areas) are typical examples in this 
respect. For example, to protect small hold coffee farmers against checks with insufficient cover 
and to encourage and to control the coffee export (which is the major source of foreign currency 
for the Government) the Government has organized farmers into primary cooperatives and 
cooperative unions.
43
 Similarly to fight inflation and to control the price and distribution of basic 
goods
44
the Government has been organizing consumers into consumer cooperatives.
45
 
Housing Cooperatives are also initiated by the Government to reduce the burden of 
administration. Housing cooperatives are essentially a mechanism for collective filing of urban 
land requests. Indeed, I have personal experience of ‘housing cooperatives’ having been a 
member of the Dirshaye Housing Coops Ltd established in Hawassa in 2004. As it has been the 
                                                             
41
Legesse (n 27); See also our discussion of the Government using cooperatives as policy instruments in Chapter 
Seven. 
42 See our discussion under Chapter One 
43Interview with Gadissa Eda’a, Ayele Bedane, Girma Regassa,‘ Interview with the Finance Head, Certificate 
Officer and Head of Legal Services at Oromia Coffee Farmers’ Cooperative Union’ (8 March 2013) Unpublished 
44For the definition of basic goods/service see Trade Practice and Consumers’ Protection Proclamation No. 
685/2010 <http://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/685-ae.pdf> accessed 30 January 2015, Art 2(1),46  and 55. 
45Tesfaye Matewos, ‘Interview with the Cooperative Societies’ Organization and Registration Officer at the 
Marketing and Cooperatives Office of the Hawassa City Administration’ (25 June2014) Unpublished; Fikre Mekuria 
and Mierab  Kolfe,‘ Interview with the Board Chairpersons of the Consumers’ Cooperative Union Ltd’ (5 August 
2014) Unpublished; Mulugeta Mengistu, ‘Interview with the Head, Promotion and Development at the Work-
Process Main Unit in the Cooperative Promotion and Development Sector of the Trade and Industry Bureau of the 
Addis Ababa City Administration’ (3 August 2014) Unpublished  
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case in all other housing cooperatives this was established by the request, if not order, of the 
Municipality. Based on such demand from the municipality, individuals who were interested in 
accessing land on smooth line
46
 took the initiative and did the following. First, they collected 
draft by-laws from Cooperative Department, Agriculture Bureau, State of Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and People. Second, they listed down twenty-four individuals who wanted to 
become a member. Thirdly, they called a general meeting. In the meeting organizers did two 
things; one, got each member’s signature on the already prepared minute; two, they ordered each 
member to deposit in the cooperative’s blocked  bank account four thousand birr(the amount 
fixed in advance by the Municipality as construction capacity indicator
47
) to be opened after the 
signature of the minute in the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia. Fourthly, got the registration of the 
cooperative by showing the minutes of the ‘general meeting’ and a bank statement that indicated 
the deposited amount. And finally, they got the urban land lease holding title deed and 
possession of the land from the municipality without paying the land lease price. After the land 
was obtained the land was divided among members and each individual took responsibility for 
constructing a house of his own design and size. A member  who completed a certain percentage 
of construction required as a condition for release of the money deposited in the blocked account, 
would automatically get an individual title deed for the land he already possessed. At no point is 
there a fund owned by the cooperative. There is no reason to treat such an arrangement as true 
cooperative. It is simply a simpler way of administering land titles.  
The current housing cooperatives that have been receiving lease-price-free urban land in the state 
of Amhara
48
 do not show any difference from their predecessors. The housing cooperatives in 
Addis Ababa are expected to pay the full cost of construction in advance even before they 
receive the ownership and the possession of the house. The house would normally be constructed 
by the government. It is difficult to call such associations   ‘cooperatives’ since they are united 
only by the deposit of money and ownership is transferred to the cooperative and then transferred 
to individual members. It is nothing but an unnecessary channel through which money passes 
from an individual to the Government and ownership passes from the Government to individuals. 
                                                             
46 There were individuals who made request for urban land on individual basis and got positive response. Put this in 
the text 
47Although there is no express legal requirement in the Urban Land Lease Law both state and federal governments 
in Ethiopia do not allow urban land holding unless they believe that the would be land holder has enough money to 
construct the necessary construction on the land. 
48 Other states do not seem to give lease-price-free urban land to ‘housing cooperatives.’ 
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It is also worth noting that housing cooperatives are not expected to serve the lower and middle 
income earners. They are intended for the petty bourgeoisie so that they may not be a burden on 
the State in accessing residential houses. The Government has already taken the responsibility to 
resolve the residential housing problems of lower and middle income earners. The Ethiopian 
Housing project seems to classify house seekers into four categories on the basis of their 
financial capacity; those who can afford both market lease price and market construction 
price(obtain land through auction and make their own construction or purchase house from real 
estate), those who afford advance payment of full construction cost but wait for the Government 
to construct them (housing cooperatives), those who pay in advance forty percent of the 
construction cost, those who pay in advance twenty percent of the construction cost and those 
who pay in advance ten percent of the construction cost. So, housing cooperatives, in their 
current sense, are far from the idea of true cooperatives. In true housing cooperatives the 
cooperative construct the houses and own them or at least transfers the ownership to the 
members. 
Lack of Cooperation 
Most cooperatives in Ethiopia have been established at local level and are usually small.
49
Most 
saving and credit cooperatives have been established within a limit of a premise of an employer 
of members of a cooperative.
50
 That means saving and credit cooperatives are usually established 
by employees and their members are mostly employees working for the same employer. 
Therefore, unless there is a forum that brings together these scattered and isolated movements in 
the spirit of cooperation, the cooperative movement will not have the necessary momentum to 
mature and develop principles. Cooperation would be possible if cooperatives were strictly 
committed to the principles of cooperation. Then they would be able to create an apex 
organization that might further facilitate cooperation between the different groups. 
However, cooperatives in Ethiopia seem uninterested in this.
51
There are a lot of cooperatives that 
have profit maximization motives and these cooperatives are usually less willing to bind 
                                                             
49Legesse (n 27) 
50 Ibid 
51Mekuria (n 45); Ibid 
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themselves to cooperative principles unless there are clear economic benefits.
52
Moreover, 
members of cooperative management boards stake little importance on principles.
53
 There has 
also been misunderstanding and disagreement as to whether cooperation could be possible 
among different types of cooperatives (producer, consumer or worker) and even among 
cooperatives in different sectors of the economy(e.g. coffee, dairy, traditional mining, weaving, 
etc).
54
This lack of cooperation has also resulted in the absence of apex organizations.
55
 
The Government’s leadership of the cooperative movement has also been the major reason for 
absence of apex. The government does not seem to show a desire to deal with larger and more 
organized cooperatives for fear that such cooperatives would easily escape its control.
56
Even in 
cases where cooperative consensus is established to create an apex organization at regional or 
national level, the Government repeatedly refuses to register the organization.
57
The Government 
wants to remain the only apex organization. More surprisingly, the Federal Cooperative Agency 
has been representing Ethiopian cooperative movement in the international cooperative 
movements.
58
 As a result cooperation has been practically possible only in the zonal level in the 
form of a cooperative union.
59
  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
52Ibid 
53Legesse (n 27)  
54 Ibid; This misunderstanding could also be attributed to lack of awareness of cooperative ideology. As far as there 
is consensus on principles of cooperatives the sector of the economy or even the types of the cooperatives is less 
important for cooperation. Comments like this should either be in the main text or not here at all. 
55Ibid 
56Tesfaye Wami, ‘Interview with the Legal Advisor and Promoter of Inspection, Audit and Legal Services at the 
Work-Process Main Unit in the Cooperative Promotion and Development Sector of the Trade and Industry Bureau 
of the Addis Ababa City Administration (4 August 2014) Unpublished 
57Mekuria (n 45); Legesse(n 27); Michael Ayalew, ‘Senior Legal Expert of the Federal Cooperative Agency’(24 
February 2014) Unpublished  
58Legesse(n 27)  
59
An exception to this is only the Oromia Coffee Farmers’ Cooperative Union Ltd. Zone is the third from bottom up 
or second from up down in Ethiopian geopolitical administrative structure. It is equivalent to sub-city in the case of 
the City Government. 
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B.  Absence of state regulations of cooperatives in Ethiopia 
In Ethiopia, although the Government uses cooperatives as policy instruments and, believes that 
cooperatives are partly dependent on the Government,
60
 there is no legal framework that 
authorizes the Government to interfere with their internal affairs. 
Cooperative principles without legal effect  
Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 provides principles, however, the consequence 
of the violation of these principles is unclear. Although it could be argued that a proclamation is 
a law and the Government has the constitutional duty to enforce all laws of the State,
61
 such an 
argument would be weak because there is no provision in Ethiopian cooperatives law that 
implicates any administrative measure against the violation. The only measure the Government 
may take is refusal to register those cooperatives that fails to include the principles in their 
constitution.
62
 
 
One may argue that interested persons may apply to the court to force the cooperatives to adhere 
to the principles. However, this is difficult, if not impossible, for at least three reasons. The first 
problem is uncertainty about who the interested person is and who the responsible person is.
63
 In 
case of the principle of open membership the interested person may be those whose application 
for membership was rejected by a cooperative. But in case of other principles such as 
                                                             
60According to the Government the reason why cooperatives are partially dependent on the government is because 
they are not mature enough to be autonomous. Until they are mature enough, the Government is serving them as 
guardian and tutor. On the other hand the cooperator believes that since the government has unable to solve some 
economic problems it has requested the cooperatives to help solve the problem. one thing that both the Government 
and cooperators agree to are; cooperatives are partly dependent and they will be fully autonomous; Mengistu (n 45); 
Wami(n 56); Mekuria (n 45) 
61 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1995 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5a84.html> accessed 30 January 2015, Art 77(1); However; some may take 
the view of Hans Kelsen about the meaning of law. According to him law is an order of a superior official to the 
inferior official. This means the law exists only if the official wants its enforcement. Otherwise we have to assume 
as if it has not been written. 
62 Council of Ministers’ Regulation No.106/2004 
<http://www.joptc.gov.et/joptc/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=0GpIFfh5Zzs%3d&tabid=109&portalid=0&mid=535&lan
guage=en-US&forcedownload=true> accessed 30 January 2015, Art 14(a) 
63 No person may be a plaintiff unless he has a vested interest in the subject-matter of the suit.  No person may be a 
defendant unless the plaintiff alleges some claim against him. See the Civil Procedure Code of the Empire of 
Ethiopia of 1965<http://www.ras-
tafari.com/documents/EN_Civil_Procedure_Code_of_the_Empire_of_Ethiopia_1965.pdf> accessed 30 January 
2015, Art 33(2) and 33(3) 
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voluntariness (assisting each other & self-responsibility), democratic control, autonomy, 
cooperation and sustainable development
64
 a cooperative may be unable to adhere to the 
principles due to the acts or position of individual members. For example, those who hold more 
shares may influence those who hold fewer shares and neutralize the principle of democratic 
control. The cooperative is interested in maintaining democratic control but is at the same time 
responsible for failure to create an environment that nurtures democracy. Similarly a member is 
responsible either for influencing or being influenced. The law does not clearly indicate 
voluntariness (assisting each other and self-responsibility) as a legal duty of members. 
 
The second problem is the incomplete recognition of cooperative principles by the Ethiopian 
Cooperative laws. The principle of surplus distribution on the basis of share capital and the 
possibility of inviting capitalists into membership cloud democracy. The vaguely regulated 
government assistance, especially access to land and loan, affects the interpretation of principle 
of autonomy.
65
 In short, the vagueness of the law, combined with low level of rule of law in the 
country, makes individual legal action difficult.  
 
The third problem is the nature of cooperatives. Cooperatives by their nature do not depend very 
much on contract law and legal professionals. They depend on voluntariness and cooperation. 
The ethics of individual members is the crucial instrument for the enforcement of cooperative 
principles. They are the opposite of investor-owned firms which depend heavily on contract law 
and legal professionals for advice. Legal professionals are more in favour of competition rather 
than cooperation through collective action. That is why the Ethiopian cooperatives law advises 
member or manager to refer disputes to conciliation and arbitration.
66
 So, the judicial system 
                                                             
64Although there is environmental impact assessment and control agency that ensure that investors adhere to the 
principle of sustainable development cooperatives could possibly escape the control since they do not need to have 
investment permit and business license to implement their business project. See Cooperative Society Proclamation 
No.147/1998<http://chilot.me/2011/11/22/cooperative-societies-proclamation-no-1471998/> accessed 30 January 
2015, Art 9(6) as amended by Cooperative Societies (amendment) Proclamation 
No.402/2004<http://chilot.me/2011/10/30/copperative-societies-amendment-proclamation-no-402-2004/#more-
2296> accessed 30 January 2015; Environmental Laws of Ethiopia Proclamation No.295/2002<http://phe-
ethiopia.org/resadmin/index.php?attachment=40> accessed 30 January 2015, Art 6(5), and Environmental Impact 
Assessment Proclamation No. 299/2002<http://phe-ethiopia.org/resadmin/index.php?attachment=41> accessed 30 
January 2015, Art 3(3) 
65Special privileges of cooperatives are discussed in Chapter Three, Section 3.1 
66 See Ethiopian Cooperative Law Art 46 as amended by Proclamation No. 402/2004 (n 64) 
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would contribute less to enforce cooperative principles. Also, many legal professionals prefer to 
leave cooperatives to self-regulate.
67
 
Indiscriminate special privileges   
Ethiopian cooperative law recognizes many special privileges for cooperatives. However, since 
such privileges are given to everybody registered as a cooperative, and the definition of 
cooperatives is not precise enough,
68
 it is impossible to limit such privileges to true cooperatives 
or cooperatives that serve as policy instruments of the Government.  
In practice, the distinction is more difficult. For example, an informal interviewee, an officer 
who was in duty to register cooperatives in Hawassa City Administration in 2011, asserted that 
the important matters to be registered as cooperative were the number of members (the number 
should be more than ten) and the decision of the members to be registered as a cooperative.
69
 
According to this interviewee, it is up to the members to decide to be registered either as an 
investor-owned firm, a cooperative, or even as a charity. In another formal interview in June 
2014, another employee in the same position claimed that membership in cooperatives is 
possible only for low and middle income earners although members are not required to prove 
their income.
70
 The absence of proof of income
71
 and the fact that cooperatives in general and 
consumer cooperatives in particular are non-discriminatory on the basis of the economic 
condition make the criteria to be ineffective and unacceptable. Furthermore, the criteria have 
nothing to do with blocking profit-seekers, what it blocks is the rich, if it can. In Addis Ababa, 
                                                             
67Wami(n 56); In a public discussion held on Proclamation No.147/1998 (n 64) the drafting committee members 
were asserting that the cooperative principles indicated in the law are not legally binding on the cooperatives; it is up 
to them to accept or reject. These committee members were even claiming that the Proclamation No.147/1998 as a 
whole is not binding unless approved by regional governments. 
የ ህ ብረ ትስ ራማህ በ ራትን ለ ማቋቋምበ ተዘ ጋ ጀ ረ ቂቅአ ዋጅላ ይ የ ተደ ረ ገ የ ህ ዝብይ ፋ ዉይ ይ ትቃለ ጉ ባ ኤህ ዳር  2 ቀን   
1991 ዓ /ም ገ ጽ  4 ና  5 
68 See Chapter Three,Section 3.2 
69 This interview was made while this researcher and other five individuals were discussing to establish a fishing 
farm and were arguing on the form of ownership of the farm. Although all the members were academic staff 
members of Hawassa University and intended to maximize profit they except this researcher were preferring 
cooperative form of ownership and the interviewee supported their preference. However; the farm failed for other 
reasons. 
70Matewos(n 45)  
71Which is in fact impossible or at least inconvenience due to absence of definition of the income level in Ethiopia 
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residence is the only criteria.
72
 The abolition of worker cooperatives in Addis Ababa resulted 
from the lack of clear guidelines to stop profit-seekers using cooperatives.
 73 
Cooperative Commission power limited   
Although there are Government agencies that are concerned with cooperatives the duty of these 
agencies is limited to supporting cooperatives. For example, the powers and duties of the Federal 
Cooperative Commission are to:
74
 
 Formulate and draft cooperative policies and laws suitable for the activities and 
development of cooperatives. 
 Encourage cooperatives to adhere to Cooperatives law and established international 
principles for cooperatives. 
 Organize and supervise Government owned cooperative training institutes. 
 Disseminate cooperative ideology. 
 Register cooperatives in the federal level. 
 Audit and inspect federal cooperatives. 
 Search market for cooperatives. 
 Provide professional and technical support to cooperatives. 
 Assist regional cooperative agencies. 
 Facilitate cooperation in the regional and international level. 
 Formulate and distribute model by-laws of societies. 
The supervision and audit is limited to protecting the property of cooperatives against 
embezzlement. The Government inspector checks the existence of necessary management 
organs, office organization, staffs and materials, meetings and records.
75
But they are limited to 
                                                             
72Mengistu(n 45) 
73
Birke Melaku, ‘Interview with the Cooperative Promotion and Development Coordinator’ (4 August 2014) 
Unpublished; Abinet Melese, ‘Interview with the Senior Cooperative Promoter in the Cooperative Promotion and 
Development Work-Process Main Unit of the Trade and Industry Sector in Arada Sub-City of the Addis Ababa City 
Administration’(4 August 2014) Unpublished 
74
Cooperative Commission Establishment Proclamation No. 274/2002 
<http://www.fsc.gov.et/resources/Negarit%20Gazeta/Gazeta-1994/Proc%20No.%20274-
2002%20Cooperatives%27%20Commission%20Establishment.pdf> accessed 30 January 2015, Art5 (emphasis 
added) 
75Wami(n 56) 
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giving comments to the management committee and reporting their findings to the 
Commission.
76
The commission may send an auditor who also give comment to the cooperative 
and report his findings to the commission.
77
 If the auditor’s finding shows some form of 
corruption, the commission would institute a court action against those responsible.
78
 
Principle of autonomy  
Ethiopian cooperative law expressly recognizes the principle of autonomy.
79
 Moreover, many 
employees of cooperative agency repeatedly reinforce the claim of cooperative autonomy. They 
claim that anything that the Government does to or for cooperatives is merely supportive and 
their internal affairs are left to the cooperatives to themselves. This claim of autonomy, however, 
contradicts the Government plan (however ultimately unsuccessful) of using cooperatives as a 
policy instrument. If the Government cannot control cooperatives, at least in some form, it is 
difficult (if not impossible) to direct them to that intended mission and goal. Moreover, this 
claim of autonomy encourages rent seekers to misdirect the special privileges of cooperatives for 
unintended purposes and Government officials may also avoid their responsibility of giving 
special privileges for unintended purposes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
76 Ibid 
77 Ibid 
78 Ibid 
79 See Chapter Four 
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8.3 Conclusion  
This chapter is our last attempt to find important points that distinguish cooperative from 
investor-owned firms in Ethiopian Legal System but our attempt is unsuccessful. 
In chapter one, we distinguished cooperatives from investor-owned firms on the basis of the 
ultimate motives. Cooperatives have not-for-profit ultimate motives whereas the ultimate end of 
an investor-owned firm is profit-maximization. In chapter two, we saw that the cooperative form 
of organization does not necessary involve not-for-profit motives. Here it was argued there 
should be other criteria to keep cooperatives distinct from investor-owned firms. What that 
criterion might be was discussed in chapter three to eight together with further discussion of the 
immense privileges which are available to cooperatives but are not available to other form of 
economic organizations. We have analyzed definition, the objectives and principles of 
cooperatives and ownership and management in chapter three, four, and five under the 
Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998. However, it appears that there is little here to 
distinguish cooperatives from investor-owned firms. Then we resorted to policy analysis with the 
hope that the Government policy objective of cooperatives may be different from investor-owned 
firms. It is not.  In chapter seven and eight examined practice to see if that might reveal a 
distinction. In chapter seven we examined what Cooperatives in Ethiopia are actually doing and 
we found out that although the government is trying to use them as policy instruments they are 
profit-maximizing economic organizations.  
In this last chapter, chapter eight, we looked at the regulation of cooperatives and found out that 
cooperatives in Ethiopia are essentially unregulated. One of the important points that distinguish 
cooperatives from investor-owned firms is that cooperatives should always be regulated. 
Historically, self-regulation has been inherent to the character of cooperatives. State regulation 
may also exist.  
Self-regulation is possible when individual members have strong motives for cooperation, when 
for example they have seen the value in collective action to solve individual problems.  
However, in Ethiopia individuals are not allowed the responsibility to solve their own problems 
in their own way. It is the state that solves the problems in its own way.  
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In its effort to solve economic problems the Government has also been utilizing cooperative 
forms of organization. This means the Government has taken center stage in cooperative 
formation. This has seriously affected the emergence of a commitment and belief in the ideas of 
cooperativism. The absence of cooperative ideas also negatively affects cooperation acting 
together. Cooperation between cooperatives reinforces commitment, knowledge and motivation 
to cooperate. Motivation, then, leads to self-regulation. 
In the absence of self-regulation we might expect state regulation. However the Ethiopian 
Government declines to regulate cooperatives. Cooperative principles without legal effect, 
indiscriminate special privileges, the limited power of cooperative commission and the 
recognition of principle of autonomy are indicators of little or non-existent state regulation. 
Generally, this research indicates that the Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 as it 
stands is almost a repetition of the Commercial Code. Moreover, generally the cooperatives 
operating currently in Ethiopia are ‘like’ investor-owned firms. Both the law and the practice in 
Ethiopia do not a warrant separate legal regime for cooperatives and investor-owned firms. If the 
separation between cooperatives and investor-owned firms is to continue, cooperatives should 
limit themselves to community building as their ultimate motive. The next two chapters show 
why we need to rebuild community and why the cooperatives would be the best to the task. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
TRUST AND ITS DECLINE 
 
9.0 Introduction  
This chapter intends to prove that trust, which is a foundation of rule of law, has been 
diminishing due to a decline in religion and community.  This is with the aim of searching for 
ultimate not-for-profit objectives that keep cooperatives distinct from investor owned firms. In 
Chapter One and Eight we have seen that cooperative have lost their traditional ultimate 
objectives and as a result have been led to profit-maximizing motive and lack of self regulation. 
In order to prove the logical coherence of the above claims, the chapter is divided into five sub-
topics. The first sub-topic proves that trust is the minimum universal morality requirement for 
human harmony.  The second sub-topic indicates how important trust is for individuals and 
institutions emphasizing the place of trust in the enforcement of law. The third and the fourth 
sub-topic show that trust has been declining due to decline in religion, moral objectivism and 
community.  
Although human relations are basically dependent on some form of trust, this fundamental 
assumption has been gradually declining. The major causes of this are the decline of religion, 
morality and community. In the past, people used to value trust because to be trusted was a 
religious or moral or customary duty. A person who failed to be trustworthy would be punished 
by God or his own conscience or by the community. But now, due to the rise of science, 
considerable sections of the modern society have already become atheists and moral norms have 
become subjective. Moreover, industrialization and urbanization resulted in high mobility of 
individuals and led to the declining of communities.  
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9.1  Trust and its role in human relationship 
 A. Concept of Trust 
Trust is “the expectation held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal, or 
written statement of another person or group can be relied upon.”1 Trust is a confident belief or 
strong hope that a person who has given his words to another would honor his words or that what 
he claims is what he really means and intends to do. This further means that there has been an 
agreement between ‘trustor’ (an individual or group that trust) and a target (a person or a group 
is trusted). The agreement necessarily imposes an obligation on the target. If the target does not 
have an obligation emanating out of the agreement there is no issue of trust. When the agreement 
imposes obligation on both parties to the agreement then trust becomes a mutual issue, both sides 
of the party depend on one-another’s trustworthiness.  
Trust relates either to the ability or the value congruence of the target.
2
The ability of the target 
relates to “the perceptions of the competence, skill, or ability of the target in the performance of 
a task; and value congruence is the moral, ethics, integrity, and value orientation of the target.”3 
Our concern here is with value congruence. The point that makes trust very indispensable is the 
non-existence of a scientific mechanism or at least too much inconvenience of such mechanism 
to make sure that the target honors his words. If there has been any scientific mechanism which 
would conveniently applied to know what is really going inside the mind of human being or what 
a target claims is right or wrong trust is unimportant. For example, citizens do not have 
convenient scientific mean to know whether or not the politician running for office really intends 
to honor election campaign claims, whereas it is possible for an employer to prove the agreed 
upon expertise of an employee. Thus trust is relying on moral integrity of the target.  
Although there is no scientific mechanism for verifying this, "moral integrity may be inferred 
from a rational calculation based on some criteria of evaluation (cognitive) and social 
                                                             
1Olugbenga Ladebo, ‘Perceptions of Trust and Employees' Attitudes: A Look at Nigeria's Agricultural Extension 
Workers’(2006) 20(3) Journal of Business and Psychology 411  
2Ammeter, Douglas, Ferris and Goka, ‘A Social Relationship of Trust and Accountability in Organizations’ 
(2004)14 Human Resource Management Review 47-65 
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identification and empathy or affective processes.”4The cognitive trust is an objective, rational, 
and methodical evaluation by a trustor concerning a target as being trustworthy.
5
 Affective trust 
is believed to be subjective in nature because it relates to the feelings, mood or emotions that a 
trustor has concerning the target as being trustworthy.
6
A relationship may progress over a period, 
from that based on a cognitive trust to a point where the trusting parties develop a mutual 
emotional interest in each other (affective trust).
7
 
B. No Trust No Human Relation 
Thomas Hobbes explains that it is in the nature of human being to be in conflict even where there 
is a difference in strength and power. For example, strong individuals may be defeated by the 
weak when the strong fall asleep. The fact that human beings have the mental ability to design 
ways and techniques that enable to create inconvenience to his enemies maintains a certain 
balance of power.
8
 The other nature of human being is egoism. With this balance of power, 
rationality and selfishness, human being is destined to live in the planet where there is resource 
scarcity, argues Hobbes. This scarcity opens a room for fierce competition for resources where 
no one would be in a better position to defeat the other.  
Unless there is some way of controlling this competition human being would live in a permanent 
state of war. “This logic of natural conflict has frequently been assimilated to the game-
theoretical model of the prisoner’s dilemma.”9 Human beings have a rational ability to be out of 
this dilemma and can easily recognize that “everyone would be better off if they were all to 
refrain from attacking one another.”10 However, individuals would not be sure whether the other 
could also refrain from attacking.
11
 So in addition to recognizing the importance of respecting 
                                                             
4Sally Atkinson and David Butcher, ‘Trust in Managerial Relationships’ (2003)18(4) Journal of Managerial 
Psychology 282-304 
5 Mark Hansen, John Morrow, and Juan Batista, ‘The Impact of trust on Cooperative Membership Retention, 
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Review41-59 
6 Ibid 43 
7Ferda Erdem and Janset  Ozen, ‘Cognitive and Affective Dimensions of Trust in Developing Team Performance’ 
(2003) 9(5) Team Performance Management 131-135 
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9Patricia Springborg(ed)The Cambridge Companion to Hobbe’s Leviathan(1st edition, Cambridge University Press, 
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the right of others, individuals want assurance that the other would equally refrain from 
attacking.  The concept of social contract emanates from this desire to get assurance about how 
individuals behave in their relation with other fellow individuals. In a social contract all 
individuals agree to refrain from attacking one another. 
 
For Thomas Hobbes, the agreement to refrain from attacking one another means that individuals 
agree to delegate their natural right of self-defense to an absolute monarch. They agree that the 
monarch has every power necessary to stop individuals from attacking one another. According to 
Hobbes, individuals, if left to their own will, could never honor the terms of the social contract; 
individuals distrust each other and there is no logical reason to trust each other. Hobbes’ theory 
was criticized for applauding dictatorship but we need to notice that it is the lack of trust between 
individual that forced him to recognize absolutism. So lack of trust may be a cause of tyrant rule. 
Without postulating trust, the formation and effectiveness of the absolute government itself is 
questionable. It is very difficult to see the rationality of delegating one’s natural right to a tyrant 
than to remain in the state of nature unless there is a trust on the tyrant that he would 
benevolently give back at least some of the natural rights. This means if there is no trust there 
would not be social contract. That is probably why absolute monarchial governments have been 
upholding the religion of the majority of their subjects or have been converting the majority of 
their residents into the religion they already upheld as state religion. The subjects would trust that 
the absolute monarch would show them benevolence at least to the bare minimum, for fear that 
God would punish him both in this world and after death for any injustice he would do to his 
subjects. To consolidate the trust of the subjects, religious fathers of the state religion preaches to 
the subjects that state is divine creation and the absolute monarch is the delegate of God.  Even if 
the state may be formed by coercion,
12
 it is still difficult, if not impossible, to run the state 
apparatus if the majority of the personnel are absolutely untrustworthy.   
                                                             
12There are various theories on the origin of state this research postulates social contract theory (state emerges out of 
the free will decision of individuals to cooperate with each other) due to its contemporary dominance.. Other major 
theories are: natural theory-state is the dictate of nature revealed to human being through reasoning; divine theory –
the state is the divine creation to carry out God’s will on earth ;patriarchal theory – the state developed out of family 
relation; psychological theory- state emanates due to the psychological desire of some human beings to rule and 
others to be ruled; theory of historical materialism- state is the result of economic class struggle. See Aleksander 
Sheptulin, Marxist-Leninist Philosophy(2nd edition, Progress Publishers, 1978) 390-410 
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Unlike Thomas Hobbes, John Locke on the other hand postulates the existence of trust between 
individuals to develop his theory of social contact.
13
 Such postulate enabled him to come up with 
democratic form of government that recognizes the sovereignty of the people. Locke postulates 
trust because he believes that human being has a moral integrity that would serve as basis for 
trust. “His bedrock premise is that a divine power exists in the universe.”14 This divine power has 
a will regarding our action and it has communicated his will to us through the Bible and enforces 
such will with rewards and punishments after death.
15
 Moral integrity is the Biblical obligation 
of individuals. Duty of moral integrity ensures trust. This trust further ensures the enforceability 
of social contract. In short Locke believes that religion ensures moral integrity and moral 
integrity in turn insures trust and trust then ensures rule of law.  
Other social theories also presuppose the existence of trust although they may not necessary 
evoke religion as a foundation. For example, Rawls’ theory of Justice postulates that individuals 
would honor what they have agreed upon in the “veil of ignorance.”16 Marxists also believe that 
any people’s collective action requires that all members of society should observe certain 
elementary rules of behaviour without which the existence of human society is 
inconceivable.
17
In practice also research has indicated that human relations are difficult, if not 
impossible, without trust.
18
Trust functions as  “a deep assumption underwriting social order.”19 
“It is the mutual ‘faithfulness’ on which all social relationships ultimately depend.”20 It is more 
basic for the constitution of solidary groups than even a sense of moral obligation.
21
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
13 Greg Froster, John Locke’s Politics of Moral Consensus(Cambridge University Press, 2005) 31, 70 and 167 
14Ibid 
15Ibid 31-32 
16John Rawls, Political Liberalism(Columbia University, 1993)49 
17
Sheptulin (n 12) 457 
18Olugbenga(n1) 409 
19David Lewis and Andrew Weigert, ‘Trust as a Social Reality Social Forces’(1985) 63(4) Social Forces 967 
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9.2 The benefits of trust 
In the preceding sub-topic, we saw that trust is the foundation of human relations and that brings 
many benefits such as the emergence networks. Networks produce norms, further trust, and 
further networks.
22
These can be used as a springboard to improve educational performance, 
economic and health betterment, and prevention of crime
23
and in serving as a basis for the rule 
of law. Such benefits serve the network members, the community at large and the state. 
A. Improving educational performance  
There is a close relation between people’s social network and their educational performance.24 
Children whose parents have strong social connection usually show better educational 
performance than children whose parents have weak social connection.
25
 Parents’ strong social 
connection reduces the possibility of their children’s school dropout and increases the possibility 
of better achievement, reading attainment and scientific literacy.
26
 
The connection between social network and educational performance of children is 
commonsensical knowledge. There is high possibility that the persons with whom the parents 
have close relationship may help the children directly or indirectly such as providing or at least 
pinpointing relevant materials to be read or persons to be consulted on the matter. Such people 
may sometimes be experts in certain areas and may help the children with very less effort. 
Children also need role models and family connection helps them to get these role models. More 
importantly the ultimate end of education is to enable human being to understand his physical 
and human environment. Human interaction would help students to understand such matters very 
easily. The interaction created by the network would serve as a laboratory to identify problems 
and to prove the theories they learn in formal schools. The parents could also learn from peoples 
in the network on ways of leading their children to success. 
Knowledge is obtained both formally and informally one supplementing the other. Those 
individuals (children or adults) who acquire good informal knowledge could easily be successful 
                                                             
22John Field, Social Capital(2nd edition, Routledge, 2008) 34 
23 Ibid 49 
24 Ibid 55 
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in her formal learning and the vise versa. After all, education is nothing more than the process of 
acquiring skill and information. Human relations are sources of informal knowledge. Traditional 
communities have been transferring knowledge in the informal way. Therefore, networks 
provide individuals with the opportunity to get information and hence enhance learning. 
B. Economic Performance 
Trust is a key economic factor.
27
 Trust is crucial element of economic development because 
widespread distrust in society imposes a kind of tax on all forms of economic activities a tax that 
high trust societies do not have to pay.
28
 Countries with high trust have less cost of production as 
compared to countries with low trust. Without trust economic transactions would get 
complicated.
29
 The late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles  Zenawi, emphasized the importance 
of trust in the economy as follows:
30
 
“Imagine, everyone having to take everyone else to court in order to enforce a 
contract. Even if it were possible to completely specify a contract and verify 
exactly whether it has been fulfilled, it would be very expensive and time 
consuming to go to court in order to enforce every contract. Where a credit 
culture that ensures that loans are generally repaid is lacking, very high 
uncertainty about loan repayment would inhibit extensive economic interaction.” 
Contract is the basis of economic transaction. Human language is incapable of 
completely specifying the content of contracts. As a result contact interpretation depends 
on “good faith having regard to the loyalty and confidence which should exist between 
the parties according to business practice.”31Trust reduces transaction costs.32 
In addition to the macro level, trust could also gives benefits at the micro and 
intermediate levels. Research has indicated that many workers find their job through 
                                                             
27Munir Quddus, Michael Goldsby and Mahmud Farooque, ‘Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity’  
Book in Review ’(2000) 26(1) Eastern Economic Journal 88  
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personal contacts.
33
This is true particularly when there is high unemployment. This is 
because employment through connection would enable the employer to reduce the 
uncertainty about the qualification, ability, and trustworthiness of the employee. 
Moreover, cost of employment would be kept to the minimum especially for small firms 
both by demanding no or very low vacancy advertisement cost and employment 
procedures and by keeping turnover to a low level.
34
 “Networks have long been seen as 
important to business success.”35 
C. Health Improvement 
According to Emile Durkheim, one of the pioneers in development of modern sociology, suicide 
rate is high in a society where there are low social network and common norms.
36
 Moreover, 
research has shown that people with strong social networks have lower mortality rates than those 
with weak social ties.
37
 People with more social capital are likely to live longer and suffer from 
fewer health disorders.
38
 This is because social networks can furnish tangible material assistance 
that reduces financial stress.
39
Moreover, networks can reinforce healthy norms which would 
distance individuals from consumption of narcotic drugs which negatively affect health.
40
 
Networks also enable friendship and affections which can be resorted to in times of distress. A 
well-networked citizen can better lobby for medical service by the government, philanthropists 
or in the community itself.
41
 There are also medical evidences that show that interaction with 
people stimulates body’s immune system.42 
D. Reducing Crime 
“One of the pernicious consequences of declining social capital in the United States, according to 
Putnam, is increased crime.”43 Disorganized communities are characterized by high rates of 
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economic deprivation, residential instability, and population heterogeneity which impede the 
development of both primary and secondary social networks among residents and between 
communities, which in turn reduces a community's capacity to exert social control, especially 
over the behavior of youth.44Social networks form the infrastructure of social capital which 
allows for "the reinforcement of positive standards for youth, offering them access to mentors, 
role models, educational sponsors, and job contacts outside the neighborhood and providing 
emotional and financial support for individuals, and supplying political leverage and volunteers 
for community institutions.
45
 Severed networks and depleted social capital, in contrast, leave 
kids to their own devices, increasing the chances that they will act on short-sighted or self-
destructive impulses.
46
In addition, destructive forms of bonding social capital, such as youth 
gangs, may emerge in response to the general depletion of other forms of bonding and bridging 
social capital.
47
 
E. Serving as a Basis for the Rule of Law 
In our discussion here, the definition of the rule of law is “the subjection of human conduct to the 
governance of legal norms through the operations of a legal system.”48 Legal norm (law) and 
legal system are main elements of this definition. We limit ourselves to the eight qualities of law: 
generality, certainty, consistency, clarity, prospective effect, publicity, plausibility and 
operativity.
49
 A legal system is at least a synergy of legal norms, standards, legal policies, legal 
structures, legal tradition, and legal actors in a given geographical area. 
 
Now imagine rule of law in a situation where it is impossible to trust the legal actors? Is it 
possible? Unless the legal actors (judges, advocates, public prosecutors, police, law professors, 
witness, legislator, executive etc) are trustworthy it is simply rhetoric to take of rule of law. If 
there is no trustworthiness a legislator may have apparent objective which is good and hidden 
objectives which is evil. This affects at least the certainty and even plausibility of the law. 
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For example, some legal professionals describe some of the laws of Ethiopia such as Tax Law, 
Anti-Terrorism Law and Land Law as Wooden Horse of Troy. Apparently the Tax law intends to 
increase the revenue of the country which is acceptable to a reasonable person. The Anti-
terrorism law is apparently intending to fight terrorism, which is still acceptable to everybody 
except the terrorists. However, the legislator might have hidden agenda of enabling the executive 
to weaken and finally destroy its opponents. This conspiracy would be more threatening in 
parliamentary form of government where the legislator and executive have common ground.  
The untrustworthy executive may discriminatorily enforce the legal norms and may give 
apparently reasonable justifications such as lack of enforcement capacity. The judicial institution 
could also be used as an instrument to facilitate the hidden agenda. In addition to this group 
interest, individual interest of the parliamentarians and members of the executive may take center 
stage in the law-making and enforcement. 
50
 
 
It is very difficult, if not impossible, for the public to control such institutionalized 
untrustworthiness because such systems would create a situation where cooperation and 
networking could fail because of lack of trust among the citizens. This means what is being 
enforced is not the legal norm agreed upon through democratic process rather the whim and the 
will of the legislator and executive as institution or individual members of these institutions. This 
is rule of man not rule of law. If members of the lawmakers or executive are untrustworthy, legal 
norms hold little value. 
 
Such hollowness of the legal norms would further affect the smooth maturation of constitutional 
system. Every citizen would believe that the only way to ensure rights is controlling political 
power or at least be affiliated with those on power. There would be no respect for the law. 
Moreover, political compromise would be impossible because compromise exists only if there is 
a trust that parties to the compromise would faithfully adhere to the contents of the 
compromise.
51
 This might have been the main reason why constitutional system is at a very early 
stage in Africa and conflict has ever been ravaging the continent. 
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The trustworthiness of judges, law practitioner, public prosecutor, police, and witnesses are also 
necessary requirements for the rule of law.
52
 The qualification of these legal actors and the 
availability of necessary physical infrastructures may contribute to the rule of law but these 
matters are mere rhetoric, if not dangerous, without moral integrity. Imagine a judge who 
tampers with court records; an advocate who conspires with opponents; a public prosecutor, 
advocate and police who cook up evidences and imagine a witness who is smart enough to tell 
lies. It is quite difficult to control these happenings through formal state machinery.
53
The rule of 
law presupposes that at least the majority of those who are subject to the law are trustworthy. 
 
The rule of law is the only feasible option that the contemporary individual could rely upon for 
survival. In the past, the individual had relied on religion
54
to be sure that his rights would be 
respected by fellow individuals and the state. Religion ensures security in two levels. First, in the 
individual level where the individual believes that the super nature protects him from evil, and 
second, in the state level where the rulers were accountable to the super nature. As a result of this 
accountability kings and queens were considered fountains of justice and anybody who was 
unsatisfied with the laws, decisions and interpretations was entitled to appeal to religious 
fathers.
55
 But now that religion is declining, the state and religion are separate. In a situation 
where there is no religious solution, the rule of Law remains the ultimate solution.  
 
9.3  Bases of trust and its contraction 
Despite its multifaceted importance trust has been contracting. Since the bases of trust are 
religion, morality and community life, it is the shrinking of these bases that has led to the 
contraction of trust. This subtopic shows how religion, morality and community serve as the 
bases of trust and the causes of their shrinking. 
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A. Bases of Trust 
We said that trust is a foundation of human relations. It solders individuals together. It is the 
glue. But where does it come from?  Why the trustor does trust the target and why does the target 
becomes trustworthy?
56
 We can possibly get answers by referring to religion, morality and 
community norms. They are usually mutually inclusive; religion influences the success of 
morality and community norms; morality affects community norms and vise versa. However, the 
three could also stand alone without religion, there may be morality and community norms, and 
without morality, there would be community norm and visa versa. 
 
Religion 
Religion is one of the major sources of trust.
57
 Religious people believe that the supernatural 
power punishes untrustworthy people. They behave trustworthily because they believe that such 
behaviour would be rewarded both in this world and after death.  They also believe, in addition 
to the reward, there is also a punishment for untrustworthy behaviors both in this world and life 
after death. The believers trust others because; in addition to recognizing that others would 
behave trustworthily out of expectation of reward and punishment of the supernatural force they 
believe that the supernatural force safeguards them against untrustworthy individuals.
58
 
 
Morality  
Not all people are religious. Moreover, it does not mean that such atheist individuals are 
necessarily untrusting person or untrustworthy persons. Although there has been disagreement on 
sources and contents of morality, there has been a general consensus that human being is a moral 
animal.
59
Human being has been understood as a creature capable of moral values.
60
 Human 
beings are endowed of mental conscience that defines right and wrong and rewards and punishes 
accordingly. Thus moral nature of human being can be the basis to trust and to be trusted. 
 
                                                             
56 Trust does not necessary mean that the target is actually trustworthy, it simply indicate the tractor’s belief of 
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57Froster(n 13) 
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Community Life 
The fact that contents of morality is the result of either reasoning or human relation and the 
existence of moral skepticism of individuals make community life a source of trust.
61
Rationalists 
believe that although morality and its content is innate in human nature not all individuals are 
capable of discerning it.
62
 Therefore, those who are unable to discern morality need someone 
who does it for them. For example, the early rationalist Plato classify individual into three 
groups, the rational group, the bravery and the producers; the rational group is the one that 
discerns contents of morality to the other two groups. Those who believe that the content of 
morality is the result of social life obviously presuppose community life. Moreover, the fact that 
some do not believe in morality necessitates community life that could control these skeptics or 
else they may be nuisance to human relation- individuals must join hands to control these 
irritants. 
Community institutionalizes norms such as trust since it develops and enforces them.
63
 Through 
socialization the youngsters learn these norms. Through social reward and punishment the adults 
learn to adhere and respect the norms. Through frequent interaction any given social group, large 
community, or even entire society can achieve norm of widespread and transitive trust and 
trustworthiness among individuals who have no prior personal acquaintance with each other 
when they interact.64 Community life is therefore, the place where a person learns trusting others 
and trustworthiness by actually living the life. Such practical life enables members not only 
knowing but also internalizing the norms. Once the norms are internalized the individual 
members act in accordance of these norms even if there may not be social reward or punishment. 
 
A community may use different methods to make the individual members internalize the norms. 
The traditional community has been appealing to religion and beliefs. The community teaches 
that its norms are the ordinance of the supernatural power and violating such ordinance is 
tangling with not only the community but also the supernatural power. The modern community 
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could appeal to reason. This may be persuading an individual that adhering to moral values is the 
issue of individual survival or at least betterment. This is egoistic morality. The community may 
also appeal to the definition of human being. This is to define human being as an animal that 
obey certain moral rules. By this definition to be considered as human it is not enough to have 
intelligent brain and is biped.
65
 This is an appeal to the psychological desire of human being to 
glorify herself.  Community may also appeal to altruism. 
 
B. Declining of Trust  
Trust has been declining. For example the research of Robert Putnam, the prominent American 
social scientist in the area of social capital, has indicated that there has been a significant decline 
in the level of trust in the USA.
66
 The decline has been a matter of commonsense in Ethiopia, it 
is what we experience in our everyday life. Religion, morality and social relations have been 
declining.  
 
Declining of religion 
It is the obvious fact that religion has been declining since sixteenth century. Religious 
sectarianism, scientism and dialectical materialism have been the major factors for its decline. In 
earlier days religion was the business of a political entity, the state. But the emergence of 
sectarianism after sixteenth century led to the emergence of separation of state and religion. In 
addition to taking religion out from state business, sectarianism has also greatly contributed to 
proliferation of atheism. Scientific discoveries have also led many to the belief that science is the 
reliable source of knowledge.  
 
However, more serious and direct attack on religion came from Marx’s dialectical materialism. 
Marxists have vigorously propagated that religion was the result of two spontaneous forces.
67
 
The first force was the natural force. The low level of development of science made human 
beings helpless in their struggle against the spontaneous force of nature and this forced them to 
find a psychological safe harbor.
68
 The second spontaneous force was the social force emerged 
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due to the emergence of propertied class that alienated human being from its labour.
69
 This 
second force makes religion an instrument of exploitation, by the propertied class, the labour of 
the working mass.
70Marxists have concluded that these two forces have limited man’s freedom 
and man has to free himself from these forces. Science would redeem him from spontaneous 
natural forces and communism would redeem him from the spontaneous social forces. If 
redeemed from such forces he would automatically be redeemed from religious limitations. This 
propaganda has deeply affected hundreds of millions of people.
71
 
 
Declining of Morality 
Morality has also been declining. The major causes for declining of morality are scientism and 
social disorganization. Although moral skepticism has existed for long, the emergence of science 
has clouded objective morality. Moral values are not measureable by using scientific 
measurement units. This has opened the room to refute moral judgments as subjective/relative. 
The disintegration of rural community due to industrial revolution also reduced the incubation 
place of objective norms. Religious decline and Marxist’s dismantling of earlier moral values 
also contributed to the declining of morality. Although Marxists were able to destroy many of the 
earlier moral values, they were not able to develop substitute moral values. Rescuing morality 
from collapse into subjectivity appears difficult.  
 
Declining of Community 
By the word ‘community’ we mean the solidarity created by the interaction of peoples of the 
same residence without any formal express prior agreement.
72
 Most traditional communities have 
been formed either on the basis of ethnicity or religion or both. It is a common sense that 
traditional communities have been decaying since the industrial revolution. The French 
Sociologist Emile Durkheim realized its negative consequence and proposed professional 
associations as a substitute.
73
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However, as Durkheim himself recognized, professional associations have not been able to 
substitute the traditional community.
74
 Humanity is not only rational but also emotional. It is 
very difficult for formal associations to satisfy the emotional part of humanity. Even such formal 
associations have been declining in recent times especially in areas where political liberalism has 
taken root. For example, Robert Putman’s research indicated that social connections have been 
declining in the United States.
75
The dominance of communitarian ideology approximately from 
1880s to 1980s might have contributed to reinforce associations and its decline since 1990s 
might implicate the declining of formal association.
76
 
 
Beyond ideological changes there have been concrete factors that contributed to the declining of 
community life. Robert Putnam classifies such factors into contributory and major 
factors.
77
Contributory factors are sheer busyness especially due to the movement of women into 
labour force whereby families do not have enough time to participate in community life and 
‘social mobility.’78 He doubts the urban mobility because his research indicated that despite 
increased home ownership civic participation has still been on the decline.
79
 The main two 
factors are demographic transformation and technological transformation of leisure.
80
 
Demographic factors include fewer marriages, more divorce, fewer children and lower real 
wage.
81
 Married, middle class parents are generally more socially involved than other peoples.
82
 
Larger economic phenomenon such as decreased local markets and increased mega and online 
stores has exacerbated the demographic factors.
83
For Putnam television is the major 
technological factor that affects community participation since TV watching takes time that 
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80Ibid 
81Ibid 
82Ibid 
83Ibid 
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might be used for socializing and it keeps people in their home.
84
 TV also encourages passivity 
and may even tend to create anti-civic tendencies
85
 such as destroying the existing community. 
 
However, Putnam’s analysis does not seem to refer to the traditional community, he seems to be 
referring mainly to associations speculated by Durkheim. The major reason why traditional 
communities have been declining is the rapid urbanization following the industrial revolution. In 
fact, Western countries have almost completed their urbanization process and have reached the 
stage of organized urban life. But African countries, particularly Ethiopia, have been on the 
process of transition from agrarian society to an urban population. As a result of this 
urbanization, the rural community is disintegrating. The urban area is also socially disintegrated 
since the settlers are new comers who have not been well accustomed to this new life and hence 
unable to organize a meaningful community. The urban redevelopment policy of the government 
which displaces old settlers in the center of the towns particularly in Addis Ababa has been an 
additional challenge to settled life in urban areas.
86
 
 
Moreover, Putnam’s claim that urban mobility is of no significant contribution in the declining 
of community life does not seem to be true at least for Ethiopia. Firstly, although there is no 
research in the area, my own personal observation in Hawassa and Addis Ababa indicates that as 
soon as a person becomes an owner of a residential house, which means permanent residence, his 
immediate action is to join the local ‘Edir,’ a community that carries out burial ceremony. He 
also immediately becomes a member of a nearby church or mosque so that he would get access 
to the local morgue. Residential house ownership contributes greatly towards community life.  
 
The other defect of Putnam is his failure to analyze the declining of power of communities. If the 
community becomes of no value there is no valid reason for individuals to join the community. 
Through time communities have lost all their traditional authority over individual residents and 
have become empty. In the past communities used to control local dealers. This was because 
business was mainly in the form of bartering mainly between non-trader local communities. 
                                                             
84 Field (n 22) 115 
85 Ibid  
86 Most of the houses in Addis Ababa are mud-plastered very old wooden shacks constructed without plan and 
internal infrastructure and the government has been replacing some of them with condo houses. 
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Even in the case of cash transactions the traders are individual retailers who were members of the 
community. Thus transaction carried out in the local community was used to be governed not 
only by formal commercial law but also the custom of the community. The community had the 
informal authority to reward or punish parties to the transaction because they were members of 
the community.  
 
But now a days bartering has already died out and retail traders are mostly alien to the 
community. This means any resident who has been offended by the retail trader never gets any 
remedy from the community since the trader is outside of the informal jurisdiction of the 
community. The proliferation of companies in the local trade further exacerbates the challenge 
since companies would serve to curtail and hide the individual responsible; community 
punishment is usually more effective on individuals than companies. Furthermore, since 
companies are usually stronger than the community they may even lobby directly or indirectly 
against customary values of the community and may even work hard to destroy the community.
87
 
Putman recognized the contribution of the decrease of local markets and the increase of mega 
and online stores to the declining of community
88
 but he seems to relate it to the declining of 
interaction between residents. This is in fact right but it is only one side of the problem, he does 
not emphasize the community’s inability to control what is going on. 
 
In addition to commercial transactions, the community has also lost control over the civil 
relations of individuals living in the community. For example, marriage in the past was mainly a 
community matter. Families and the community had a great role in the choice of spouses, on 
conditions of marriage, the wedding ceremony and even in the determination of rights and duties 
of the spouses during the continuation and dissolution of the marriage. But all these powers have 
already been transferred to the formal law and court. The criminal and civil jurisdiction of the 
society has already gone to the state. Generally the customary laws have been completely 
abolished. And, even after being abolished, incessant attacks have been carried against them both 
by the state and other modern institutions, so that they would lose not only the legal basis but 
also the moral basis to which they may appeal to control individual residents. 
                                                             
87 Putnam also sees that TVs may work to destroy community. This implies that companies may use media to 
destroy community. See Field (n 22) 115 
88 See our discussion on page 18 
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The community also lost its power to educate its young generation. In the past education was 
mainly given by the local community in the informal or formal way but now this has become the 
responsibility of a state. This denies the community any chance to educate according to its 
customary laws and moral values and to pass these on to its young generation. Even more the 
state and private run formal education serves as additional instrument to totally discard 
customary norms.
89
 
 
What worries us is not the decaying of customary norms but the inability of the modern system 
to substitute them. In Africa in general, and in Ethiopia in particular, modern laws and the State 
have not been able to substitute for customary norms. The State has serious difficulties in 
enforcing laws and prosecuting either due to infrastructure problem or because of lack of trust. 
The State has also shown glaring weakness in producing, through its modern education, trusting 
and trustworthy citizens. As such communities should be revived to complement and solve some 
of these defects. Communities remain the best place to produce trust. 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
This Chapter shows that lack of trust is a social problem that needs to be addressed. Without trust 
human relation and civilization is unimaginable. Moreover; trust improves educational 
performance of children, increases economic efficiency at all levels, improve individual’s health, 
reduce crime rate, and ensure rule of law. However; trust has been declining due to the declining 
of religion, objective morality and traditional community. The revival of community would 
possibly lead to the revival of trust. 
 
The next Chapter shows how the community could be revived through cooperatives. 
 
                                                             
89 Communists were using everything possible including education and cooperative to discard the preexisting norms 
of all types. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
REBUILDING COMMUNITY THROUGH COOPERATIVES 
 
10.0  Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, we have seen that trust is declining due to the decline in religion, 
morality and community. It has been suggested that to salvage trust, we need to do something to 
stop, or at least to reduce, the decline of religion, morality and community. The primary way this 
can be achieved is to revive community life.  Cooperatives could serve as the best means of 
reviving community. In this chapter, we show that because of the nature of cooperatives, they 
can be utilized to reshape community in-line with traditional community values. 
This Chapter is divided into six sub-topics. The first subtopic indicates the urgency of building 
community in Ethiopia. The second subtopic shows that consumer cooperatives resemble 
traditional community. Cooperatives are relatively unoccupied localized association capable of 
creating strong interaction between residents and originally also designed to create community of 
‘New Moral World.’ The third subtopic shows that cooperatives would be attractive to individual 
residents. The fourth subtopic shows that cooperatives could have a community resembled 
management structure where democratically elected elders are the leaders. The fifth subtopic 
shows that in addition to rebuilding trust at the local level, cooperatives could promote trust 
between communities and serve as a forum for crime prevention, a source of information and a 
method of preserving culture. The final subtopic argues that the state, charities and manufactures 
should limit their involvement with cooperatives as far as possible; with the possible exception 
of delegating powers and providing financial aid.  
Aside from being relatively unoccupied, cooperatives, especially consumer cooperatives, display 
a tendency to strengthen the interaction between individuals. This is because they have a 
common supplier amongst other factors. They could also be used to alter the behaviour of 
resident retail traders and increase their bargaining power against national and transnational 
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companies. Residents in the locality become members of the consumer cooperatives in order to 
benefit from the supply of goods/services of the cooperatives and other benefits.  
Elderly community members are better suited to manage the cooperatives because they are able 
to commit the time needed for the role and have extensive knowledge of local cultures. The 
cooperatives may also directly or indirectly promote the solidarity of the villagers through 
cooperative meetings, creational centers and ceremonies. These combined incidents would 
finally create a strong community that exercises informal control over the residents. The 
Government, NGOs and manufacturers could also help cooperatives to build a stronger 
community. 
10.1 The special urgency to rebuild community in Ethiopia 
Although rebuilding trust by reviving the traditional community through the use of cooperatives 
is necessary, such a task is also urgent for Ethiopia. This is because Ethiopian society is in 
transition.There are five major factors that make the Ethiopian situation urgent and unique; the 
extent of flux in the community, limited state capacity, constitutional issues, the democratization 
process and the immature media. 
Firstly, Ethiopian communities are unstable. Ethiopian society is comprised of hunters, pastoral 
nomads, sedentary agriculturalists and urban dwellers. All these communities are on the process 
of transition. The Government has already started resettling the hunters and the pastoral nomads 
into sedentary agriculture. Urbanization in Ethiopia has been a very recent history and less than 
twenty percent of the population is residing in urban areas. As a result there is rapid migration 
from hunting, pastoral nomads and a sedentary community to urban communities; Ethiopia is in 
the process of urbanizing its population. The modern economic situation pushes for urbanization. 
Moreover, since urban communities are a recent phenomenon in Ethiopia, the communities have 
not yet reached the strength expected of them. Furthermore, the Government’s urban 
redevelopment policy of replacing mud-plastered wooden shacks particularly in Addis Ababa 
has been dismantling the urban community that might have been formed had the redevelopment 
not gone ahead. In short communities in Ethiopia are in a constant flux. This means that the 
traditional community has been disintegrating without any immediate reinforcement of the 
positive principles which the Country would benefit from were they to continue. This is not the 
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case in the Western world. Western communities are almost entirely urban communities with 
less migration to urban areas. Moreover, since urbanization has been a long history in the West, 
the urban community has already been relatively solidified. There is also no massive urban 
redevelopment. 
The second factor that makes the case of Ethiopia urgent when compared to the West, is the 
limited capacity of the state to enforce formal laws. Ethiopia contains around ninety-five million 
people and is considered the second poorest country in the world. This means the country does 
not have enough resources to properly organize state structures and to enforce laws to the 
expected standard. Modern technologies and expertise especially in criminal investigations are 
also lacking. So Ethiopia cannot confidently rely on modern laws, as the state has to delegate 
some of its duties to the local community and to trustworthy individuals. The West is capable of 
organizing the state machinery to the expected standard. 
The third unique part of Ethiopia is the simultaneous constitutional recognition of the rights of 
nations, nationalities and the freedom of residence:  
 
“Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to speak, to write and to 
develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture; and to 
preserve its history.”1 
Similarly every Ethiopian citizen has the freedom to choose his residence and reside without 
Government restriction.
2
 Unless a solution is designed, these two rights could possibly conflict 
and could even lead to political instability.
3
Immigration has the potential to change and develop 
the local language and culture, but this means in turn that the local language and culture is a risk 
of being superseded by new ideas brought by immigrants. This happens because the local 
community is not solid enough to neutralize the influence the new comers and then put them 
under the influence of the local language and culture. Cooperatives would solidify the local 
community. 
 
                                                             
1 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution, Art 39(2)  
2 Art 32 
3 The case of Amhara settlers in Guraferda of SNNP, Benishangul-Gumuz and Western Oromia was a hot political 
issue in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Although land was an apparent issue the real fear has been the possibility of the 
dominance of Amhara language in the areas. 
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The fourth issue that makes community solidarity through cooperatives very urgent is the 
democratization process. Ethiopia has not yet shown significant improvement in her political 
democratization process. This may be related to the social consciousness of the people. 
Therefore, community solidified through the cooperatives may serve as a forum of inculcating 
democratic ideas from the local and grass root level. The community may also serve as an 
apprentice for future leaders to learn and practice democracy.
4
 
 
The fifth issue is the immaturity of the media in Ethiopia. The media is considered as the fourth 
government in western world. Media provides information thereby enabling individual to 
exercises the rights to get sufficient information about his surroundings and village he is living 
in. This is creating networking between individuals both to help and control each other. The 
media provides a forum for public gossiping or twitting about peoples living in their community 
thereby shaping behavior through naming and shaming. For example, the British people have 
practically been able to control the behaviour of their celebrities through naming and shaming. 
However, such a modern source of information is inadequate in Ethiopia. So until such time that 
the media could be available adequately we should stick to the traditional way of information 
communication that is personal and oral communication. Community is the best place for such 
purposes. 
10.2  Cooperatives replicate traditional community 
Consumer cooperatives could be a modern replica of traditional community since it was 
designed in the beginning to build a community of “New Moral World,” and as such it is 
generally an association of residents of the same locality and it is a forum for individual 
interactions. 
 
A. Community of New Moral World 
Robert Owen who began the modern cooperative movement in Britain in the first half of 
nineteenth century designed cooperatives to be a community that produced citizens of good 
                                                             
4Stanley Renshon, ‘Political Leadership as Social Capital: Governing in a Divided National Culture’ (2000) 21(1)  
Political Psychology; 199-226  
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character.
5
He intended the village of cooperatives to replace the old, immoral, competitive world 
with the “New Moral World.”6This idea was taken over by the two successive phases of the 
British cooperative movement-Owenite communities and the Rochdale Society of Equitable 
Pioneers.
7
 The history of the Israeli cooperative movement also indicates that the primary target 
of the cooperative movement was formation of strong Jewish community in the Middle East.
8
 
Cooperatives were also formed in North America for the purpose of building a community of 
new settlers.  In Africa also, the French and the Belgians’ were using cooperatives to build local 
communities that could serve as a basis to develop and disseminate the colonialists’ culture.  
There is also a recent interpretation that Emile Durkheim’s social solidarity would best be 
realized through cooperatives.
9
Cooperatives have been an essential aspect of social integration in 
the peasant communities of East Asia.
10
 Recent community development researches also indicate 
the relevance of cooperatives to build community.
11
 A research made in Italy in 2010 also shows 
that cooperatives would be utilized to dismantle parochialism and clientelism which are the 
major challenges to community development in Italy.
12
 In short, cooperatives have been used to 
build a community. 
 
B. Localized 
One of the major characteristics that distinguish cooperatives from investor owned firms is the 
restriction of membership to local residents. True cooperatives are associations of individuals 
where as investor owned firms are associations of capital. Cooperatives are alternative market 
either for goods and services (producer or consumer cooperatives) or labour (worker 
cooperatives).The accessibility issue of such a market makes cooperatives associations of 
                                                             
5Arnold Bonner, British Cooperation The History, Principle and Organization of the British Cooperative 
Movement(Co-operative Union Ltd, 1961) 10 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid 46 
8Margarett Digby, Cooperatives Land Use: The challenges to traditional cooperation (1st edition, Basil Blackwell, 
1965) 34 
9 Lawrence Black and Nicole Robertson, Consumerism and the Cooperative Movement in Modern British History: 
Taking Stock (Manchester University Press, 2009) 86-100 
10 William Lebra, and Thomas Maretzki, The Community Cooperative in Northern Okinawa Economic 
Development and Cultural Change (1963) 11(3) Part 1 Economic Development and Cultural Change 225-238   
11Wilson Majee and Ann Hoyt, ‘Cooperatives and Community Development: A Perspective on the 
Use of Cooperatives in Development' (2011) 19 Journal of Community 
Practice<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10705422.2011.550260> accessed 10 June2011 48-61 
12Vanna Gonzales, ‘A different kind of social enterprise: social cooperatives and the development of civic capital in 
Italy’ (2010)41(1) Community Development 50–75 
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residents of the same locality. Transporting goods and service has significant costs but capital 
can easily move from place to place with low costs of movement. In short,cooperatives are 
equivalent to traditional markets where the purchasers and the sellers are the local community 
members.  
The idea of community in the New Moral World idea, as discussed in the preceding subtopic, 
also implies that cooperatives are local associations. The Rochdale Society of Equitable 
Pioneers, which has been a model of many modern cooperatives in all corners of the world, was 
also established by residents of the same locality. In congruence with this character of 
cooperatives, the Ethiopian Cooperatives Law also provides that cooperatives shall be 
established by persons who live or work in a given area; shares could be sold outside of the 
locality of the cooperatives only if the cooperative is in dire need of capital.
13
So this localized 
nature of cooperatives makes it feasible for cooperatives to become the modern replica of 
traditional community.
14
 
 
C. Currently unoccupied 
Compared to a state, the traditional community has been usually occupied with very limited 
responsibility and has had sufficient time of strengthening the relationship between the residents 
of the community and protecting and enforcing the norms developed in the community. A state is 
burdened with a lot of duties such as law making, enforcing, adjudicating, defence, development, 
and fighting terrorism. Similarly compared to states, cooperatives are currently remaining idle, 
since their historical role has been fully or partly taken over by the state.  
Historically, cooperatives emerged as a solution to economic and social problems left 
unaddressed by the states such as trade monopolies, consumer rights and exploitation. After the 
second half the nineteenth century antitrust laws have been issued in many countries and state 
has taken responsibility to control monopoly. Consumer protection laws have been issued at least 
                                                             
13 Ethiopian Cooperatives Law, Art 6(2) cum art 16(6) as amended. 
14 However; some saving and credit cooperatives may be far from replicating traditional community since there 
members may be people working for the same employer. Even then they are localized associations although the 
locality is not residential locality. This type of saving and credit cooperatives is the dominant features of 
cooperatives in Ethiopia. This may imply that Ethiopian traditional communities have been shattering and as a result 
people have been trying to replace this phenomenon by association in the work place which is relatively stable. For 
example, this researcher has worked for more than twelve years in for one employer but has resided in more than 
eight communities showing that residence is more unstable than employment. Saving and credit cooperatives can be 
established in the residential area, if something is done to revive the traditional community. 
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after the Second World War. Welfarism has also been pushed into state policy. This situation 
leaves cooperatives to become redundant and out of place.  
Thus, if cooperatives do not get objectives that coincide with their basic ideology, they would 
either wither away or would serve as a camouflage for rentiers or dictators. The rentiers may put 
themselves under the gown of cooperatives and demand privileges and support from government 
welfare. The dictators may also use cooperatives as a means to control the national economy or 
to create economic discrimination. For example, special privileges recognized under Ethiopian 
Cooperatives Law are prone to high level of discrimination between citizens.
15
 Since the 
contemporary problem unaddressed by the state is the gradual erosion of trust the cooperatives 
would be the best candidates to fill this gap. In addition to the lack of necessary conditions for 
building trust, the contemporary government is overburdened with security and economic issues 
at the macro level. Cooperatives have now enough time to take the responsibility of rebuilding 
community. 
D. Forum for individuals Interaction 
Cooperatives, especially consumer cooperatives, can replicate traditional local market and social 
gathering since it could serve as a forum to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds.
16
 This makes it the modern replica of traditional community. 
Cooperatives as a local market 
In traditional community in Ethiopia, transactions have been mainly achieved through bartering, 
although now that has been changing rapidly.
17
 This means transactions were mainly between 
local residents. This therefore; increases the chance of interaction between the residents. Even in 
the case of a transaction which is a cash transaction, the dealer would mostly be local resident. 
The dealer may even serve as a ‘journalist’ to the residents since he would bring them 
                                                             
15 See our detail discussion under Chapter Three 
16The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution, Art 29(2) recognizes freedom of information in all 
form and from all corners. Since the media is infant in Ethiopian and most of the population in Ethiopia even in 
urban areas are unable to read and write such freedom could be real to all if the traditional sources of information are 
made to continue.  
17This researcher was very much accustomed to bartering which is known as ‘liwcha’ in Amharic in his birth place, 
about one-hundred thirty kilometers north of Addis Ababa. There was a specified location in the market for such 
bartering. Almost all types of agricultural products could be bartered. However, the information this researcher got 
from the local residents shows that such bartering has already died out. 
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information about other localities or remote areas. The fact that the dealers are local residents 
would enable the community to indirectly control even non-resident traders who supply goods to 
the local dealers. This is because since the local community controls the dealer through his social 
relations with the community, where he would be forced to properly bargain while purchasing 
his trading stock. The local drinking houses also serve as a forum for residents to meet each 
other. 
Likewise cooperatives could serve as a transaction between residents. While going to purchase 
from the common shop there is a higher possibility that they meet each other and share ideas 
than a purchase made out-of-town. The cooperatives would also serve as a medium to control 
producers and suppliers of goods traded in the cooperative shop. In addition, the cooperatives 
may provide recreation centers that could further widen the opportunity of residents to know 
each other. 
Social Gatherings 
Traditional communities have social gatherings of different kinds and purposes. For example in 
Ethiopia there are religious and cultural gatherings. Mesqel (Finding of the True Cross)
18
, Timqet 
(Baptism), Ashendye, Erecha, and Fiche-Chambellalla are very well-known gatherings.
19
There 
are also gathering for economic reasons such as Equb (traditional saving& credit) and Debo 
(friendly gathering for any type of work) and social reasons such as marriage and burial 
ceremony. All these create an opportunity for individual interactions. Cooperatives can imitate 
traditional communities by providing alternative ways of gatherings such as annual general 
meetings, marriage and burial ceremonies and other festivals.
20
 In short, like traditional 
communities cooperatives could also be a forum of social gatherings. 
Intercommunity relationship 
Social scientists classify individuals’ relationships in the community level into three: bonding, 
bridging and linking relationships. Bonding relationship is the interaction between individuals 
                                                             
18 The UNESCO registers it as intangible heritage in 2014 
19These gatherings are normally gatherings at a local level although there seems some shift towards large gathering 
in case of Erecha and Fiche-Chambellalla. 
20 However, since modern community is composed of individuals from diverse religion and culture, cooperatives 
cannot imitate the religious and cultural gatherings 
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from the same sociological background in a relatively narrow locality.
21
 This interaction tends to 
reinforce the exclusive identities of homogenous group.
22
 Local markets and social gatherings 
are agents of this social bonding in traditional community. Bridging relationship is linking 
individual members of the community to more distant and broader identities.
23
Linking 
relationship consists of relationship up and down the social and economic scale.
24
 It allows 
people to leverage resources, ideas and resources, ideas and information from contacts outside of 
their own social milieu.
25
 
The traditional community has been playing roles in bridging relation. The leaders of the 
community play a role in marriage and disputes between residents of different community. The 
community could also serve as an address of individuals. Local markets may also attract 
sellers/purchasers from neighboring communities. Cooperatives could exceed traditional 
communities in creating bridging relationship. This is because cooperatives could be established 
at a community level to play bonding role, at intercommunity level to play a bridging role and at 
a national level to play linking role.
26
 
 
10.3 Membership as a rational choice 
In this subtopic, we address two issues; the basis of cooperative membership and the limitation 
on principle of open membership. It is argued that an individual’s rational choice should be the 
basis of cooperatives and in order to maximize member benefit, the maximum number of 
members should be limited to the optimal maximum. We first start with the basis and then 
proceed to principle of open membership. 
 
A. Rational choice as basis of cooperatives 
Cooperative membership is voluntary and open to everybody who needs the services of the 
cooperative. But why do people join cooperatives? What is the motive to join cooperatives? Is it 
because of utilitarian moral obligation or out of natural duty or brothers’ sake (altruistic sake) or 
                                                             
21John Field, Social Capital (Routledge, 2008) 73 
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid 
25Ibid 
26 Art  6(2) of Ethiopian Cooperatives Law and Art 3-7 of  Council of Ministers Regulation No. 106/2004 to provide 
for the implementation of the Cooperative Societies Proclamation No.147/1998 
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own sake? Is it immoral to give priority to one’s own interest without regard to the interest of 
others? In short, to which moral theories should cooperators appeal to persuade individuals to 
invite them to cooperative membership, if the cooperatives have to attain the objective of 
building community that nurtures trust? 
 
We are intending to build a community that nurtures moral norms that become the basis of 
trust.Individuals need to be trusting and reciprocate trustworthiness because it is impossible, or at 
least difficult, to live without it. Trust is the value required for individual survival. It is 
individual’s choice to trade his own trustworthiness for trustworthiness of others. This means the 
basis of trust is individuals’ rational choice.  
 
The dominant normative theories of morality are deontological, utilitarian, altruism and 
egoism.
27
 Deontological theory claims that a person is said to be moral when he/she fulfils her 
duties regardless of the consequence thereof.
28
 The duties are keeping promise, speak the truth, 
pay our debts etc.
29
 Utilitarian theory claims that all acts which are right are so simply because 
they will produce the best consequences possible in the circumstances. Altruism declares that 
any action taken for the benefit of others is moral and any action taken for the benefit of oneself 
is bad.
30
However, we cannot persuade individuals to join cooperatives by appealing to moral 
theories because it is the decline of morality that forced us to see for alternative ways of reviving 
morality.
31
Had morality been practically working we do not need to search for alternative means 
of preserving and maintaining trust.
32
 
 
Moreover, Deontological theory emphasises a duty is created upon a person after such a promise 
is entered into. Our primary concern here is how to persuade a person to give his promise. It is 
believed that if there is reason that persuades a person into an obligation the fear of loss of the 
thing that pushed him into the obligation could be sufficient means to keep him obeying his 
promises. Utilitarianism by its nature is far from ensuring trust, because a person may violate 
                                                             
27Oliver Johnson, ‘Rightness, Moral Obligation, and Goodness’ (1953)50(20) The Journal of Philosophy597  
28 Ibid 
29 Ibid 
30Ayn Rand and Nathanial Branden, The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism(Signet/New American 
Library 1964) viii 
31 See our discussion of declining of morality in Chapter Eleven 
32Joseph Mackie, ‘Obligations to Obey the Law’(1981), 67(1) Virginia Law Review143-158 
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trust if such act could produce more happiness or reduce more pain. Although such criticism is 
usually directed against act utilitarianism, rule utilitarianism never escapes the challenge, since 
the law maker may change the law now and then based on the consequence thereby killing the 
trust that should exist between the subjects and the governor. Altruism is of no practical 
relevance either because very few people are altruists or its equivalent of rational egoism.
33
 
 
Furthermore, the three theories depend on the individual’s self-regulation of the actor without 
giving any room for the victim of the act to take measure on the actor. Thus, in addition to 
overburdening individuals with duties, these theories create apparently powerful but actually 
powerless individuals who have very little power to decide on their own fate. They also leave 
wider room for free riders.  
 
The practicable theory that can justify cooperatives that build community is rational egoism. 
According to this theory it is moral to act in one’s own rational interest. A rational person is 
prudent and hence can judge what benefits him now and in the future. He is always after 
maximizing his own benefits. Such person does not bother about the others unless there is 
something that concerns him. This person’s action is called rational action. 
 
Although theory of rational action has been used to justify economic decisions of individuals, it 
is now used by sociologists to justify social relations.
34“Individuals normally pursue their own 
interest; if they choose to cooperate, it is because it is in their interest to do so.”35This rational 
action protects the collective interest without affecting individual freedom. Modern community 
is composed of individuals from diverse background and attitude. Community building should 
not affect their right to reside in the locality of the cooperatives. Respecting individual rights and 
                                                             
33Ziyad Marar, Deception (The Art of Living) (Routledge, 2008) 22-23. One may also argue that Bible itself 
preaches rational egoism: a person obeys the rules of God if he wants to get reward and escape punishment both in 
this world and after death. Three examples are enough to show this. Example one: the usually cited Golden Rule “do 
unto others what you want others do unto you ultimately implies rational egoism, it is a matter of reciprocity. A 
prudent person not only wants trustworthy persons but also realizes that she can get this only if she herself is 
trustworthy. Example two: the metaphor of salt in the Luke 14:34-35:”Salt is a good thing; but if salt itself becomes 
tasteless what will you use to season it? If it is useless either on the land or on the dung-heap; it can only be thrown 
away.” Third example: Jesus returns to recompense and requite everyone according to his deeds.(Revelation  22:12) 
34Michael Hechter and Satoshi Kanazawa, Sociological Rational Choice Theory(1997) 23 Annual Review of 
Sociology191-214 
35 Field (n 23) 
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freedoms would also create friendly atmosphere for the cooperatives; no resident would have an 
interest to challenge the cooperatives as far as his right is not affected. Moreover, this rational 
choice would keep unwilling or unconvinced residents out of the membership of the 
cooperatives. Forcing unwilling or unconvinced people to join cooperatives by any means 
including morality or law is creating administrative burden on the cooperatives.  
 
Historically also successful cooperatives have been those established on the basis of rational 
choice theory. Robert Owen’s village of cooperatives was mainly the result to altruism but failed. 
The Owenites community was mainly the result of utilitarianism but also failed. State supported 
cooperatives in Africa and socialist countries also failed with the failure of government. As we 
discussed in Chapter seven and eight, Ethiopian cooperatives have already become crippled since 
the state interferes and imposes a utilitarian doctrine on the cooperatives.  But the Rochdale 
Society of Equitable Pioneers was established on the basis of rational choice of the members and 
became the basis of British and international cooperative movement. The producer’s 
cooperatives of North America have also been successful and their basis has been rational 
choice. So cooperators should appeal to benefits that a member gets if he becomes member and 
opportunities he lose if he is outside of the cooperatives. 
 
B. Limitation on the principle of open membership 
In order to maintain the efficiency of rational choice, there should be maximum limit of 
membership. It is very difficult to strengthen and solidify the community through cooperatives 
unless the number of members is manageable. If the number is too big it is difficult to know each 
other. So principle of open membership should be limited to the optimal maximum by defining 
locality to a limited territory. However; within the limited territory every body willing to use the 
cooperative should be given freedom to join the cooperative. 
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10.4  The management of cooperatives 
In this subtopic, we highlight the importance of collective management and elderly membership 
in the management and then hypothesis the possible adaptation of the traditional community 
management styles such as ‘Gada System.’ 
 
A. Collective Management  
Cooperatives should be managed by group of individuals. Only the group decision, both as 
policy maker and executive, binds the cooperative community. This is to avoid any possible 
emergence of individual dictators. Individual dictatorship is a virus that eats up the cooperative 
community. Dictatorship opens a room for parochialism and clientelism. In addition to pushing 
some members to go out of the cooperative, it opens a room for power competition. The 
management organ should therefore, be limited to the management board and control committee 
and other sub-committees subordinate to these two major organs. These organs are accountable 
to the community’s general meeting. 
 
B. Elderly management 
If the cooperatives have to build social solidarity by reviving the traditional community its 
management has to remain in the hands of elders of the community. This is for two major 
reasons. The first reason is that the elders have sufficient time to dedicate to the cooperative. 
Most individuals leave the labour market at the age of sixty either due to the existing pension law 
or due to less productivity of the labour after such age. For the cooperatives, the availability of 
experienced individuals and the benefits of community leadership which it can offer makes it an 
attractive proposition. Moreover, they are usually experts (informal knowledge) in dispute 
resolution. Furthermore, community management is mainly an appeal to reverential fear and 
elders are more revered. Therefore, although democratic election is means of coming to the 
management position, elderly age should be one of the legibility criterions. 
 
C. Hypothesizing the ‘Gada’ system  
If we have to revive traditional community, it would be logical to revive the management styles 
of this traditional community as far as such style is democratic and overlaps with cooperative 
ideology. Such a style of management would be very important in a situation where the 
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community is relatively homogenous and conscious of its own culture. But since most traditional 
communities exclude women from leadership serious measures should be taken to abolish such 
exclusion. 
 
Gada System was a traditional community leadership at micro, meso and macro level in the 
south and south central Ethiopia before the formation of modern government. It is a segment of 
generation that succeed each other every eight years in assuming responsibilities.
36
 It is believed 
to continue to exist in the grass root level although the macro level institutions were decayed.
37
 
The peculiar feature of this system was that it classified members of the community into groups 
on the basis of their age and each group had a social duty assigned to it. This grouping 
contributes a lot in solidifying the community, acculturating and preparing the younger 
generation for leadership. The other interesting feature of the gada system that makes it 
candidate for cooperative community in contemporary Ethiopia is its tendency to assimilate new 
comers into the dominant society. The simultaneous recognition of collective ethnic right to 
language and culture and the freedom of movement under Ethiopian Constitution may conflict 
unless there is a system that absorbs the new comers without posing language and cultural 
clashes. 
 
10.5  Major and subsidiary tasks of cooperatives 
 
The main tasks of cooperatives are serving as an alternative market for the members. As a 
subsidiary task, the cooperatives may serve as a reference, source of information, crime control, 
source of informal knowledge and forum for cultural preservation. Both the main tasks and 
subsidiary tasks serve as glue to solder the residents together. This subtopic indicates the extent 
of these tasks. 
 
A. Alternative market for the members 
Cooperatives are economic organization. Its major task is involving in economic activities. 
However, the cooperatives that are expected to strengthen the local community it has to serve as 
                                                             
36Asmerom Legesse, Oromo Democracy: An Indigenous African political System (Red Sea Press, 2000) 31 
37 Ibid 30 
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an alternative market of consumption goods/services so that every member of the community 
could have some interest in the cooperatives. However, the consumer cooperatives should limit 
themselves to retail shop in the primary level and wholesale in the union level. There should not 
be any participation in production. This is because such task overburdens the cooperatives and 
may alienate it from its ultimate task of building community. Due to their cooperative nature (as 
compared to competitive nature of investor owned firms) and lack of expertise in the 
management cooperatives could not be efficient in the production. Moreover, involvement in 
production would exacerbate the conflict of interest between cooperatives and investor owned 
firms. So cooperatives should specialize in distribution whereas investor owned firms should 
specialize in production. In addition to consumer goods/services, rural cooperatives may also 
serve as product market. Consumer cooperatives could also serve as labour market as its major or 
secondary task. 
 
B. Subsidiary tasks 
In addition to the major economic task, cooperatives may carry out social activities. These 
activities increase the chance of interaction of the residents of the community and also serve as a 
justification for state and charity assistance. 
 
Reference 
The cooperatives may provide certificate of reference to the individual member resident 
whenever a testimony about the behaviour of the person is required. This encourages individuals 
to participate in the cooperatives and disciplines him to behave in accordance of the local norms. 
It also increases the recognition of the role of the cooperatives by other institutions such as courts 
and employers. 
 
Source of information 
In urban Ethiopia, it seems very difficult for the Government to know some of the residents of a 
locality. This poses a security danger especially in relation to terrorism. The cooperatives could 
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follow up the daily activities of new comers and provide necessary information to the 
government if they appear to be dangerous.
38
 
 
Crime prevention   
In addition to community surveillance and the reporting of suspicious behaviors to the police the 
community can control crimes through policies that are more closely associated with restorative 
justice, re-integrative shaming and peacemaking criminology.
39
 
 
Source of informal knowledge transfer 
Cooperatives could also serve as a forum of informal learning both to the youth and the adults. 
Knowledge is mainly experience sharing. The interaction of the residents opens wider room for 
experience sharing. Elders can also get a chance to transfer their knowledge and experience to 
the next generation. In countries like Ethiopia where most of the knowledge is transferred orally 
such forum is quite important. 
 
Forum to develop culture  
Cooperatives could also serve as a means to develop culture. Culture is the result of social 
integration and networking. This would be important for Ethiopian in view of Art 39 (2) of the 
FDRE constitution which recognizes collective right to develop language, culture and history. 
 
 
10.6  Cooperative autonomy: assistance of the State and NGOs 
 
 Cooperative autonomy: A must for long lasting survival 
Principle of cooperative autonomy has to be strictly adhered to by the cooperatives. If the 
cooperatives are unable to maintain autonomy against the interference of, political interest may 
inroad into the community. Such type of community becomes either identical to the lower level 
political administration or a source of conflict especially in Ethiopia where there has not been 
                                                             
38 Barbara Warner, Elizabeth Beck and Mary Ohmer, 'Linking informal social control and restorative justice: 
moving social disorganization theory beyond community policing' (2010) 13(4) Contemporary Justice Review 355-
369 
39 Ibid 
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national consensus. Lack of political neutrality reduces the chance of residents joining the 
cooperatives and the non-members may work for the dissolution of the community. Furthermore, 
the political issues may overshadow the issue of building social solidarity. 
 
A. State assistance  
In addition to the special privileges recognized by the Ethiopian Cooperatives Law the state may 
empower the cooperative community by recognizing some acts of the cooperatives or delegating 
some state powers to the cooperatives. For example, the state may give recognition to the acts of 
the cooperative community on matters such as the conclusion of marriage or dissolution of 
marriage by mutual agreement and its consequences thereof. Moreover, it may legitimatize the 
power of cooperative community to give references for individual members of the cooperatives. 
In rural areas the cooperatives community may be authorized to play a conciliation role in land 
related disputes. 
 
The state should, however, refrain from lobbying about the importance of cooperatives or giving 
technical and professional assistance since such acts undermines the autonomy of the 
cooperatives and may also redirect cooperatives away from its agenda of building social 
solidarity. 
 
B. NGOs Relation to Coop Community  
NGOs should limit itself in financial assistance only. The NGOs should not be allowed to give 
any training whatsoever. Although, they can provide information in any form the interpretation 
of such information should be left to the community. 
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10.7 Conclusion 
 
Thus this Chapter Ten has shown that cooperatives would be used to build trust. In Chapter Nine 
it is shown that trust would revive if community life revives. This Chapter shows that 
cooperatives are best alternatives to revive community life. There are many reasons make 
cooperatives best alternative to rebuild traditional community. Firstly, cooperatives have 
theoretically and practically been engaging in community building activities and hence have 
ample experience. Secondly, compared to state or even other entities such as NGOs, cooperatives 
have sufficient time to work on rebuilding of community. Thirdly, they are association of local 
residents who aim to resolve collective problem through collective action.  Traditional 
communities have been collective action of local residents to resolve collective problems. Lack 
of trust is a collective problem that can be solved only through collective action. Fourthly, 
cooperatives can increase the interaction between residents by serving as a local market, forum 
of social gathering and facilitating intercommunity relationship. Such interaction would give rise 
to the development of networks and local norms. Fifthly, since membership in a cooperative can 
be on the basis of rational choice they would not be resisted by those who do not value 
community life. Six, Cooperatives could be managed by the elderly and according to the local 
custom. This primarily helps to revive the traditional values. The fact that cooperatives could 
limit their major task to selling and/ or buying on behalf members and instead add additional 
subsidiary tasks such as giving reference to resident member, giving information to the 
government, preventing crime, transferring informal knowledge, and developing local culture 
would also enable them to rebuild community. Cooperatives could also serve as best alternative 
channeling support for those (state, NGOs or even investor owned firms) who want to support 
the revival of community. 
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CONCLUSION  
The utilization of cooperatives for a variety of purposes by a plethora of different institutions 
greatly reduces the comprehensibility of cooperatives. The cooperative form of organization has 
had many non-profit motives that have emerged from multiple sources. These motives were 
motivated by: economic self-defense, self-help, community building, cultural transformation, 
political intervention by a State into an economy, poverty eradication, and the ending of a caste 
system. The motives are largely dependent on the impetus behind the cooperative movement, 
that is whether it was motivated by the people involved (self-motivation), motivates by the state 
pursuing a political aim or whether it was motivated by philanthropists pursuing philanthropic 
ideas. 
Cooperative organizations that emanate from members’ self-help motives are the result of 
freedom of association and freedom of contract and are mainly concerned with members’ 
economic and social challenges. The fact that these cooperatives are half way between investor-
owned firms and charities confuses the identity of the cooperative with that of the investor-
owned firms. This opens a gap for the emergence of cooperatives that have profit as their motive. 
Cooperative Organizations that are initiated by the Government are half way between public 
enterprises and investor-owned firms, and have a political motive of either transforming the 
culture of society or regulating the economy. The Government often use cooperatives as an 
instrument to transform the culture of the society, such as a return to colonial Africa or the 
Communist Governments of Eastern Europe. Alternatively they can use cooperatives to interfere 
in the economy, which is how cooperatives have manifested in many African and South East 
Asian countries. In order to attain its objectives, the Government usually gives away some 
privileges to these typically rent-seeking cooperatives. This has led to a risk of cooperatives 
becoming too similar to investor-owned firms, and in turn, foregoing their public objectives in 
the process.  
Cooperatives could also be organized by community members to defend traditional, community 
values or used by philanthropists to facilitate progress, such as to fight poverty and injustice. 
However, the flexibility of the cooperative has led to cooperatives becoming indistinguishable 
from other forms of company. 
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True cooperative movements have lost their moral underpinning and many now work towards 
profit-maximization objectives. This is because true cooperatives have been declining since the 
Second World War, and particularly after 1970 due to external factors such as the changing role 
of a state in the national economy, the efficiency of hypermarkets, the emergence of consumer 
movements, the effects of globalization, and at a national level, factors such as financial 
challenges which have led to a decline in cooperatives. As a result, many cooperatives were 
either dissolved or converted to investor-owned firms or modifications have been made to the 
principles upon which the cooperatives have been established. 
There have also been considerable moves by entrepreneurs to utilize the cooperatives to exploit 
Government incentives. It is self-evident that the ultimate aim of entrepreneurs’ is to maximize 
returns from investments, and to that end, they will select the form of company which gives the 
greatest incentives. The central issues that an investor considers in determining the form of 
organization are transaction costs, management costs and risk. Thus, if the cooperative form of 
organization proves more efficient on these criteria the entrepreneur will not hesitate to form 
their business under this umbrella. By understanding the theory of how firms operate as explored 
earlier in this thesis, it demonstrates there are situations that cooperatives can be the best form 
under which to organize their company. For example, transaction costs may be minimized if the 
firm is assigned to the suppliers of raw materials. Transactional costs would also be minimized if 
the ownership of the firm is assigned to those who become losers when price is distorted by 
unfair trade practices, gradual labour specialization, immobility, and asymmetric information. 
There will be fewer legal barriers that limit the entrepreneur to grab the cooperative form of 
organization, since cooperatives are normally the result of freedom of association and freedom of 
contract. 
 
The Ethiopian cooperative law, policy, and practices have done little to distinguish cooperatives 
from investor-owned firms. The law that governs cooperatives in Ethiopia is the Cooperative 
Society Proclamation No.147/1998. But this law fails to distinguish cooperatives from investor 
owned firms at all level beginning from definition, formation and liability and extending to 
principles, ownership and management. Cooperative policy of the government may be expected 
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to remedy the defect but it does not exist. The practice is further exacerbating the defects of the 
law and the absence of policy. 
 
One may ask why one worries about distinguishing cooperatives from investor-owned firms in 
Ethiopia. The answer would immediately be clear when one realizes that Cooperatives in 
Ethiopia are entitled to robust benefits that are not available to investor-owned firms. 
Cooperatives are entitled to priority claims on the property of the member, set-off in respect of 
shares or benefits of members’ share or benefit of  a member in a cooperative not liable to 
attachment, administrative ease, income tax exemptions, and government assistance. Investor 
owned firms are not entitled to these privileges although cooperatives are entitled to all other 
benefits of investors owned firms. These privileges need to be justified before they are dispensed 
readily to firms who may operate under the disguise of a cooperative. 
 
The definition of cooperatives is now incomprehensible. This is because besides being silent on 
issue of profit, it confuses the definition of ‘cooperative society’ with the definition of ‘society’ 
and more importantly it equates the word ‘voluntariness’ with defect free consent in contract. 
The cooperatives are defined on two levels: the first definition is about ‘cooperative society’ and 
the second is about ‘Society.’ Although this might have been intended to make distinction 
between registered and unregistered ones it pushes one to believe that cooperative societies are 
different from societies and are outside of the ambit of the Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 
147/1998.  More   importantly, in the proclamation the definition of cooperatives society 
contains ‘voluntariness’ as its basic element but there is an indication that it is equivalent to 
defect free consent which is essential element of contract. But in cooperatives voluntariness goes 
beyond defect free consent and implies some form of charity commitment. The definition is also 
silent about the issue of profit and this may open the room to bring other parts of the 
proclamation specially provisions dealing with distribution of surplus and capital contribution to 
conclude that profit maximization is the central theme of cooperatives. 
 
More surprisingly, under Ethiopian cooperative law, a cooperative member’s money is more 
important than his moral commitment to the ideology of the cooperative. This is because the 
capital of cooperative is fixed and a person joins a cooperative only if he agrees to contribute a 
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certain amount of money to the capital of the cooperatives and pays at least a quarter of this 
money. The law also allows the sale of shares to persons living outside the local area of the 
cooperative. Moreover, the content of by-laws of cooperative is the same with the memorandum 
of association and articles of association. 
We may expect that the above definitional and conceptual defects may be cooled down by the 
principles of cooperatives. But such is not the case. The Cooperative Society Proclamation 
No.147/1998 modifies the cooperative principles. Cooperative principles and ethics would help a 
cooperative to make sure that it has been moving on the right track. Furthermore, cooperatives 
could be fully understood only by having enough understanding of these principles. Any change 
of the principles means change of the cooperative goal. However, although the proclamation 
provides voluntariness, democracy, autonomy, education, cooperation and sustainable 
development it underemphasizes the principle of open membership and excluded mutuality 
principle. The principle of open membership is a key principle to distinguish cooperatives from 
investor-owned firms. The principle of cooperative education also fails to include or at least 
gives very less attention to the ethical training for members. 
One may expect that ownership under Cooperatives is indivisible as against divisible ownership 
in investor owned firms. But that is not the case.  Under Ethiopian Cooperative law, freedom of 
contract allows profit seekers to organize producer, worker and consumer cooperatives. This is 
because, although there is some restriction on the right to transfer ownership right in 
cooperatives, such restrictions can be eased by the by-laws. Moreover, cooperatives are entitled 
to reinvest in investor owned firms, they can provide service to non-members, there is a 
possibility of closed membership and unlimited share capital, there is very small legal reserve 
fund and its utilization is unregulated, profit-sharing is on the basis of capital contribution, and 
there is wider rights to transfer shares. 
 
Furthermore, the management is accountable to owners only. Under Ethiopian cooperative law, 
there are three key management organs of a cooperative: the general meeting, the management 
committee and the control committee. General meetings are a meeting of members of 
cooperatives. The management committee means a body elected by the general meeting with the 
responsibility to manage the activities of the society. The control committee is a committee 
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established by the general meeting to audit the activities of the management committee. The 
members of the management committee and control committee are normally members of the 
cooperative. The Federal Cooperative Agency has no power to over see the decisions of the 
meeting. More interestingly the Ethiopian cooperative law leaves much more freedom to the 
general meeting than Commercial law leaves to the shareholders’ meeting. The management 
committee and the control committee are accountable to the general meeting. The general 
manager could be made to be accountable to the management committee. This implies that 
cooperatives could follow the management style of investor owned firms if such style could 
maximize profit. 
 
Cooperatives are also indistinguishable from investor owned firms on basis of the government 
policy or their day to day activities or their regulation. The law does little to keep cooperatives 
distinct from investor-owned firms, but does public policy?  The Government might have a 
policy that it can address only through cooperatives and that policy objective may then enable us 
to distinguish cooperatives from investor owned firm. Or, although the Government might not 
have such a policy, the cooperatives might in practice been caught with non-profit maximizing 
motives. Finally the existence of cooperative regulation would also help us to keep cooperatives 
distinct from investor-owned firms. However, none of this was found to exist in Ethiopia. 
Although the existence of special privileges to cooperatives makes us expect a public interest 
behind cooperatives, the Ethiopian Government does not have any public interest objectives that 
can be attained purely through the use of cooperatives. The Ethiopian Government claims to be a 
developmental state. That means the power of the Government is limited only by economic 
rationality. Thus the Government can direct investor owned firms to whatever objectives that 
ultimately lead to economic growth through a carrot-and-stick approach or establish public 
enterprises whenever necessary. Thus, cooperatives in their proper sense becomes of no use. In 
practice also Ethiopian government does not have any clear ultimate objects that it wants to 
attain through the instrumentality of cooperatives. Although it may  be claimed that the 
Government have intended to use cooperative as instrument to interfere in the agricultural 
economy by using them as a medium of agricultural product marketing and distribution of 
agricultural technology such allegation is less convincing since the government has other better 
alternatives. Moreover, the confusion between policy and strategy committed by the Ethiopian 
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Agricultural Transformation Agency while it was developing Agricultural Cooperative Sector 
Development Strategy 2012-2016 implies the non-existence of a clearly articulated government 
cooperative policy. This would further be evidenced from differing interpretations given to 
cooperatives by different state organs and relegation of non-agricultural cooperatives. One may 
agree with the non-existence of clear and elucidated policy but could still conjecture that the 
government might have intended to use cooperatives as an instrument of channeling basic 
goods/services to the consumers, saving and credit alternative, and poverty reduction strategy but 
such conjecture holds no water where the Ethiopian government has unlimited alternatives to 
interfere in the economy. 
However; evidence gathered indicates that the Government has been attempting to use 
cooperatives as an instrument to control inflation, channel agricultural marketing, mobile rural 
saving and forum of political indoctrination although such attempts have been unsuccessful due 
to rent-seeking tendencies both in the part of the Government and the cooperatives. The 
Government rent-seeking tendencies are apparent from its desire to use cooperatives as a forum 
of political indoctrination. The profit seeking objective of the cooperatives would be inferred 
from the behaviour of the cooperatives and cooperators such as the appointment of general 
managers, profit sharing on the basis of capital contribution, transactions with non-members, 
investing in profit seeking firms and compromising principles of autonomy, education and 
coordination. In short, cooperatives in Ethiopia do not have any not-for-profit vision and the 
Government has been unable to direct them to its own vision. 
Cooperatives are neither self-regulated nor state regulated and hence they are free  to act as they 
deem it proper without limit like investor-owned firms. The lack of individual motives to 
cooperate, the absence of cooperative ideology and the non-existence of apex organization 
implicates the non-existence of cooperative self-regulation in Ethiopia. Cooperative regulation 
by the state has become impossible due to the lack of constant and strong Government 
commitment and the lack of legal framework. 
Regulation of cooperatives refers to the mechanism of ensuring the adherence to cooperative 
principles. Regulation may be either self-regulation or state regulation depending on the sources 
of the objectives of the cooperatives. If the cooperative movement is from below (initiated by 
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members) or side(initiated by philanthropists), the regulation is mainly self-regulation but if the 
cooperative movement is from above(initiated by the government), state regulation is necessary.  
Three things are essential for cooperative self-regulation to exist. The first thing is strong motive 
(vision) of members behind the cooperatives mission/goal. However, since the Ethiopian 
Government has been taking responsibility for almost every problem of individuals, individuals 
are not accustomed to solving problems collectively. This means individuals do not have any 
concern to form a cooperative. Even if it is formed members never worry whether or not the 
cooperative is properly functioning since they get or lose nothing. Cooperatives as instrument of 
self-help become less important since individuals become passive in respect of their own 
problems. The second important thing is cooperative ideology. Cooperative ideology is a belief 
in self-help, self-sufficiency and autonomy. However, since it is the Government that has been 
organizing the cooperatives in Ethiopia such ideology has not got a ground to flourish. Due to 
lack of motive to cooperate and lack of cooperative ideology combined with state interference 
there is no apex cooperative organization in Ethiopia, which is third important point for self 
regulation.  
Two things are essential for the government to regulate cooperatives. The first thing is policy 
commitment. However, since the Ethiopian Government has unlimited alternatives to interfere in 
the economy it lacks constant and strong motive to regulate cooperatives. The second issue is the 
legal framework that enables the Government to interfere into the internal affairs of cooperatives. 
In Ethiopia there is no such framework because the cooperative principles laid down in the 
Cooperative Society Proclamation No. 147/1998 do not have legal effect, special privileges are 
indiscriminately available to everyone registered as cooperative, and the power of the 
Cooperative Agencies is limited to supporting cooperatives without any power of supervising 
and controlling. Moreover, the express recognition of principle autonomy serves as a pretext 
both for the Government not to take responsibility for the improper functioning of cooperatives 
and for the cooperatives to use it as a shield to remain in their wasteful behaviour. 
Having examined cooperatives from, a general theoretical overview, through Ethiopian 
cooperative law, through Ethiopian cooperative policy and Practices there is little to distinguish 
cooperatives from investor owned firms. This indicates that cooperatives in Ethiopia are little 
more than wasteful rent-seeking organizations and a missed opportunity to improve Ethiopian 
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society. I have therefore attempted to find other solutions to resolve the dilemma and make the 
cooperatives responsible for the special privileges the public is giving them. I have three 
alternatives. The first alternative would be to abolish the Cooperative Society Proclamation 
No.147/1998 altogether. The second alternative would be to redefine cooperatives so that the 
Cooperative Society Proclamation No.147/1998 governs only cooperatives that play the role of a 
commission agent to its members (who should be nobody but either producers of primary 
products or consumers or workers). The third is the second alternatives with the additional task 
of using cooperatives for community building. 
According to the first alternatives cooperatives should be merged with investor owned firms. If 
the government wants to encourage producer-owned or consumer-owned or worker-owned firms 
this would be done by other legislations that deal with incentives to investors. Moreover, it is 
preferable for the government to use such incentive or to establish public enterprises to intervene 
into the economy. The second alternative limits cooperatives to the mutuality principle of user 
owner, user control, and user-benefit. The cooperative buys goods/services by their own name 
but for the benefit and on behalf of members. 
However, such alternatives neglect the role of cooperative in solving social problems
1
 that has 
less direct link with market economy and the state or charities can never solve such as building 
morality. Historically, cooperatives were self-help organizations. That means they have been 
solving problems that require collective action that the market or the state or charities failed to 
resolve. Cooperatives should continue to play this role. 
Although the state has been intervening into the economy, it has neglected the issue of morality 
especially trust. A lack of trust undermines human relations which in turn undermines 
civilization. Moreover; trust improves educational performance, reduces  the cost of transactions, 
improves health and reduce crime. Trust is also the foundation of rule of law and without the rule 
of law human relations are unimaginable.  
The sources of trust are religion, morality and community life and these are declining. Very little 
can be done to save religion and morality but community life could be saved. Cooperatives are 
                                                             
1
See Merrett, Christopher D. and Walzer, Norman (eds.) Cooperatives and Local Development; Theory and 
Application for the 21st Century 2004 pp..275-279 
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good mechanisms with which to build community life. Rebuilding communities is especially 
urgent in Ethiopia since Ethiopian Society has been in transition. The traditional community has 
been disintegrating without any visible substitute that would take over its task. Moreover, the 
state has limited capacity to enforce formal laws and unless the law enforcement burden is 
shared by the community the rule of law could be crippled. The simultaneous constitutional 
recognition of rights of nations, nationalities and the freedom of residence, the urgency of 
democratization process, and the immaturity of the media in Ethiopia are also problematic areas.  
Consumer cooperatives could be a replicate of a traditional community in modern form. This is 
because it is generally an association of residents of the same locality, it is less occupied and it is 
a forum for individual interactions. Historically, also it was designed in the beginning to build a 
community of ‘new moral world. Membership should however, be on the basis of individual 
rational choices so that individual rights would not be endangered by the formation of the 
community. Moreover, the community cooperative should better be under collective 
management to avoid any possible emergence of individual dictator that undermines the 
community. Preferably, elderly members of the community cooperative should be members of 
the collective management since they could have the knowledge, commitment, integrity and time 
necessary for the duty. Reviving the management style of the local community is also advisable 
to further facilitate community consolidation and avoid any possible resistance from those who 
want to maintain local culture.  
In order to concentrate on the community building task, the community cooperative should not 
involve in any form of production. It should limit itself in retail and wholesale trade (retail on 
local (primary) cooperative level and wholesale on union level) and service delivery. However, 
to strengthen its community building task, it may carryout social activities such as providing 
reference to individual members, community surveillances, a forum for informal knowledge 
transfer and a forum for local culture. 
Although assistance from outside may be useful, cooperative autonomy is a must for a long 
lasting survival of the community cooperative. State assistance should be limited to extending 
special privileges and delegating some of its sovereign power to the community cooperative. 
Charities should limit themselves to financial aid and information supply. Advocacy of 
237 
 
whatsoever nature either by the state or charities should be absolutely prohibited. Community 
cooperatives could however, be business partners of manufacturers, importers and wholesalers. 
Thus cooperatives have been uncategorizable from investor owned firms generally because of 
the declining of their traditional objectives, and enterprises move into cooperative form of 
enterprise and particularly in Ethiopia due to legislative and policy failure and due to lack of 
cooperative regulation. Ethiopian Cooperative would be distinct enough if the law redefines 
them as community building economic associations. 
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የ ል ማታዊ ዲሞክ ራሲያ ዊ ስ ር ዓ ት  ግ ን ባ ታ  ትግ ላ ችን ና  ፈ ተ ና ዎቹ  ሐምሌ  2006 (Our Struggle to 
Build Developmental Democratic System and Challenges July, 2014) 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 Policy documents presented in Amharic (Federal Working language) do not have English Version. Believing that 
the title could give some clue about the content of the documents I have provided my personal translation in the 
bracket 
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Appendix - Interview Manuscript
1
 
A. Interviews with Oromia Coffee Farmers’ Cooperative Union Officers, 
Gelan, State of Oromia 
These interviews were carried out in March 2013. The members of this union are 
cooperatives of small hold coffee producers in the state of Oromia, the biggest state in terms 
of size, population and coffee production. This cooperative union is one of the biggest and 
more organized unions. These qualities are the major factors why I select it for my interview. 
In order to get the consent of the officers for the interview I was required to file an 
application setting out the information I wanted and the purpose for which I intended to the 
information. Accordingly I wrote an application letter that contained the thesis of my 
research and specific information I wanted. I was then allowed to talk to the following 
officers of the cooperative union. The interviews were made in person. I present the specific 
interviews as follow: I made at most care to transcribe the full ideas of the interviewees. I 
transcribed here the answers of the interviewee believing the questions could be easily 
inferred from the answers. 
 
      Gadissa Eda’a ‘Interview with the Finance Head’ (8 March 2013) 
1. The Cooperative Union was established by the decision of the government with the 
intention of solving the problem of issuing check without sufficient fund to small 
hold coffee producer peasants. Coffee dealers had developed a custom of cheating 
and exploiting the business inexperience of the peasants by issuing a check that was 
not accepted by the paying bank As coffee has been taking a lion’s share in Ethiopia’s 
export earning the problem was seriously taken by the Government. Hence the 
Government decided to establish and took the initiation to establish coffee producers’ 
cooperatives that collect the product from the peasants and transfer it to the 
                                                             
1
  All my questions in the interview were open-ended questions. I made at most care to transcribe 
the full ideas of the interviewees. I transcribed here the answers of the interviewee believing the 
questions could be easily inferred from the answers. 
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cooperative union that further supply to the international market. Problem of the 
farmers to access to loan was also another pushing factor. 
2. In addition to voluntariness, the size of coffee plantation of the individual member of 
the primary cooperative,  the size of annual supply to the union and support letter 
from the Wereda administration (the second lowest political administration, the 
lowest being kebele)  
3. Dividend is distributed partly on the basis of share capital contribution and partly on 
the amount of transaction. 
4. The union is free of income tax but it collects value added tax on all transaction it 
enters into.  
5. The union received the land up which has built not for free; it has paid compensation 
for the peasants who were occupying the land. Recently the Government has begun to 
demand lease price in addition to the compensation to the land holders to be removed.  
In fact the union has not able to get plots of land to construct coffee processing 
factors near the peasants’ residences. 
6. The union makes annual report to Oromia Cooperative Agency.  The government also 
appoints external auditor by tendering international auction. All expenses concerning 
the external audit are born by the union. There is quarterly internal audit. 
7. The union purchases coffee only from members in order to ensure the traceability of 
the coffee for the purpose of international market. But it gives other services such as 
coffee washing and packing to other non-members. 
8. More than fifty percent of members are nominal members who do not supply their 
product to the union but to sell to the market for better price. 
9. Some times the cooperatives may be the property of the manager or board of 
directors. Corruption is rampant in cooperatives. 
10. Access to loan is also very difficult due to corruption. Since coffee market does not 
exceed two months delay in loan release makes the loan of no use. 
11. There is government interference in the cooperatives. Cooperative autonomy does not 
exist or at least impossible. Cooperatives are under the government control. 
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12. The government has less commitment to promote cooperatives although resource is 
sufficiently available to make promotion. The cooperative promotions organs of the 
government are weakly organized. 
13. The cooperative movement has a hidden agenda of dismantling and substituting the 
lowest level of political administration. 
 
Ayele Bedane, ‘Interview with the Certificate Officer’  (8 March 2013) 
1. The central objectives of cooperative union are to enable members to receive fair 
price for their product. In fact the government decided and initiated the establishment 
of the union in order to rescue coffee producing peasants from fraud of check with 
out sufficient fund. The amount of coffee production and the size of coffee plantation 
are major criteria. Those having more than five hectares of coffee plantation are not 
entitled to become members. 
2. Profit distribution is decided by the general meeting on the basis of the report of the 
board and external auditor. 
3. The union provides loan to the member cooperatives. 
4. The union could purchase from non-members if the supply of the members is below 
its purchasing plan. 
5. The union is now a perfect trader. It has already received trade license as exporter 
and it is a big exporter. It makes large annual profit and has already out of the truck 
of true cooperatives. 
6. The government has repeatedly scolded the union for becoming a profiteering 
organization. The government is not also happy with the large size of the union’s 
capital and membership. 
7.  The union does not believe that the government is giving it a special privilege. For 
example although the law exempts cooperatives from court fee such is not practical. 
8. The government does not respect the autonomy of the union. 
9. Membership is open. 
         Girma Regassa, ‘Interview with Legal Services Head (8 March 2013)  
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1. Dividend is distributed partly on the basis of share capital and partly on the basis of 
annual transaction with the cooperative. However; the members of the union are 
demanding that it should be based totally on the basis of capital contribution. 
2. The union has share holding in Oromia Insurance Share Company and Oromia 
Cooperative Bank Share Company. 
3. The union can carry out any kind of economic activity for gain with out any to get 
additional trade license once it got the trade license. 
4. The union has not obtained for free. The right to access to land for free has not been 
respected. 
5. Due to high rate of corruption and untrustworthiness, the cooperatives would less 
possibly attain their true objectives. 
6. The manager is a professional employee and his monthly salary is fifteen thousand 
birr(about five hundred pound). 
 
B. Interview with Hawassa City Administration Marketing and Cooperative 
Society Office Promotion and Registration Officer, Hawassa, the State of 
SNNP. 
This interview was made in person. I introduced the purpose of my research and directly 
entered into asking questions I prepared in advance. I transcribed here the answers of the 
interviewee believing the questions could be easily inferred from the answers. 
Tesfaye Matewos Kalo, ‘Interview with Hawassa City Administration Marketing and 
Cooperative Society Office Promotion and Registration Officer’ (26 June 2014) 
1. Factors that distinguish cooperatives from investor owned firms are that their 
members are individuals that have low or middle income. 
2. Cooperatives may be organized by the members to have easy access to government 
subsidized basic consumption commodities. 
3. Although Cooperatives could sell to non-members they should first satisfy the 
demand of their members. 
4. The government controls cooperatives if they are supplying basic goods that the 
government is empowered to control their distribution according to Competition and 
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Consumer Protection Law. This is to make sure that they are selling the goods 
following the specified quota or quoted price or both and to a specified destination. 
5. Although there is a legal right to access land use right such right has been gradually 
blocked. 
6. The government supports the cooperatives by controlling the management through 
audit, inspection and training. The government also assists cooperatives by searching 
better market for their products. 
7. The cooperative law and the cooperative practices are quite opposite especially in 
housing cooperatives. 
8. No cooperative has been demanded to pay tax contrary to the law. 
9. The Saving and Cooperatives have been practically more successful and useful to 
their members 
10. The ultimate objectives of the government mutual development, saving, market 
stabilization, creating culture of honesty, transparency and accountability. Especially 
cooperatives are more preferable in market stabilization since the private sector is 
untrustworthy. 
11. Major challenges that the cooperatives are failure to give priority to members. 
Consumer cooperatives have been tempted to sell to non-member at a better price. 
Poor accounting and lack of enthusiasm in the part of the management to participate 
in the training courses and seminars made available by the government. To solve the 
problem of lack of enthusiasm the government has gone to the extent of paying per 
diem to the trainees. The government has also been working on cooperative 
promotion so that public awareness about of the use of cooperative increase. 
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C. Interview with  Federal Cooperative Agency Officers, Addis Ababa 
The Federal Cooperative Agency is a federal government organ established to promote and 
register cooperatives at a federal level. To get this interview I went to the foreign relation officer 
and he directed me to the interviewee. Then after I introduced the reason why I want the 
interview I immediately and directly began to asked questions I already prepared. 
 Abera Bekele, ‘Interview with Public Relation Officer’ (March 11, 2013) 
1. The purpose of cooperatives are improving saving culture, serving as a bridge to 
technology transfer, adding value chain (adding value to products at every level of 
transaction, ensuring balanced economic development( reducing the gap between the 
reach and the poor by subsidizing cooperatives which would be owned low income 
earner), creating work opportunity, reducing over urbanization and facilitating market. 
2. Dividend distribution is 40% on share capital and 60% on amount of annual 
transaction. 
3. There is no cooperative policy for agricultural cooperatives. 
Michael Ayele, ‘Interview with Senior Legal Expert’ (March 11, 2013) 
1. Although the Federal Cooperative Commission has developed a project by buying 
consultancy service from UKCC to open Cooperative College it is not clear whether 
the government would agree and assign necessary budge 
2. The Ministry of Revenue and Custom Authority has been forcing the cooperatives to 
pay income tax as if they are investor-owned firms. Paradoxically, the Ministry has 
refused to recognize cooperatives as investors. The Ministry of Transport has recently 
classified cooperatives into category of Charities and Societies (Non-profit making 
associations) while registering vehicles. 
3. The Federal Cooperative Commission has made repeated discussion with concerned 
government organs so that they accept its advice as to how to deal with cooperatives 
but still there has not been any significant improvement. 
4. Oromia International Bank Share Company is an investor-owned firm in which the 
cooperatives have invested their money. 
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5. The Federal Cooperative Agency in collaboration with regional agencies has been 
promoting and assisting the formation and strengthening of agricultural cooperatives. 
To further strengthen the process an Agricultural Cooperative College has been 
considered. The government has also planned to introduce certification and rebranding 
of agricultural cooperatives. 
 
D. . Interview with  Addis Ababa City Administration Cooperative Society 
Officers, Addis Ababa 
This interview is made by directly contacting the persons to whom I wanted to talk. That is I my 
self chosen the individuals by taking into account their official position 
Interview with Ato Mulugeta Mengistu, Addis Ababa Trade and Industry Bureau 
Cooperative Promotion and Development Work-Process Main Unit Head, (3 August 2014) 
1. Housing Cooperatives are part of the government housing project. However; land has not 
yet been allotted. Before 2005 Housing Coops would not be registered unless there had 
been a plot of land to be transferred to the registered Coops. But now that has been 
changed and it is enough for the Coop to deposit 50% of estimated construction cost. The 
major purposes of HC are saving of land, creating consumer coops, developing common 
infrastructures. The HC is not expected to construct houses on the land it receives.  Its 
major role is to organize members on matters that is common to all members. 
2. Cooperative Societies are engaging in business activities.  
3. Membership criterion to Consumer Coops, in addition to those criteria indicated in the 
Ethiopian Coops Law, is being a resident of a kebele in which the consumer coops are 
established. Only one coop can be established in one kebele. Although there is 
constitutional right to association the Work-process Main Unit Head has limited such 
rights so the consumer coops would be big enough. The minimum number of members of 
primary consumer coops shall be two hundred.  
4. The government has been making repeated and intense promotion so that a consumer 
coop could register at least fifty percent of the kebele residents as its members. Although 
there is no data that shows the increase of membership of a consumer coops, the coops 
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are doing hard to increase their members and they have been showing remarkable success 
in this regard. The consumer coops are induced by the fact that they can become full 
owners of the kebele property that has been used to supply goods/services to the local 
community.  
5. The government makes sure that coops could not be disguised traders by requiring coops 
to deposit 30% of their profit in a government account. Moreover; members are 
encouraged to use their dividends to buy additional shares so that the capital of the coops 
could be raised.  
6. When coops are dissolved they are expected to return to the government the land that was 
freely assigned to them. All the land freely given to coops are registered by the name of 
Addis Ababa City Administration Trade and Industry Bureau.  
7. The reason why the government is not willing to authorize the establishment of 
Cooperative Banks is because the government is not  willing to loss the deposites that 
Saving and Credit Coops have in government owned banks.  
Tesfaye Wami, ‘Interview with Promoter and Legal Advisor’ (4 August 2014) 
1. The major challenges to cooperative movement in Ethiopia are;  
a) Lack of cooperative policy. This is the primary challenge to cooperative 
movement. The government has given less attention to the cooperatives since 
the government is not willing to see them controlling the market. They are 
controlling the export and import market. They are also controlling large 
number of population as their members. For example in Addis Ababa more 
than 23% of the residents have already become members of the consumer 
cooperatives. 
b)  Legal imposition of maximum shareholding. If the cooperatives are expected 
to move towards business the law should not limit the maximum share capital 
of a member. Such has to be determined by the by-laws. 
c)  Less willingness in the part of the new generation to join cooperative. 
d)  Lack of enthusiasm in the part of the management. This is mainly because 
they carry out their duties gratuitously. 
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2. The government controls cooperatives through inspection, audit and legal service. 
Inspection includes checking the management structure that is the existence of 
necessary management organs as indicated by the Cooperative Law. Inspection 
also includes checking the existence of necessary office organizations such as 
work manuals, by-laws and articles, and auditing and inspection manuals. The 
Inspectors also check the existence of managers and necessary staff members and 
infrastructures. Cooperatives’ relation with government and other higher 
cooperatives is also point of inspection. The inspector would also check whether 
or not the cooperative is keeping proper records such as accounting and minutes, 
working in accordance of the Cooperative Law and the number of meetings held 
in the inspection period. On the basis of his finding the inspector gives comment 
to the management committee or the general manager. He also reports his finds to 
the government. Auditors do the same thing with the inspector but the auditor 
emphasis the financial accounting. In addition to giving comments to the 
management of the cooperative they report any fraud or mismanagement to the 
government. On the basis of the report of the auditor the government may institute 
a court action against those responsible for the fraud or mismanagement. 
3. Government interferes into daily affairs of cooperative very rarely. However; 
until the cooperatives become competitive in the business realm the government 
should continue to support them. The government has to act as a guardian/tutor 
until they become matured enough. This means the government goes out of the 
promotion and development when cooperatives become business organizations 
(investor owned firms). 
4. Most employees of Cooperative Promotion and Development Office of Addis 
Ababa City Administration are members of saving and credit association but only 
few of them are members of consumer cooperatives. 
5. Consumer Cooperatives in Addis Ababa are highly profitable but profit could not 
be distributed until fifty percent of residents in the locality of the consumer 
cooperative become members. 
Birke Melaku and Abinet Melese ‘Interview with Coordinator and Higher Promoter’, 
Arada Sub-City (4 August 2014) 
261 
 
1. There is less willingness in the part of the public to join cooperatives. This is because; 
a) The public believes that membership in a cooperative brings no better benefit 
whatsoever. Since the members of the cooperatives usually reinvest any share in 
the annual surplus on the basis of the decision of the general meeting the public is 
unable to see the actual benefit of cooperatives. Moreover, since the government 
has already ordered the cooperatives to provide their service to non-members and 
even to retail traders the benefit of the cooperatives has remained invisible to the 
public. Hence it has become difficult to convince individuals to join cooperatives. 
b) Lack of awareness in the part of the public despite the effort of the government to 
promote cooperatives. 
c) Profit-motive of cooperators.  Some cooperators believe that they are entitled to 
make unlimited profit from the cooperative’s economic activity. This motive goes 
to the extent of refusing to admit new members under the guise of the by-laws 
and the Cooperative Law that authorize the general meeting to decide on the 
admission of new members. 
2. Major challenges of the cooperative movement are: 
a) Unwillingness of members to attend the annual general meetings. It has been a 
general trend to cancel the annual general meeting due to lack of quorum. As a 
result it has even become difficult to decide on the distribution of dividends. 
b) Government decision to use cooperatives as a channel to distribute basic 
goods/service to the public. This has not enabled cooperatives to function 
according to the principle of mutuality. 
c) The government prohibition of the distribution of annual profit. Consumer 
cooperatives are expected to keep separate book of account for the revenue they 
derive from shops, recreation centers, public schools etc that has been transferred 
to them from kebele administration and no profit would be distributed to 
members until at least fifty percent of the residents of the kebele become 
members. This fact has created a stalemate where the members are unwilling to 
increase membership for fear that the new comers would reduce their share in the 
profit especially the accumulated profit. The government also discourages 
dividend from any source to pay distributed to members. 
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3. Workers’ Cooperatives in Addis Ababa City Administration has been ordered to be 
converted into investor owned firms because they were frequently violating cooperative 
principles. Now the City Administration does not register workers’ Cooperative. 
4. There are cooperatives that have profit maximizing objectives. Even some fiercely argue 
that they are entitled to profit maximization motives. 
5. The government pays office allowance and telephone fees for the management 
committees and the general managers of cooperatives. 
 
 E. Interview with Saving and Credit Cooperative Union Officer, Addis Ababa 
Daniel Legesse, ‘Interview with Addis Ababa Saving and Credit Cooperative Union 
Manager, (3August 2014) 
1. Coops have their own general manager.  
2. The role of union is to provide loan beyond the by-laws of primary coops. Primary coops 
give loan on the basis of saving but unions give loan on the basis of credit worthiness of 
the borrower.  
3. Primary coops could give loan only to their members but unions could give loans to 
member primary coops or individuals members of such primary coops. Unions may also 
extend loans to other non-member coops especially to consumer cooperatives.  
4. The government makes strict control on coops. From the beginning especially in producer 
and consumer coops it is the governments that originates the business idea and then invite 
individuals to buy the idea. The government advocates its business idea through its 
employees. Once the advocacy succeeds the government itself prepares the by-laws and 
makes the volunteers to sign the by-laws. The founders of the coops are not entitled to make 
even a slightest change to the by-laws presented by the government. The government even 
goes to the extent of controlling employment contracts of the coops. There has been annual 
inspection and audit, which go beyond financial accounting. Therefore; coops are under the 
feet of the government from moment of inception to dissolution.   
5. There are no saving and credit coops established by philanthropists except Self-Help Women 
Saving and Credit Coops and Union. All other saving and credits coops have been 
established by employees with in the premises of their employers. These coops could allow 
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only fellow employees as members. Employers provide office facilities free of rent to the 
cooperatives. 
6.  The government has not given any land to saving and credit coop so far but consumer coops 
are going to be given in the near future.  
7. The government is not willing to allow the establishment of Coop Banks since such would 
lead to the removal of large funds from the government owned commercial bank. 
 
F. Interview with Consumer Cooperative Union Officers, Addis Ababa 
 
Fikre Mekuria and Tewodros Taddele, ‘Interview with Board Chairperson and 
General Manager, Mierab Kolfe Consumer Cooperatives Union LtD’,(5 August 2014) 
 
1. The purpose of cooperatives has shown change depending on the state 
economic and political objectives. The Ethiopian imperial regime had an 
economic objective of increasing agricultural output. Hence cooperatives that 
used to receive state assistance were agricultural cooperatives. They were 
intended to be used as a medium of agricultural technology transfer. The 
Swedish government was giving financial support to such state project. 
Although there were consumer cooperatives at the time they did not receive 
state support. The socialist government implemented cooperatives to distribute 
industrial goods to peasants and as a means of collective farming. The 
incumbent government has been using cooperatives as an instrument of price 
stabilization. The government has begun to give emphasis to consumer 
cooperatives since 2007 when the then Prime Minister declared in public 
meeting to use cooperatives as a means to fight inflation. 
2. Ethiopian Cooperatives have already gone out of the truck of true 
cooperatives. This is because the government has appealed to cooperatives to 
get assistance to control inflation. As a result they are not autonomous. They 
are rather government instruments and are strictly controlled and supervised 
by the government. Only Unions are a bit closer to true cooperatives. Primary 
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cooperatives are expected to provide their goods/services to everybody in 
demand. Unions are also expected to sell to retail traders. 
1. Cooperatives are given special privileges. All the transactions of cooperative 
union are free from value added tax. There is no income tax. Lease price free 
land has been given to all consumer cooperative unions in Addis Ababa. 
Consumer Cooperatives are entitled to loan from government with out 
collateral. 
2. There is a hope that once the government puts inflation under control it would 
give consumer cooperatives their autonomy to function in accordance of the 
principles of true cooperatives. 
3. There are ten consumer cooperative unions in Addis Ababa, one at each sub-
city. There is a plan to establish Consumer Cooperative Federation in Addis 
Ababa.. 
4. Consumer cooperative unions distribute their profits annually on the basis of 
60% transaction and 40% share capital. 
5. There are profits maximizing cooperatives which are not willing to be bound 
by cooperative principles. 
6. Cooperatives are now gaining property and to ensure such property against 
risk they need insurance cooperatives. However; the Ethiopian Insurance 
regulation restricts insurance business to share company form. As a result 
cooperatives are forced to establish a micro Insurance company under the 
Commercial Code of Ethiopia that operates outside of the real of cooperative 
principles. Cooperatives have also established Bank in the form of Share 
Company. The cooperatives are establishing such companies not because they 
are profit motivated but because there is no room in the law that allows them 
to establish cooperative bank and cooperative insurance. 
7. The government controls cooperatives. To start with the cooperatives depend 
on the model bylaw prepared by the government. In addition through 
inspection and audit process the government controls sale price, market 
coordination, membership, capital increment, and loss. It also controls that the 
cooperatives are supplying goods to the public without discrimination. 
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G. Interview with Ethiopian Central Statistics  Authority Officer, Addis 
Ababa 
 
Zelalem Hailegiorgis, ‘Interview with Business Statistics Director 
Directorate Director’ (3 August 2014) 
The interview I made with Zelalem was short .I asked him whether there is any data on 
cooperatives in Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency. He said there has not been any data. 
He continued to explain why they do not have such data. He said that the Authority collects 
data on those entities that can have an impact on the national economy either as a GDP 
contributor or monopolized sector. He continued and said that the role of cooperatives in 
this respect has not yet felt by the economy. 
